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The Goals of This Book: The Role of  
Philosophy in AI Research
This is a book about some aspects of the philosophical founda-tions of Artificial Intelligence. Philosophy is relevant to 
many aspects of AI and we don’t mean to cover all of them.1 Our 
focus is on one relatively underexplored question: Can 
 philosophical the or ies of meaning, language, and content help 
us understand, explain, and maybe also improve AI systems? 
Our answer is ‘Yes’. To show this, we first articulate some pressing 
issues about how to interpret and explain the outputs we get 
1 Thus we are not going to talk about the consequences that the new wave in AI 
might have for the empiricism/rationalism debate (see Buckner 2018), nor are we 
going to consider—much—the question of whether it is reasonable to say that 
what these programs do is ‘learning’ in anything like the sense with which we are 
familiar (Buckner 2019, 4.2), and we’ll pass over interesting questions about what 
we can learn about philosophy of mind from deep learning (López- Rubio 2018). 
We are not going to talk about the clearly very important ethical issues involved, 
either the recondite ones, science- fictional ones (such as the paperclip maximizer 
and Roko’s Basilisk (see e.g. Bostrom  2014 for some of these issues)), or the 
more down- to- earth issues about, for example, self- driving cars (Nyholm and 
Smids 2016, Lin et al. 2017), or racist and sexist bias in AI resulting from racist 
and sexist data sets (Zou and Schiebinger 2018). We also won’t consider political 
consequences and implications for policy making (Floridi et al. 2018).
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from advanced AI systems. We then use philosophical theories to 
answer questions like the above.
An Illustration: Lucie’s Mortgage Application is Rejected
Here is a brief story to illustrate how we use certain forms of arti-
ficial intelligence and how those uses raise pressing philosophical 
questions:
Lucie needs a mortgage to buy a new house. She logs onto her 
bank’s webpage, fills in a great deal of information about herself 
and her financial history, and also provides account names and 
passwords for all of her social media accounts. She submits this to 
the bank. In so doing, she gives the bank permission to access her 
credit score. Within a few minutes, she gets a message from her 
bank saying that her application has been declined. It has been 
declined because Lucie’s credit score is too low; it’s 550, which is 
considered very poor. No human beings were directly involved in 
this decision. The calculation of Lucie’s credit score was done by a 
very sophisticated form of artificial intelligence, called SmartCredit. 
A natural way to put it is that this AI system says that Lucie has a low 
credit score and on that basis, another part of the AI system decides 
that Lucie should not get a mortgage.
It’s natural for Lucie to wonder where this number 550 came from. 
This is Lucie’s first question:
Lucie’s First Question. What does the output ‘550’ that has 
been assigned to me mean?
The bank has a ready answer to that question: the number 550 is a 
credit score, which represents how credit- worthy Lucie is. (Not 
very, unfortunately.) But being told this doesn’t satisfy Lucie’s 
in t roduc t ion
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unease. On reflection, what she really wants to know is why the 
output means that. This is Lucie’s second question:
Lucie’s Second Question: Why is the ‘550’ that the  computer 
displays on the screen an assessment of my credit-worthiness? 
What makes it mean that?
It’s then natural for Lucie to suspect that answering this question 
requires understanding how SmartCredit works. What’s going on 
under the hood that led to the number 550 being assigned to 
Lucie? The full story gets rather technical, but the central details 
can be set out briefly:
Simple Sketch of How a Neural Network Works2
SmartCredit didn’t begin life as a credit scoring program. Rather, it 
started life as a general neural network. Its building blocks are small 
‘neuron’ programs. Each neuron is designed to take a list of input 
data points and apply some mathematical function to that list to 
produce a new output list. Different neurons can apply different 
functions, and even a single neuron can change, over time, which 
function it applies.
The neurons are then arranged into a network. That means that 
various neurons are interconnected, so that the output of one 
 neuron provides part of the input to another neuron. In particular, 
the neurons are arranged into layers. There is a top layer of 
 neurons—none of these neurons are connected to each other, and 
all of them are designed to receive input from some outside data 
source. Then there is a second layer. Neurons on the top layer are 
connected to neurons on the second layer, so that top layer neurons 
2 For a gentle and quick introduction to the computer science behind basic 
neural networks, see Rashid 2016. A relatively demanding article- length intro-
duction is LeCun et al. 2015, and a canonical textbook that doesn’t shirk detail 
and is freely available online is Goodfellow et al. 2016.
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provide inputs to second layer neurons. Each top layer neuron is 
connected to every second layer neuron, but the connections also 
have variable weight. Suppose the top layer neurons T1 and T2 are 
connected to second layer neurons S1 and S2, but that the T1- to- S1 
connection and the T2- to- S2 connections are weighted heavily 
while the T1- to- S2 connection and the T2- to- S1 connections are 
weighted lightly. Then the input to S1 will be a mixture of the T1 and 
T2 outputs with the T1 output dominating, while the input to S2 
will be a mixture of the T1 and T2 outputs with the T2 output dom-
inating. And just as the mathematical function applied by a given 
neuron can change, so can the weighting of connections between 
neurons.
After the second layer there is a third layer, and then a fourth, and 
so on. Eventually there is a bottom layer, the output of which is the 
final output of SmartCredit. The bottom layer of neurons is 
designed so that that final output is always some number between 
1 and 1000.
The bank offers to show Lucie a diagram of the SmartCredit neur al 
network. It’s a complicated diagram—there are 10 levels, each con-
taining 128 neurons. That means there are about 150,000 connec-
tions between neurons, each one labelled with some weight. 
And  each neuron is marked with its particular mathematical 
 transformation function, represented by a list of thousands of 
 coefficients determining a particular linear transformation on a 
 thousands- of- dimensions vector.
Lucie finds all of this rather unilluminating. She wonders what 
any of these complicated mathematical calculations has to do 
with why she can’t get a loan for a new house. The bank 
 continues explaining. So far, Lucie is told, none of this 
 information about the neural network structure of SmartCredit 
explains why it’s evaluating Lucie’s creditworthiness. To learn 
about that, we need to consider the neural network’s training 
history.
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A bit more about how SmartCredit was created
Once the initial neural network was programmed, designers 
started training it. They trained it by giving it inputs of the sort that 
Lucie has also helpfully provided. Inputs were thus very long lists of 
data including demographic information (age, sex, race, residential 
location, and so on), financial information (bank account balances, 
annual income, stock holdings, income tax report contents, and so 
on), and an enormous body of social media data (posts liked, groups 
belonged to, Twitter accounts followed, and so on). In the end, all of 
this data is just represented as a long list of numbers. These inputs 
are given to the initial neural network, and some final output is pro-
duced. The programmers then evaluate that output, and give the 
program a score based on how acceptable its output was that meas-
ures the program’s error score. If the output was a good output, the 
score is a low score; if the output was bad, the score is a high score. 
The program then responds to the score by trying to redesign its 
neural network to produce a lower score for the same input. There 
are a number of complicated mathematical methods that can be 
used to do the redesigning, but they all come down to making small 
changes in weighting and checking to see whether those small 
changes would have made the score lower or higher. Typically, this 
then means that a bunch of differential equations need to be solved. 
With the necessary computations done, the program adjusts its 
weights, and then it’s ready for the next round of training.
Lucie, of course, is curious about where this scoring method came 
from—how do the programmers decide whether SmartCredit has 
done a good job in assigning a final output to input data?
The Scoring Method
The bank explains that the programmers started with a database of 
millions of old credit cases. Each case was a full demographic, 
financial, and social media history of a particular person, as well as 
a credit score that an old- fashioned human credit assessor had 
assigned to that person. SmartCredit was then trained on that data 
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set—over and over it was given inputs (case histories) from the 
data set, and its neural network output was scored against the ori-
gin al credit assessment. And over and over SmartCredit reweighted 
its own neural network trying to get its outputs more and more in 
line with the original credit assessments.
That’s why, the bank explains, SmartCredit has the particular col-
lections of weights and functions that it does in its neural network. 
With a different training set, the same underlying program could 
have developed different weights and ended up as a program for 
evaluating political affiliation, or for determining people’s  favourite 
movies, or just about anything that might reasonably be extracted 
from the mess of input social media data.
Lucie, though, finds all of this a bit too abstract to be very helpful. 
What she wants to know is why she, in particular, was assigned a 
score of 550, in particular. None of this information about the 
neural architecture or the training history of SmartCredit seems 
to answer that question.
How all this applies to Lucie
Wanting to be helpful, the bank offers to let Lucie watch the com-
putational details of SmartCredit’s assessment of Lucie’s case. First 
they show Lucie what the input data for her case looks like. It’s a list 
of about 100,000 integers. The bank can tell Lucie a bit about the 
meaning of that list—they explain that one number represents the 
number of Twitter followers she has, and another number repre-
sents the number of times she has ‘liked’ commercial postings on 
Facebook, and so on.
Then they show Lucie how that initial data is processed by 
SmartCredit. Here things become more obscure. Lucie can watch 
the computations filter their way down the neural network. Each 
neuron receives an input list and produces an output list, and those 
output lists are combined using network weightings to produce 
inputs for subsequent neurons. Eventually, sure enough, the num-
ber ‘550’ drops out of the bottom layer.
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But Lucie feels rather unilluminated by that cascading sequence of 
numbers. She points to one neuron in the middle of the network 
and to the first number (13,483) in the output sequence of that 
 neuron. What, she asks, does that particular number mean? What 
is it saying about Lucie’s credit worthiness? This is Lucie’s third 
question:
Lucie’s Third Question: How is the final meaningful state of 
SmartCredit (the output ‘550’, meaning that Lucie’s credit score 
is 550) the result of other meaningful considerations that 
SmartCredit is taking into account?
The bank initially insists that that question doesn’t really have an 
answer. That particular neuron’s output doesn’t by itself mean 
anything—it’s just part of a big computational procedure that 
holistically yields an assessment of Lucie’s credit worthiness. No 
particular point in the network can be said to mean anything in 
particular—it’s the network as a whole that’s telling the bank 
something.
Lucie is understandably somewhat sceptical at this point. How, 
she wonders, can a bunch of mathematical transformations, none 
of which in particular can be tied to any meaningful assessment of 
her credit- worthiness, somehow all add up to saying something 
about whether she should get a loan? So she tries a different 
approach. Maybe looking at the low- level computational details 
of SmartCredit isn’t going to be illuminating, but perhaps she can 
at least be told what it was in her history that SmartCredit found 
objectionable. Was it her low annual income that was re spon-
sible? Was it those late credit card payments in her early twenties? 
Or was it the fact that she follows a number of fans of French film 
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on Twitter? Lucie here is trying her third question again—she is 
still looking for other meaningful states of SmartCredit that 
explain its final meaningful output, but no longer insisting that 
those meaningful states be tied to specific low- level neuron 
 conditions of the program.
Unfortunately, the bank doesn’t have much helpful to say about 
this, either. It’s easy enough to spot particular variables in the ini-
tial data set—the bank can show her where in the input her annual 
income is, and where her credit card payment history is, and 
where her Twitter follows are. But they don’t have much to say 
about how SmartCredit then assesses these different factors. All 
they can do is point again to the cascading sequence of calcula-
tions—there are the initial numbers, and then there are millions 
upon millions of mathematical operations on those initial num-
bers, eventually dropping out a final output number. The bank 
explains that that huge sequence of mathematical operations is 
just too long and complicated to be humanly understood—there’s 
just no point in trying to follow the details of what’s going on. No 
one could hold all of those numbers in their head, and even if they 
could, it’s not clear that doing so would lead to any real insight 
into what features of the case led to the final credit score.
Abstraction: The Relevant Features of the Systems 
We Will be Concerned with in This Book
Our concern is not with any particular algorithm or AI systems. It 
is also not with any particular way of creating a neural network. 
These will change over time and the cutting edge of programming 
today will seem dated in just a year or two. To identify what we 
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will be concerned with, we must first distinguish two levels at 
which an AI system can be characterized:
• On the one hand, it is an abstract mathematical structure. 
As such it exists outside space and time (it is not located 
anywhere, has no weight, and doesn’t start existing at any 
particular point in time).
• However, when humans use and engage with AI, they have 
to engage with something that exists as a physical object, 
something they can see or hear or feel. This will be the 
physical implementation (or realization) of the 
abstract structure. When Lucie’s application was rejected, 
the rejection was presented to her as a token of numbers 
and letters on a computer screen. These were physical 
phenomena, generated by silicon chips, various kinds of 
wires, and other physical things (many of them in different 
locations around the world).
This book is not about a particular set of silicon chips and wires. It 
is also not about any particular program construed as an abstract 
object. So we owe you an account of what the book is about. Here 
is a partial characterization of what we have in mind when we talk 
about ‘the outputs of AI systems’ in what follows:3
•  The output (e.g. the token of ‘550’ that occurs on a particular 
screen) is produced by things that are not human. The non- human 
status of the producer can matter in at least three ways:
First, these programs don’t have the same kind of physical imple-
mentation as our brains do. They may use ‘neurons’, but their 
3 This is not an effort to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for being 
an AI system—that’s not a project we think is productive or achievable.
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 neurons are not the same kind of things as our neurons—they 
differ of course physically (being non- biological), but also compu-
tationally (they don’t process inputs and produce outputs in the 
same way as our neurons). And their neurons are massively differ-
ent in number and arrangement from our neurons, and massively 
different in the way they dynamically respond to feedback.
Second, these programs don’t have the same abilities as we do. We 
have emotional repertoires and sensory experiences they lack, and 
arguably have beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears that they also lack. 
On the other hand, they have computational speeds and ac cur acies 
that we lack.
Third, these programs don’t have the same histories that we do. 
They haven’t had the kind of childhoods we have had, and in par-
ticular haven’t undergone the same experiences of language acqui-
sition and learning that we have. In short, they are non- human 
(where we will leave the precise characterization of this somewhat 
vague and open- ended).
•  When we look under the hood—as Lucie did in the story above—
what we find is not intelligible to us. It’s a black box. It will oper-
ate in ways that are too complex for us to understand. It’s 
important to highlight right away that this particular feature 
doesn’t distinguish it from humans: when you look under the 
hood of a human, what you will find is brain tissue—and at a 
higher level, what looks like an immensely complex neutral net-
work. In that sense, the human mind is also a black box, but as 
we pointed out above, the physical material under the hood/
skull is radically different.
•  The systems we are concerned with are made by human pro-
grammers with their own beliefs and plans. As Lucie saw, under-
standing SmartCredit requires looking beyond the program 
itself to the way that the program was trained. But the training 
was done by people, who selected an initial range of data, 
assigned target scores to those initial training cases based on 
their own plans for what the program should track, and created 
specific dynamic methods for the program to adjust its neural 
network in the face of training feedback.
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•  The systems we are concerned with are systems that are intended 
to play a specific role, and are perceived as playing that role. 
SmartCredit isn’t just some ‘found artefact’ that’s a mysterious 
black box for transforming some numbers into other numbers. 
It’s a program that occupies a specific social role: it was designed 
specifically to assign credit scores, and it’s used by banks because 
it’s perceived as assigning credit scores. It’s treated as useful, as 
producing outputs that really are meaningful and helpful credit 
scores, and it becomes entrenched in the social role it occupies 
because it’s perceived as useful in that way.
None of this adds up to a complete metaphysics of AI systems. 
That’s not the aim of this book. Instead, we hope it puts readers in 
a position to identify at least a large range of core cases.
The Ubiquity of AI Decision- Making
SmartCredit raises concerns about what its outputs mean. 
But SmartCredit is only the tip of the iceberg. We are increasingly 
 surrounded by AI systems that use neural network machine 
learning methods to perform various sorts of classifications. 
Image recognition software classifies faces for security purposes, 
tags photographs on social media, performs handwriting analysis, 
guides military drones to their targets, and identifies obstacles and 
street signs for self- driving cars. But AI systems of this sort aren’t 
limited to simple classification tasks. The same underlying neural 
network programming methods give rise, for example, to stra-
tegic game- playing. Google’s AlphaZero has famously achieved 
superhuman levels of performance in chess, Go, and Shogi. Other 
machine learning approaches have been applied to a wide variety 
of games, including video games such as Pac- Man, Doom, and 
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Minecraft.4 Other AI systems perform variants of the kind of 
‘expert system’ recommendation as SmartCredit. Already there 
are AI systems that attempt to categorize skin lesions as cancer-
ous or not, separate spam emails and malware from useful 
emails, determine whether building permits should be granted 
and whether prisoners should receive parole, figure out whether 
children are being naughty or nice using video surveillance, and 
work out people’s sexual orientations from photographs of their 
faces. Other AI systems use machine learning to make predictions. 
For example, product recommendation software attempts to 
ex trapo late from earlier purchases to likely future purchases, and 
traffic software attempts to predict future locations of congestion 
based on earlier traffic conditions. Machine learning can also 
be  used for data mining, in which large quantities of data are 
analysed to try to find new and unexpected patterns. For example, 
the data mining program Word2Vec extracted from a database of 
old scientific papers new and unexpected scientific conclusions 
about thermoelectric materials.
These AI systems are able to perform certain tasks at extra or-
din ar ily high levels of precision and accuracy—identifying cer-
tain patterns much more reliably, and on the basis of much noisier 
input, than we can, and making certain kinds of strategic deci-
sions with much higher accuracy than we can—and both their 
sophistication and their number are rapidly increasing. We should 
expect that in the future many of our interactions with the world 
will be mediated by AI systems, and many of our current intellec-
tual activities will be replaced or augmented by AI systems.
4 See https://www.sciencenews.org/article/ai- learns- playing- video- games- 
starcraft- minecraft for some discussion about the state and importance of AI in 
gaming.
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Given all that, it would be nice to know what these AI systems 
mean. That means we want to know two things. First, we want to 
know what the AI systems mean with their explicit outputs. When 
the legal software displays the word ‘guilty’, does it really mean 
that the defendant is guilty? Is guilt really what the software 
is tracking? Second, we want to know what contentful states the 
AI  systems have that aren’t being explicitly revealed. When 
AlphaZero makes a chess move, is it making it for reasons that we 
can understand? When SmartCredit gives Lucie a credit score of 
550, is it weighing certain factors and not others?
If we can’t assign contents to AI systems, and we can’t know 
what they mean, then we can’t in some important sense under-
stand our interactions with them. If Lucie is denied a loan by 
SmartCredit, she wants to understand why SmartCredit denied 
the loan. That matters to Lucie, both practically (she’d like to 
know what she needs to change to have a better chance at a loan 
next time) and morally (understanding why helps Lucie not view 
her treatment as capricious). And it matters to the bank and to us. 
If we can’t tell why SmartCredit is making the decisions that it is, 
then we will find it much harder to figure out when and why 
SmartCredit is making its occasional errors.
As AI systems take on a larger and larger role in our lives, these 
considerations of understanding become increasingly important. 
We don’t want to live in a world in which we are imprisoned for 
reasons we can’t understand, subject to invasive medical condi-
tions for reasons we can’t understand, told whom to marry and 
when to have children for reasons we can’t understand. The use of 
AI systems in scientific and intellectual research won’t be very 
productive if it can only give us results without explanations 
(a neural network that assures us that the ABC conjecture is true 
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without being able to tell us why it is true isn’t much use). And things 
are even worse if such programs start announcing scientific results 
using categories that we’re not sure we know the content of.
We are in danger, then, of finding ourselves living in an increas-
ingly meaningless world. And as we’ve seen, it’s a pressing danger, 
because if there is meaning to be found in the states and activities 
of these AI systems, it’s not easily found by looking under 
the hood and considering their programming. Looking under the 
hood, all we see is jumbles of neurons passing around jumbles of 
numbers.
But at the same time, there’s reason for optimism. After all, if 
you look under our hoods, you also see jumbles of neurons, this 
time passing around jumbles of electrical impulses. That hasn’t 
gotten in the way of our producing meaningful outputs and hav-
ing meaningful internal states. The hope then is that reflecting on 
how we manage to achieve meaning might help us understand 
how AI systems also achieve meaning.
However, we also want to emphasize that it’s a guarded hope. 
Neural network programs are a little like us, but only a little. They 
are also very different in ways that will come out in our subse-
quent discussion. Both philosophy and science fiction have had 
an eye from time to time on the problem of communicating with 
and understanding aliens, but the aliens considered have never 
really been all that alien. In science fiction, we get the alien lan-
guage in Star Trek’s Darmok,5 which turns out to be basically 
English with more of a literary flourish, the heptapod language of 
‘Story of Your Life’,6 which uses a two- dimensional syntax to 
5 See Star Trek: The Next Generation, season 5 episode 2.
6 In Chiang, Stories of Your Life And Others, Tor Books, 2002. The book was the 
inspiration for the film Arrival.
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present in a mildly encoded way what look like familiar contents, 
and the Quintans of Stanislaw Lem’s 1986 novel Fiasco, who are 
profoundly culturally incomprehensible but whose occasional 
linguistic utterances have straightforward contents. In philoso-
phy, consideration of alien languages either starts with the 
assumptions that the aliens share with us a basic cognitive archi-
tecture of beliefs, desires, reasons, and actions, or (as Davidson 
does) concludes that if the aliens aren’t that much like us, then 
whatever they do simply can’t count as a language.
Our point is that the aliens are already among us, and they’re 
much more alien than our idle contemplation of aliens would 
have led us to suspect. Not only that, but they are weirdly alien—we 
have built our own aliens, so they are simultaneously alien and 
familiar. That’s an exciting philosophical opportunity—our 
understanding of philosophical concepts becomes deeper and 
richer by confronting cases that take us outside our familiar terri-
tory. We want simultaneously to explore the prospect of taking 
what we already know about how familiar creatures like us come 
to have content and using that knowledge to make progress in 
understanding how AI systems have content, and also see what 
the prospects are for learning how the notions of meaning and 
content might need to be broadened and expanded to deal with 
these new cases.
The Central Questions of this Book
Philosophy can help us understand many aspects of AI. There are 
salient moral questions such as whether we should let AI play 
these important social roles. What are the moral and social 
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consequences of letting AI systems make important decisions 
that throughout our history have been made by humans who 
could be held accountable? There are also pressing questions 
about whether advanced AI systems could eventually make 
humans superfluous—this is sometimes discussed under the label 
‘existential risk’ of AI (see Bostrom  2014). None of these is the 
topic of this book.
The questions we will be concerned with have to do with how 
we can interpret and understand the outputs of AI systems. 
They are illustrated by the questions that Lucie asked the bank in 
our little story above. Recall Lucie’s first question:
Lucie’s First Question: What does the output ‘550’ that has 
been assigned to me mean?
Lucie’s first question is a question about how to understand a spe-
cific output of a specific program. We’re not going to try to answer 
Lucie’s question, or even to give particular tools for answering this 
kind of question. But we are interested in the meta- question about 
whether Lucie’s question is a reasonable and important one. 
We’ve already observed that AI systems are frequently used as if 
questions like Lucie’s made sense and had good answers—we 
treat these systems as if they are giving us specific information 
about the world. It’s thus important to consider whether there is a 
sensible way to think about these programs on which questions 
like Lucie’s first question could eventually be answered.
This perspective leads to Lucie’s second question:
Lucie’s Second Question: Why is the ‘550’ that the  computer 
displays on the screen an assessment of my credit-worthiness? 
What makes it mean that?
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Our central interest in this book starts with examining what kinds 
of answers this question could have. If the output states of AI sys-
tems do mean something, then surely there must be some reason 
they mean what they do. If we could at least figure out what those 
reasons are, we might be better positioned down the road to 
answering Lucie’s first question.
The bank tried one particular method of answering Lucie’s 
second question: they directed Lucie to the details of SmartCredit’s 
programming. As we saw, this method wasn’t obviously 
 successful—learning all the low- level neural network details of 
SmartCredit’s programming didn’t seem to give a lot of insight 
into why its outputs meant something about Lucie’s credit 
worthi ness.
But that was just one method. Our central project is to 
emphasize that there are many other methods that are worth 
considering. One way to think about the project is to remem-
ber  that humans, too, are content- bearing. Our outputs, like 
SmartCredit’s outputs, at least prima facie, mean things and carry 
information about the world. But looking inside our skulls for 
an explanation of those contents isn’t likely to be much more illu-
minating than looking inside SmartCredit’s programming code 
was. We emphasized above that programs like SmartCredit are 
different from people in many important ways, and that’s worth 
keeping in mind (and will guide much of our discussion below). 
But at the same time, both we and machine- learning programs 
like SmartCredit are systems producing outputs based on some 
enormously complicated and not obviously illuminating underlying 
computational procedure.
That fact about us, though, hasn’t stopped us from assigning 
contents to people’s outputs, and it hasn’t stopped us from 
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entertaining theories about why people’s outputs mean what 
they do. It’s just forced us to consider factors other than neuro-
computational implementation in answering that ‘why’ question. 
Theories about why human outputs mean what they do have 
appealed to mental states, to causal connections with the environ-
ment, to normative considerations of coherence and charity, to 
biological teleology, and to relations of social embedding. One of 
our central projects is then to see whether these kinds of theories 
can be helpfully deployed in answering Lucie’s second question, 
and how such theories might need to be adapted to accommodate 
the differences between people and programs.
Lucie had a third question:
(Lucie’s Third Question): How is the final meaningful state 
of SmartCredit (the output ‘550’ meaning that Lucie’s credit 
score is 550) the result of other meaningful considerations that 
SmartCredit is taking into account?
Eventually we want a good theory of content for AI systems. 
A good theory of content for people needs to do more than just 
assign contents to the things we say—it also needs to assign con-
tents to ‘hidden’ internal states of beliefs and desires, which then 
help make sense of, and perhaps constrain the contents of, the 
things we say. We should be open to the possibility that it’s the 
same for AI systems. SmartCredit ‘says’ some things—it produces 
explicit outputs of the form of the ‘550’ evaluation it outputs for 
Lucie. But in making sense of why SmartCredit’s explicit outputs 
have the meanings that they do, we might want to attribute add-
ition al contentful states to the program—for example, we might 
(as Lucie does) want to be able to attribute to SmartCredit various 
reasons that led it to assign Lucie the credit score that it did.
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On a more abstract level: AI systems produce various outputs, 
and we can always ask what, if anything, makes it the case that an 
AI system has a certain output; and AI systems produce those out-
puts for various reasons, and we can ask whether those reasons 
are contentful reasons (rather than just irreducibly complicated 
mathematical computations), and what, if anything, makes it the 
case that the reasons have the contents that they do.
The underlying facts are not in dispute: ML (machine learning) 
systems are (or consist of) massively complex algorithms that 
generate an enormous neural network with thousands or millions 
of interconnected ‘neurons’. It is also beyond dispute that in many 
cases the overall structure and dynamics of that system is too 
complex for any human to comprehend. A burning question is 
now: when this system produces an output consisting of an 
English sentence like the examples given above, how can that out-
put mean what those English words mean? How can we know 
that it tells us something about what we call creditworthiness?
‘Content? That’s So 1980’
A central aim in this book is to encourage increased interaction 
between two groups. First, AI researchers, who are producing 
machine learning systems of rapidly increasing sophistication, 
systems that look to have the potential to take on or supplement 
many of our ordinary processes of reasoning, deciding, planning, 
and sorting. And second, philosophers, who work in a rich intel-
lectual tradition, which provides tools for thinking about content, 
tools directed both at determining what features of a system make 
it contentful (and in what ways) and at characterizing different 
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kinds of contents with a variety of formal tools. We want to 
encourage that interaction because we think that AI has a content 
problem—we need to be able to attribute contents to AI systems, 
but we’re currently poorly positioned to do so.
A certain view of the history of AI research can make all of 
that  seem like a confused retrograde step. AI researchers tried 
approaches centred around content and representation. That’s 
what the symbolic artificial intelligence program was about, that’s 
what led to endless projects focused on a small block world based 
on clear representational systems. But the wave of contemporary 
successes in AI has been won by moving away from the symbolic 
approaches. Neural network machine learning systems are delib-
erately designed not to start with a representational system—the 
whole goal is to allow data that hasn’t been pre- processed into 
representational chunks to be filtered by neural network systems 
in a way that isn’t mediated by representational rule systems and 
still produce powerful outputs. So if what we’re suggesting in this 
book is a return to symbolic AI, and a move away from the 
machine learning successes, contemporary AI researchers would 
be understandably uninterested. (For an introduction to this sort 
of old- school philosophical theorizing inspired by old- school AI 
theorizing, see Rescorla 2015.)
But that’s not what we are suggesting. Our point, in fact, is that 
philosophy brings to the table a collection of tools designed to 
find content in the wild, rather than building content into the 
architecture. The central problem in the philosophical study of 
content is this: when people go about in the world, encountering 
and interacting with various objects, making various sounds, hav-
ing various things going on inside their heads, a bunch of contents 
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typically result. Some of the sounds they make have contents; 
some of the brain states they are in have content. Philosophical 
accounts of content want to explain what makes that the case: 
what needs to be going on so that some sounds are contentful and 
others are not; what needs to be going on so that some sounds 
mean that it’s raining and other sounds mean that it’s sunny.
People, of course, are the original neural network systems. So 
the philosophical project of content must be compatible with 
application to neural networks. That’s because the philosophical 
project isn’t to build contentful systems by setting them up with 
the right representational tools, but rather to understand the con-
tents that we find ‘in the wild’. Work in philosophy of language 
and formal semantics has indeed produced very sophisticated 
mathematical models of representation. But the philosopher’s 
suggestion isn’t that we should take those models and use them in 
designing good humans. We (philosophers who work on the 
theory of content) are not proposing that babies be pre- fitted with 
Montague semantics, or that axiomatic theories of meaning be 
taught in infancy. We just want to understand the content that 
certain complex systems (like people) carry, whatever the causal 
and historical story about how they came to carry that content.
So even if the history of AI research has made you a representa-
tion/content pessimist, we encourage you to read on. We think 
that intellectual engagement between philosophy and AI research 
has the promise of letting you have your non- content- oriented 
design tools and your post facto content attribution, too. And, we 
want to suggest, that’s a good thing, because content plays crucial 
roles, and AI systems that lie wholly outside the domain of  content 
won’t give us what we want.
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What This Book is Not About: Consciousness 
and Whether ‘Strong AI’ is Possible
There’s an earlier philosophical literature on AI that we want to 
distance ourselves from. In influential work, John Searle (1980) 
distinguished between what he called Strong and Weak AI. Strong 
AI, according to Searle, has as a goal to create thinking agents. The 
aim of that research project is to create machines that really can 
think and have other cognitive states that we humans have. Searle 
contrasted this with the weak AI project according to which the 
aim was to create machines that have the appearance of thinking 
(and understanding and other cognitive states). Searle’s central 
argument against Strong AI was the Chinese Room Argument. 
There’s now a very big literature on the soundness of that argu-
ment (and also on how to best present the argument—for some 
discussion and references, see Cole 2014).
The project of this book will not engage with Searle- style argu-
ments and we are not interested in the Strong vs Weak AI debate.
Our starting point and methodology are different from the lit-
erature in that tradition: Our goal in the first four chapters of Part I 
is to use contemporary theories of semantics and meta- semantics to 
determine whether (and how) ML systems could be interpreted. 
We take some of the leading theories of how language has repre-
sentational properties and see what those theories have to say 
about ML systems. In most cases they are mixed: there’s some 
match with what we are doing and some mismatch—and then we 
suggest fixes. In Chapter Four we suggest that maybe the right atti-
tude to take is that we need to revise our meta-semantics to 
accommodate ML systems. Rather than use anthropocentric 
the or ies of content (i.e. theories of content based on how human 
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language gets content) to determine whether ML systems have 
content, we should revise our theories of content attribution so 
that ML systems can be considered representational (in effect 
revising what representation is, so that ML systems can be 
 accommodated).
This strategy contrasts with the argumentative strategy 
exemplified by Searle’s Chinese Room argument (and the tradition 
arising from that argument): the idea behind that strategy is to 
use reflections on a cluster of thought experiments to settle, once 
and for all, the question of whether machines can understand and 
have a semantics. This book doesn’t engage with and only in dir ect ly 
takes a stand on that form of argument.
Connection to the Explainable AI Movement
In 2018, the European Union introduced what it calls the General 
Data Protection Regulation. This regulation creates a ‘right to 
explanation’ and that right threatens to be incompatible with 
credit scores produced by neural networks (see Kaminski 2019 
Goodman and Flaxman 2017, Adadi and Berrada 2018) because, as 
we pointed out above, many ML systems make decisions and 
re com menda tions without providing any explanation of those 
decisions and recommendations. Without explanations of this 
sort, ML systems are uninterpretable in their reasoning, and may 
even become uninterpretable in their results.
The burgeoning field of explainable AI (XAI) aims to create AI 
systems that are interpretable by us, that produce decisions that 
come with comprehensible explanations, that use concepts that we 
can understand, and that we can talk to in the way that we can 
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engage with other rational thinkers.7 The opacity of ML systems 
especially highlights the need for artificial intelligence to be both 
explicable and interpretable. As Ribero et al. (2016:3–4) put it, ‘if 
hundreds or thousands of features significantly contribute to a 
prediction, it is not reasonable to expect any user to comprehend 
why the prediction was made, even if individual weights can be 
inspected’. But the quest for XAI is hampered both by implemen-
tation difficulties in extracting explanations of ML system behav-
iour and by the more fundamental problem that it is not clear 
what exactly explicability and interpretability are or what kinds of 
tools allow, even in- principle, achievement of interpretability.
Doshi- Velez and Kim (2017) state the goal of interpretability as 
being ‘to explain or present [the outputs of AI systems] in under-
standable terms’ (2017:2) and proceed to point to real problems in 
modelling explanations. What they do not note is that both under-
standing and terms/concepts require at least as much clarification as 
explanation. As they point out, much work in this field relies on 
‘know it when you see it’ conceptions of these core concepts. This 
book aims to show how philosophy can be used to remedy this 
lacuna in the literature.
The core chapters in this book aim to present proposals for 
how we can attribute content to AI systems. We return to the 
implications of this for the explainable AI movement towards 
the end of the book.
7 A recent discussion in philosophy is Páez 2019. Outside of philosophy, some 
recent overviews of the literature are Mueller et al.  2019 and Addadi and 
Berrada 2018. For particular proposals about how to implement XAI, see Ribeiro 
et al. 2016, Doshi- Velez & Kim 2017, and Hendricks et al. 2016. For an approach 
that uses some ideas from philosophy to explain ‘explanation’, see Miller 2018.
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Broad and Narrow Questions  
about Representation
We should note one limitation of our approach: we focus on 
whether the outputs of AI systems are content- bearing. In the 
 little story about Lucie, we ask what the output ‘550’ means. We 
are interested in whether that token can and should be considered 
contentful—in Chapter Three we put this as the question of 
whether there’s aboutness in the AI system. This is closely con-
nected to, but distinct from, a broader issue: Does the AI system 
have the ability to reason? Does it have a richer set of beliefs and 
so a richer set of contents? We can also ask: what is the connection 
between being able to represent the thought that Lucie’s credit 
score is 550, and having a range of other thoughts about Lucie? 
Can a system have the ability to think only one thought, or does 
that ability by necessity come with a broader range of representa-
tional capacities? These are crucial questions that we will return 
to in the final chapter. Prior to that, our goal is somewhat more 
narrow and modest: Can we get the idea of content/representa-
tion/aboutness for AI systems off the ground at all? Are there any 
plausible extensions of existing meta- semantic theories that 
opens the door to this? Our answer is yes. In the light of that posi-
tive answer, the broader questions take prominence: how much 
content should be attributed? What particular content should be 
attributed to a particular AI system? Does SmartCredit under-
stand ‘credit worthiness’, and also ‘credit’ and ‘worthiness’, and 
grasp the relevant compositional rule? Does understanding 
‘credit’ involve an understanding of money, borrowing, history, etc? 
These are questions that become pressing, if the conclusions in 
this book are correct.
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Our Interlocutor: Alfred, The Dismissive Sceptic
A character called Alfred is central to the narrative of this book. 
Alfred, we imagine, is someone whose job it is to make AI sys-
tems. He is very sceptical that philosophers can contribute to his 
work at all. In the next chapter, Alfred is having a conversation 
with a philosopher. Alfred argues that while he thinks talking to 
philosophers is a bit interesting, it is basically useless for him. 
According to Alfred, philosophers have nothing substantive to 
contribute to the development of AI.
Alfred will return at several junctions in this book. In writing 
this book (and thinking through these issues), Alfred has been 
very useful to us—we hope he is also of some interest to readers 
(and especially those potential readers who are entirely uncon-
vinced that AI will profit from an injection of philosophy).
Who is This Book for?
The intended audience for this book are readers interested in 
starting to think how philosophy can help answer important 
questions about interpretable AI. They have some knowledge of 
philosophy, some knowledge of AI, and are interested in how to 
use the former to reflect on the latter.
There are some people who should not buy or read this book:
• If you are looking for a technical book that engages in great 
detail with the formal aspects of neural networks, then this 
book is not for you.
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• If you’re looking for a book that develops in detail a new 
theory about the nature of meaning, then this book is also 
not for you.
• If you’re looking for a complete theory of interpretable AI 
then, unfortunately, you’ve also bought (or borrowed or 
downloaded) the wrong book.
Our goals are modest. We hope the book will help frame some 
important issues that we find surprisingly little literature on. AI 
raises very interesting philosophical questions about in ter pret-
abil ity. This book tries to articulate some of those issues and then 
illustrate how current philosophical theories can be used to 
respond to them. In so doing, it presupposes some knowledge of 
philosophy, but not very much. Our hope is that it can be used 
even by upper- level undergraduate students and graduate stu-
dents not expert in either AI or philosophy of language. We hope 
it will inspire others to explore these issues further. Finally, we 
hope it opens up a door between researchers in AI and the phil-
oso phy of language/metaphysics of content.

2
ALFRED (THE DISMISSIVE 
SCEPTIC)
Philosophers, Go Away!
In the previous chapter, we outlined a range of interesting  philosophical challenges that arise in connection with under-
standing, explaining, and using AI systems. We tried to make the 
case that philosophical insight into the nature of content (and the 
difference between a system having content and simply being evi-
dence of some sort) is centrally important both for understanding 
AI and for deciding how we should integrate it into our lives.
When we first started work on this project, we got in touch with 
people in the AI community. We thought that our work on these 
issues should be informed by people working in the field—those 
who are actually developing ML systems. When we approached 
people, they were friendly enough. We had many helpful conver-
sations that have improved this book. However, it soon became 
clear to us that the people working at the cutting edge of AI (and in 
particular those working for the leading corporations) considered 
us, at best, lunchtime entertainment—a bit like reading an inter-
esting novel. There was a sense that no one really took these 
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever, Oxford University Press (2021). 
© Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192894724.003.0002
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philosophical issues seriously. Here is a caricatured summary of 
the attitude we encountered:
Look, these big- picture concerns just aren’t where the action is. I 
don’t really care whether this program I’m working on is ‘really a 
malignant mole detector’ in any deep or interesting sense. What I 
care about is that I’m able to build a program that plays a certain 
practical role. Right now I can build something that’s pretty decent 
at the role. Of course there’s a long way to go. That’s why I spend 
my time thinking about how adding back propagation, or long 
short term memory, or exploding gradient dampening layers, or 
improved stochastic gradient descent algorithms, will lower cer-
tain kinds of error rates. If you have something actually helpful to 
say about a piece of mathematics that will let me lower error rates, 
or some mathematical observations about specific kinds of fragil-
ity or instability in the algorithms we’re currently using, I’m happy 
to listen. But if not, I’m making things that are gradually working 
better and better, so go away.
We take this dismissive reaction very seriously and much of this 
book is an attempt to reply to it. We are not going to dismiss the 
dismissal. At the end of the book, we have not refuted it. There’s 
something to it, but, we argue, it’s an incomplete picture and we 
outline various ways in which it is unsatisfying.
It’s worth noting that this pragmatic- sceptic’s dismissal of phil-
oso phy has analogues in almost all practical and theoretical 
domains. Practising mathematicians don’t worry much about the 
foundations of their disciplines (they don’t care much about what 
numbers are, for example). Politicians don’t care much about 
the or ies of justice (they don’t spend much of their time reading 
Rawls, Nozick, or Cohen). Those making medical decisions with 
massive moral implications don’t spend much time talking to 
moral philo sophers. And so it goes. There’s a very general 
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question about what kind of impact philosophical reflection can 
have. One way to read this book is as a case study of how 
 philo sophers should reply to that kind of anti- philosophical 
scepticism.
We should, however, note that not all those working in AI share 
Alfred’s dismissive attitude towards increased reflection on the 
foundations of ML systems. In 2017, Google’s Ali Rahimi gave a 
talk where he compared the current state of ML systems to a form 
of alchemy: programmers create systems that work, but they have 
no real, deep, understanding of why they work. They lack a foun-
dational framework. Rahimi said:
There’s a self- congratulatory feeling in the air. We say things like 
‘machine learning is the new electricity.’ I’d like to offer an alterna-
tive metaphor: machine learning has become alchemy.1
It’s become alchemy because the ML systems work, but no one 
really understands why they work the way they do. Rahimi is not 
entirely dismissive of making things that work without an under-
standing of why it works: ‘Alchemists invented metallurgy, ways 
to make medication, dying techniques for textiles, and our mod-
ern glass- making processes.’ Sometimes, however, alchemy went 
wrong:
. . . alchemists also believed they could transmute base metals into 
gold and that leeches were a fine way to cure diseases. To reach the 
sea change in our understanding of the universe that the physics 
and chemistry of the 1700s ushered in, most of the theories al chem-
ists developed had to be abandoned.
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7psGHgatGM.
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More generally, Rahimi worries that when we have ML systems 
that contribute to decision making that’s crucial both to in di vid uals 
and to societies as a whole, a foundational understanding would 
be preferable.2
If you’re building photo sharing services, alchemy is fine. But we’re 
now building systems that govern health care and our participation 
in civil debate. I would like to live in a world whose systems are 
built on rigorous, reliable, verifiable knowledge, and not on 
alchemy.
Many in the AI community dismissed Rahimi’s pleading for a 
deeper understanding. Facebook’s Yann LeCun replied to Rahimi 
saying that the comparison to alchemy was not just insulting, but 
wrong:
Ali complained about the lack of (theoretical) understanding of 
many methods that are currently used in ML, particularly in deep 
learning. Understanding (theoretical or otherwise) is a good 
thing. . . But another important goal is inventing new methods, new 
techniques, and yes, new tricks. In the history of science and tech-
nology, the engineering artifacts have almost always preceded the 
theoretical understanding: the lens and the telescope preceded 
optics theory, the steam engine preceded thermodynamics, the air-
plane preceded flight aerodynamics, radio and data communication 
preceded information theory, the computer preceded computer 
science.3
We will argue that Rahimi is right: the current state of ML systems 
really is a form of alchemy—and not just for the reasons Rahimi 
mentions. The one important reason is that the field lacks an 
2 Note: Rahimi’s worry is not specifically about interpretability, but the same 
point applies.
3 https://www2.isye.gatech.edu/~tzhao80/Yann_Response.pdf.
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understanding of how to describe the content of what it has 
 created (or how to describe what it has created as deprived of 
 content). We are presented with AI as if it is something that can 
talk to us, tell us things, make suggestions, etc. However, the 
people making AI have no theory that justifies that contentful 
presentation of their product. They have given us no rational 
argument for that contentful presentation. They’ve just written 
some algorithms and they have no deeper understanding of what 
those pieces of mathematics really amount to or how they are 
properly translated into human language or affect human 
thoughts. If the view is that these programs have no content at all, 
then that too is a substantive claim that needs justification: What 
is content such that these systems don’t have it?
So: welcome to the world of philosophy. It’s a world where 
there’s very little certainty. There are many alternative models, the 
models disagree, and there’s no clear procedure for choosing 
between them. This is the kind of uncertainty that producers and 
consumers of AI will have to learn to live with. It’s only after a 
refreshing bath in philosophical uncertainty that they will start to 
come to grips with what they have made.
A Dialogue with Alfred (the Dismissive Sceptic)
Alfred: I appreciate the interest you philosophers have in these 
issues. It’s important that a broad range of disciplines reflect on 
the nature of AI. However, my job is to make exactly the kinds of 
AI systems that you talk about in the introduction of this book 
and I don’t get it. I just don’t see that there’s anything you philo-
sophers can tell me about interpretation that will help me do my 
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job. We’ve made all these amazing advances, and we did it without 
you. I’m not doubting that there’s some interesting meta- reflections 
around these issues, but that’s just lunch entertainment for us. It 
makes no real difference to what we do, day to day. Issues about 
the nature of interpretation and the nature of content don’t seem 
pressing to me in my professional life.
So, as a conversation starter, let me try this: philosophical the-
or ies of meaning and language make no difference to what we do. 
For professional purposes, we can ignore them.
Philosopher: I don’t see how you can avoid those issues. What 
do you think is going on with SmartCredit, then? We give the soft-
ware access to Lucie’s social media accounts, and it spits out the 
number 550. But so far, that’s just pixels on a screen. The output of 
the program is useless until we know that 550 means a high risk of 
default. We need to know how to look at a program and figure out 
what its outputs mean. That’s absolutely central to our ability to 
make any use of these programs. We can’t just ignore that issue, 
can we?
Alfred: Of course we say things like, ‘That output of 550 means 
that Lucie is a high risk of default.’ But that’s just loose talk—we 
don’t need to take it seriously. All that’s really going on is this. 
SmartCredit is a very sophisticated tool. It takes in thousands of 
data points and sorts and weighs them using complicated and 
highly trained mathematical algorithms. In the end SmartCredit 
spits out some number or other. That number doesn’t in itself 
mean anything. It’s just a number—just the end product of mil-
lions of calculations. Of course the bank should then take that 
number into account when deciding whether to extend a loan to 
Lucie. But not because the number means that Lucie is a default 
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risk—rather, because the number is the output of a highly reliable 
piece of software.
Philosopher: Wait, I’m not sure I understand what you’re pro-
posing. Just recently I went to the doctor and he used a machine 
learning program called SkinVision to evaluate a mole on my 
back.4 According to him, SkinVision said that the mole was likely 
to be malignant, so he scheduled surgery and removed it. Are you 
telling me that the doctor was wrong and that SkinVision didn’t 
say anything about my mole? I guess then I had surgery for no 
reason. Or what about the case of Eric Loomis? Loomis was found 
guilty of participating in a drive- by shooting, and was sentenced 
to six years in prison in part because, according to the judge, the 
machine learning program COMPAS said that Loomis was a high 
risk to reoffend.5 Are you telling me that the judge was wrong and 
that COMPAS didn’t say anything about Loomis’s recidivist risk? 
If that’s right, surely it was a huge injustice to give Loomis more 
prison time. It looks like we’re treating these programs as if they 
are saying things all over the place, and making many important 
and high- stakes decisions based on what we think they are saying. If 
that’s all wrong, and the programs aren’t really saying anything, 
don’t we need to do some serious rethinking of all of this  technology?
Alfred: I think you’re making a mountain out of a molehill 
here. Again, it’s just loose talk to say that COMPAS says that Loomis 
is high risk or to say that SkinVision says that your mole is probably 
malignant. But that doesn’t mean we’re taking important actions 
for no reason. SkinVision didn’t say that your mole was probably 
4 See https://www.skinvision.com. Alfred: Wait, we can talk in footnotes?
5 https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts- using- ai- sentence- criminals- must- 
stop- now.
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malignant, but your doctor did say that. He said it in a sloppy 
way—he used the words ‘SkinVision says that your mole is prob-
ably malignant’—but we don’t need to take his exact phrasing 
seriously. It’s clearly just his way of telling you (himself) about 
your mole. And there’s no worry about having a mole removed 
because your doctor says that it’s probably malignant, is there? 
The same with COMPAS. COMPAS didn’t say that Loomis was 
high risk—the judge did. Again, he said it in a sloppy way, but we 
all know what’s going on. And there’s nothing wrong with giving 
someone a severe sentence because a judge says that he’s a high 
recidivism risk, is there? That kind of thing happens all the time.
Philosopher: That’s helpful. So the idea is that all the meaning 
and content is in the people saying things in response to the pro-
grams, not in the programs themselves. That’s why we don’t need 
a theory of content for the programs. (Hopefully we can get a 
good theory of content for people—but in any case that’s not a 
special problem for thinking about AI systems.) But I’m still wor-
ried about how this idea is going to be worked out. My doctor 
gives SkinVision a digital photograph of my mole, and it produces 
a printout that says ‘Malignancy chance = 73%’. Then my doctor 
says that my mole is probably malignant. On your view, SkinVision 
didn’t say anything, and its printout didn’t have any content—all 
the saying and all the content is coming from the doctor. But it 
sure seems like quite a coincidence that there’s such a nice match 
between what my doctor really meant and what the words printed 
by SkinVision seemed to me but (on your view) didn’t really mean.
Alfred: Of course it’s not a coincidence at all. The designers of 
SkinVision included a helpful user interface so that doctors would 
know what to say when they got the results of a SkinVision ana-
lysis. There’s nothing essential about that—SkinVision could have 
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been designed so that it just outputs a graph of a function. But 
then doctors would have needed more training in how to use the 
program. It makes sense just to have the programmers add on 
some informative labelling of the outputs on the front end and 
save the doctors all that work.
Philosopher: ‘Informative labelling’—I like that. You can’t 
have informative labelling without information. Doesn’t that then 
require that the outputs of SkinVision do mean something, do 
carry the information that (for example) the mole is probably 
malignant?
Alfred: Good point. OK, what I should have said was not that 
it’s the doctor who’s the one who’s really saying something—rather, 
it’s the programmer who’s really saying something. When SkinVision 
prints out ‘Malignancy chance = 73%’, that’s the programmer 
speaking. She’s the one who is the source of the meaning of those 
words. They mean what they do because of her programming 
actions, not because of anything about the SkinVision program 
itself. SkinVision is then just a kind of in dir ect way for the 
 programmer to say things. That’s a bit weird, I admit, but there are 
lots of other forms of indirect announcement like that. When the 
programmer writes some code which, when run, prints ‘Hello 
World’, it’s the programmer, not the program, who greets the 
world. SkinVision and other AI systems are just more complicated 
versions of the same thing. The doctor then also says that your 
mole is probably malignant, but that’s just the doctor passing on 
what the programmer indirectly said to him.
Philosopher: That’s an interesting idea. But I’m worried that 
it has a strange consequence. Suppose that the programmer of 
SkinVision had been in a perverse mood when programming the 
final user interface, and had set things up so that the mathematical 
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output that in fact leads to SkinVision printing ‘Malignancy 
chance = 73%’ instead caused SkinVision to print ‘Subject is guilty 
of second degree murder’. Would that then mean that SkinVision, 
rather than a piece of medical software, was instead a bit of legal 
software, making announcements about guilt or innocence rather 
than malignant or benign statuses?
Alfred: What? Of course not. Why would you even think that? 
SkinVision’s whole training history shaped that neural network 
into a medical detector, not a legal detector. How would a 
 perverse  programmer implementing perverse output messages 
change that?
Philosopher: Well, doesn’t it follow from what you said? If 
SkinVision itself isn’t really saying anything, and it’s just a tool for 
letting the programmer speak, then if the programmer chooses to 
have it produce the words ‘Suspect is guilty of second degree mur-
der’, what’s said (by the programmer, through the program) is that 
the suspect is guilty of second degree murder. And if the informa-
tion conveyed is legal, rather than medical, then it looks like a 
piece of legal software.
Alfred: Not a very good piece of legal software! The guilt and 
innocence announcements it produces aren’t going to have any-
thing to do with whether the person is really guilty. You can’t tell 
guilt or innocence from a photograph of a mole. And even if you 
could, SkinVision hasn’t been trained to do so.
Philosopher: Agreed, it would be a terrible piece of legal soft-
ware. But my point is just that that’s what it would be, since its 
outputs mean what the programmer wants them to mean. I can 
see that in this case there’s some plausibility to the claim that 
when the perversely programmed SkinVision prints ‘Subject is 
guilty of second- degree murder’, what’s said is that the subject 
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is guilty of second- degree murder. (Whether it’s SkinVision itself 
or the programmer who’s saying this is less clear to me.) But I’m 
worried that that’s a special feature of this example. In this par-
ticular case, the programmer has decided to put the program 
output in the form of words in a pre- existing language. It’s thus 
very tempting to take that output to mean whatever those 
words mean in the language. In the same way, if a monkey 
 banging on a keyboard happens to type out ‘To be or not to be, 
that is the question’, we might feel some inclination to say that 
the monkey has said something. But probably that feeling 
should be resisted, and we should just say that the sentence 
means  something, and that the monkey has accidentally and 
 meaninglessly produced it.
Consider another case. StopSignDetector is another machine 
learning neural net intended to be used in self- driving autono-
mous vehicles. The plan for StopSignDetector was, not surpris-
ingly, to have it be a stop sign detector, processing digital images 
from a car camera to see if there is a stop sign ahead. But 
StopSignDetector doesn’t print out ‘There is a stop sign’, or any-
thing like that. There’s just a little red light attached to the com-
puter that blinks when the program reaches the right output state. 
As I understand your view, the blinking red light doesn’t mean 
anything in itself, but is just a device for the programmer saying 
that there is a stop sign. That’s because, I guess, the programmer 
intends the blinking red light to announce the presence of a stop 
sign. But now add in the perverse programmer. What if the pro-
grammer decides instead that the blinking red light should 
announce the presence of a giraffe—but doesn’t change anything 
in the code of StopSignDetector. Does that mean that we end up 
with a very bad giraffe detector?
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Alfred: I think all of this is getting much more complicated 
than it really needs to be. We speak sloppily as if these programs 
are saying things, producing outputs that somehow represent spe-
cific facts about the world. That’s all just sloppy speech. In many 
cases, that sloppiness can be fixed up by taking us really to be talk-
ing about what the end user (like the doctor or the judge) is saying 
or what the original programmer is saying. But sure, I agree that in 
weird cases when end users or programmers have weird secret 
plans, that’s not a good way to fix up our sloppy talk. But it’s not 
that hard to find a different way, is it?
Think about your standard pocket calculator. You push the but-
tons ‘58 + 67’ on the keyboard, and on the display it shows ‘125’. 
Does that mean that the calculator is saying that 58 plus 67 is 125? 
Surely not—there’s no need for that kind of content talk. Of 
course, someone using the calculator might then say ‘58 + 67 = 125’, 
and thereby mean (as people do) that 58 plus 67 is 125. And it’s 
presumably not an accident that the calculator display looks the 
way it does—the original programmer of the calculator software 
chose that display format because of their plan that the calculator 
be a tool to announce arithmetic facts. But even if we discovered 
that the programmer had strange secret plans and the calculator 
user had strange secret interpretive ideas, it wouldn’t matter. 
That’s because in the end the calculator is just a tool for getting at 
mathematical results. So long as the calculator is working cor-
rectly, who really cares what anyone’s communicative plans are, 
or what the calculator or anyone else is ‘really saying’.
Philosopher: But I’m not sure a calculator is the right com pari-
son for you. The programming of a calculator is a straightforward 
example of symbolic representational programming. If we look 
into the coding details of the calculator, we will indeed be able to 
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find the parts of the program that represent numerical values, and 
that represent the applications of various mathematical op er-
ations to those numerical values. Here, it looks entirely natural to 
me to say that the calculator display really does mean that 58 plus 
67 is 125. None of the special features of (for example) SmartCredit 
that made its contents so obscure seems to be present in this case.
Alfred: OK, fair enough. But I bet I could program up a machine 
learning pocket calculator if I really set my mind to it. I bet you 
haven’t actually checked out the coding of your TI- Nspire—would 
you really change anything in how you used the calculator if you 
discovered that it had a neural network implementation?
Philosopher: Probably not. But that’s because I would think 
that, whether neural network or not, the calculator’s program was 
about mathematical operations. Remember, I’m not a sceptic 
about the role of content in these cases, you are. I’m happy to say 
that we don’t need to worry about obscure communicative plans 
on the part of the programmer or the user, because I’m happy to 
say that the program itself means something. (Of course, I think 
it’s a very hard question why it means something, and I think in 
some cases we might have a lot of trouble figuring out what it 
means.) So what’s your view on this? Don’t you need a view on 
what it means to say that the calculator is a ‘tool for getting at 
mathematical results’? That looks an awful lot like a disguised 
claim about the contents of the calculator claims.
Alfred: That’s got to be too fast. A hammer is a tool for pound-
ing in nails, right? That’s not a claim about the meaning or content 
of a hammer. That’s just an observation about what hammers are 
useful for.
Philosopher: Agreed. But I think this overlooks an important 
distinction. A hammer isn’t an informational tool. When we use a 
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hammer, we’re not trying to learn anything—we’re just trying to 
get something done (get some nails in some wood). It’s not too 
surprising if we don’t need any notion of content to explain that 
kind of tool. But a language is also a tool, isn’t it? And to say that 
kind of tool, we need to talk about contents. That’s because 
 language is an informational communicative tool, a tool that 
we’re using to learn things. So we need to say what sentences 
mean to see what we can learn from them. And SkinVision and 
COMPAS look like tools of the same sort. We’re not trying to do 
something with those tools—all of the doing is by the doctor or the 
court. We’re just trying to get some information out of the tools. 
And if we’re going to get information out, we need a contentful 
inter action with the program.
Alfred: Good, that helps me see what I want to say. In the end, 
the tools I want to make are more like hammers than like lan-
guages. Consider an example. I want to build a self- driving car. I’m 
not trying to make a car that I’ll learn something from—I just 
want a car that will do something for me. I want a car that I can get 
into and that will then take me to the right place. That’s a big pro-
ject, so I’m not trying to do it all at once. Along the way, I produce 
a machine learning image recognition program that will beep 
when there’s a pedestrian in the road. For now, that can be a help-
ful signal to the driver. But eventually, I’ll have that bit of program-
ming integrated into a larger autonomous vehicle program. Once 
that’s all done, all I care about is that the car won’t in fact hit pedes-
trians. Whether the beeps from that one part of the program 
‘mean that there’s a pedestrian in the road’ makes no difference to 
me. Why would I care? I’m not trying to give anyone any informa-
tion with that beeping; I’m just trying to make sure that the car 
doesn’t crash.
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Philosopher: I see the idea, but how does that help with other 
cases? Maybe we don’t need to assign contents to the full 
 self- driving car, but before the pedestrian detector is integrated 
into the full car, while it’s being used to warn human drivers, don’t 
we need its beeps to mean that there’s a pedestrian in the road?
Alfred: I don’t see why. I’m happy to think of the driver in the 
same way that I think of the self- driving car. I’m not interested in 
getting any particular contents to the driver. What I care about is 
that the driver swerves when the program beeps. So long as that 
happens, and the pedestrian isn’t hit, I’m happy.
Philosopher: I see. So you’re just thinking of the programs as 
little causal prods that push people into the right kind of activity. 
SkinVision just needs to cause doctors to perform surgeries; never 
mind what the doctors believe. COMPAS just needs to cause 
judges to issue severe sentences; never mind what judges might 
learn from COMPAS.
Alfred: Right. Sure, probably the best way to get doctors to 
perform surgeries under the right conditions is to get them to 
believe that people need surgeries under those conditions. But 
that’s just an accidental feature of doctors making them different 
from nails. The thing that really matters is just that our program 
causally prompts the right things to happen.
Philosopher: I’m not sure this ‘it’s all just causal prods’ idea is 
going to be as easy to work out as you seem to think. You said you 
just wanted ‘a car that I can get into and that will then take me to 
the right place’. But where did this notion of ‘right place’ come 
from? That requires that the car takes you where you want to go, 
and that then requires that you are able to tell the car where to 
go. But doesn’t that still require a contentful interaction with the 
program? Maybe it’s on the input side rather than the output side, 
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but the issues seem to me to be the same—I need to be able to do 
something to the program that I can count on putting the 
 program into the right state. I need to be confident that when I tell 
the self- driving car to take me to the airport, its subsequent 
driving will be guided by the content of what I told it.
Alfred: I’m tempted to say that the problem you’re pointing out 
is just another artefact of our being only part- way through the 
overall project. I already agreed that for now I want the pedestrian 
detector’s beeps to be understood by human drivers as signalling 
that there is a pedestrian in the road. We’re talking about under-
standing and meaning here because the programming project 
isn’t finished yet, so we can’t just let the car do its own self- driving 
business. But the same is true for the need to give the car direc-
tions. Down the road, the goal should be a car that you don’t need 
to give directions to. The car will figure out how to deal with 
pedestrians in the road; it will also figure out how to deal with a 
passenger in the car. Maybe it will access your calendar and deter-
mine where you ought to be and automatically take you there.
Philosopher: Wait, ‘figure out’? ‘Determine’? ‘Access your cal-
endar’? That all looks like content- based talk.
Alfred: Sure, but it’s all dispensable in the same way. When I 
say that the car will figure out how to deal with pedestrians in the 
road, I just mean it won’t hit pedestrians in the road. When I say 
the car will figure out how to deal with a passenger in the car, I just 
mean that it will take that passenger to a location where the pas-
senger ought to be. And so on.
Philosopher: I’m not sure I like the vision of the AI future 
you’re sketching here. These days when I get in the car and drive 
somewhere, I have plans and reasons for what I’m doing and I per-
form a bunch of deliberate intentional actions in pursuit of my 
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goals. Your self- driving car takes that all away from me. I don’t 
need any plans, or any reasons for going anywhere. I just get in the 
car, and the car takes me somewhere that will work out well for 
me. It feels like a Wall- E future, with all of us passive passengers 
on the Axiom. It’s important to us that we have reasoned 
engagement with the world—aren’t you proposing to shrink that 
 reasoned engagement down to nothing, by embedding us in a net-
work of devices that just causally push us around to where we 
ought to be?
Alfred: Well, as long as you’re really getting where you ought 
to be, is it really that bad? We’re surrounded by lots of systems and 
devices that take care of our needs without our reasoned engage-
ment. When you’re exposed to germs, your immune system just 
takes care of it for you—it causally pushes bits of your body into 
the right places without any intervention by you. Things wouldn’t 
be any better if you had to reason your way through a viral infec-
tion, would they?
Philosopher: Fair enough, although just because something is 
good in some places doesn’t mean it’s good everywhere. But surely 
there’s also a real issue about whether we can count on the 
 self- driving car taking us where we ought to be. What’s our source 
of confidence in that ‘ought’? Either we’re just building into the 
program what the right final goals are (get us where our calendar 
says we ought to be), in which case it looks like we still need con-
tent tracking with the program. Or we’ve got the kind of advanced 
AI that has the ability to reshape the categories it’s been trained to 
track, in which case, if there’s no notion of content of the 
 program’s reshaped categories, I’m not sure why we should be 
confident that what it’s doing is in any sense getting us where we 
ought to be.
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Alfred: Look, all of this is getting extremely speculative. Forget 
about this utopian/dystopian picture in which our AI systems just 
shepherd us through the world. Remember, I’ve already observed 
that you can think of human users now as being like the eventual 
self- driving car. I don’t care whether the car knows that there’s a 
pedestrian in the road and takes that into account. All I care about is 
that when the pedestrian detector beeps, the car changes course. 
And similarly for the human user. I don’t care whether the human 
user knows that there’s a pedestrian in the road and takes that into 
account. All I care about is that when the pedestrian detector beeps, 
the driver changes course. Who cares what the underlying mech-
an ism is by which that happens?
Philosopher: There’s a sense in which I agree with all of that. 
Forget about programs entirely, and just think about people. There’s 
some sense in which all of the content talk we go in for may be 
optional. Maybe we can stop thinking about other people as 
creatures having beliefs and desires and plans with contents and 
making claims with contents, and just think about them as 
 lumbering obstacles to be manipulated and manoeuvred around. 
But surely something is gained by instead thinking about people as 
bearers of content. If we’ve at least reached the point, then, of 
saying that content talk for AI systems is exactly as dispensable as 
content talk for people, I think we’ve got enough to motivate some 
careful thinking about how to make that content talk work out in 
the AI case.
Alfred: Fair enough. Let’s at least see what you’ve got.
part ii
A PROPOSAL FOR 





Aboutness, Representation, and Metasemantics
We didn’t refute Alfred’s content- scepticism, but at least we got him to agree to explore strategies for attributing 
content to AI. That’s the goal of the rest of this book. As we 
pointed out to Alfred, the most salient prima facie argument for 
doing that is that AI is presented to us, by its producers, as 
 having content. AI systems are presented as saying things, 
as  making   suggestions, and sometimes making decisions. We, the 
human users, typically treat them as conversation partners and 
as sources of information (contentful information, that is).
There should be no disagreement about the fact AI systems are 
often (and arguably typically) presented to end- users in this way. 
There are indefinitely many illustrations of this from academic 
work to advertisements. Here’s a tiny collection of the kinds 
of  claims we have in mind (all emphasis ours). From academic 
papers:
SmartBot can fall into false or impossible beliefs. For example, 
SmartBot can believe one of its cards has no valid value as all pos-
sible cards are inconsistent with the observed play according to 
SmartBot’s convention. (Bard et al 2019)1
1 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.00506v1.pdf.
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever, Oxford University Press (2021). 
© Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192894724.003.0003
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Robots must know how to be gentle when they need to interact with 
fragile objects, or when the robot itself is prone to wear and tear.
(Huang et al. 2019)
For a given set of desired performance measures, i.e. cycle time, 
work- in progress, and utilisation of three different testers, the 
neur al network suggests a suitable design of scheduling rules, and 
the number of each type of tester needed to achieve management’s 
goal. (Alam et al. 2004)
It is W [weights linking nodes] that constitutes what the network 
knows and determines how it will respond to any arbitrary input 
from the environment. (Tam 1991)
From more technical computer science blogs:
Neural networks are a set of algorithms, modeled loosely after the 
human brain, that are designed to recognize patterns. They interpret 
sensory data through a kind of machine perception, labeling or 
clustering raw input. The patterns they recognize are numerical, 
contained in vectors, into which all real- world data, be it images, 
sound, text or time series, must be translated…
A neural network is a corrective feedback loop, rewarding weights 
that support its correct guesses, and punishing weights that lead it 
to err. (Nicholson, skymind.ai)2
From a more or less general interest computer science blog:
DeepXmas: AI knows if you are naughty or nice…
This AI home security system can use deep- learning and figure out 
when kids are making messes, or doing things that need action. 
This type of technology could save a life in the future (e.g. kid chok-
ing on a blind cord). (“We don’t want the AI to just become a person 
or kid detector, we want it to understand naughtiness.”)3
2 https://skymind.ai/wiki/neural- network.
3 https://towardsdatascience.com/deepxmas- ai- knows- if- you- are- naughty- 
or- nice- 2bd00b2ad3d2?gi=f35896d7ff04.
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Loose Talk, Hyperbole, or ‘Derived Intentionality’?
Recall from the previous chapter that Alfred dismissed all of this 
as loose talk or hyperbole. He thinks it is useful, but fundamentally 
misleading jargon. Maybe it is not just misleading, but also false. 
According to the sceptic, AI can’t, literally speaking, perform 
speech acts, nor can AI think, believe, or have any of the mental 
states that we humans have. The sceptic says we find it natural to 
say things like:
The calculator says that 87x9= 783,
but calculators don’t really say anything. Our theory of what it 
is  to perform the speech act of saying need not account for 
calculator- speech. That ordinary speech is filled with false 
 anthropocentric descriptions of calculators shouldn’t mislead 
philosophers. The same goes for talk about the kinds of advanced 
AI we focus on in this book.
It is very important to emphasize that we don’t take ourselves 
to have refuted that kind of view. Our goal is a more modest one: 
as a counterbalance to that dismissive view, we will consider some 
first steps towards making (some) content attributions true. The 
best way to work out an alternative to the no- content view is actu-
ally to try to work out some of the details of an alternative.
Here is a reason for being a bit interested in our effort. Start by 
asking why we take content talk more seriously for people than 
we do for calculators. It’s because people act in lots of complicated 
ways that the content attributions help make sense of, while the 
calculator doesn’t really have complex actions (a purely physical 
account of what’s going on with circuits in the calculator lets us 
understand what we want to understand). But the AI systems that 
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we are considering also act in very complicated ways that aren’t 
illuminated by looking at what’s going on with the microstruc-
ture. It is particularly interesting that their complicated forms 
of behaviour aren’t the same as the human complicated forms of 
behaviour. This is what we need to engage in: what we below will 
call anthropocentric abstraction.
None of this amounts to a conclusive proof that certain forms 
of AI can perform certain forms of speech acts. However, note 
that if, after reading this book, you end up finding our efforts 
unconvincing, you’ll do so because you have philosophical 
arguments against what we say. You have in effect used theories 
about the metaphysics and methodology of content attribution 
to help you understand AI and our interactions with AI. That’s 
support for one of our central messages: there should be more 
interaction between theories about the metaphysics of content 
and theories of AI.
Aboutness and Representation
Compare two things. On the one hand, a sock—say, the left sock 
worn by Alan Turing when he started writing his famous paper on 
computability—and on the other, this sentence:
(1) The Eiffel Tower is in Paris
The sock is not about anything. It just exists. It can be worn, 
washed, and mended, but it doesn’t represent anything. The sen-
tence ‘The Eiffel Tower is in Paris’, on the other hand, is about 
something—it exhibits what philosophers imaginatively call 
‘aboutness’. English speakers have an easy time identifying what it 
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 04/03/21, SPi
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is about: most obviously, it is about Paris and the Eiffel Tower. It’s 
about those two objects because ‘Paris’ is the name of Paris and 
‘the Eiffel Tower’ is the name of the Eiffel Tower. However, it is not 
just about those two objects. It is also about the latter being located 
in the former. On one view, for example, there’s something called 
a fact or a situation, that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, that the sentence 
represents.4
A striking fact about (1) is that by virtue of its representational 
properties, it is the kind of thing that can be true or false.5 If the 
Eiffel Tower is in Paris, then (1) is true. If the Eiffel Tower is not in 
Paris, then (1) is false. As it happens, it has the property of being 
true. Another way to put this: (1) represents the world as being a 
certain way. If the world is that way, then (1) is true. If the world is 
not that way, then (1) is false. The world is that way, so it is true. 
The sock, on the other hand, cannot be true or false. It doesn’t 
represent the world as being any way at all.
The phenomenon of aboutness is so familiar to us (and so cen-
tral to our lives) that it is easy to forget or overlook how amazing 
it is. We just used the word ‘Paris’, sitting in Oslo, and somehow 
that word manages to ‘reach’ all the way to a physical structure 
1,555 km away (and does so without a passport or a plane ticket). 
Somehow the word ‘Paris’ connects with Paris. Not only can 
aboutness cross space in a seemingly mysterious way, it can also 
cross time. The expression ‘Emperor Kanmu’ denotes a Japanese 
emperor who lived more than 1,000 years ago. Just having read 
the previous sentence, you, our reader, can now use the expres-
sion ‘Emperor Kanmu’ to talk about Kanmu.
4 For introductory work on the metaphysics of facts, see Armstrong (1997) 
and Mulligan (2007).
5 We sidestep issues as to what the most fundamental ‘truth- bearers’ are 
because they aren’t immediately relevant.
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A sentence like (1) is an artefact. It consists of objects that we have 
constructed, i.e. words. But it is not only artefacts that have about-
ness. We humans can believe, think, hope, fear, expect, conjecture, 
etc. In so doing, our minds are directed at features of the world in 
much the same way sentences of a language are. Just as you can say, 
in English, that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, so you think, or believe, or 
hope, or fear that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. In  the nineteenth 
 century, the philosopher Franz Brentano (Brentano 1874) introduced 
(although cognates, meaning similar things, had already existed in, 
for example, Latin) the term ‘intentionality’ to denote this ability of 
the human mind to represent. In the current literature, the terms 
‘intentionality’, ‘representation’, and ‘aboutness’ are often used 
 interchangeably (though in some theoretical contexts they are 
 distinguished). In what follows we’ll for the most part use ‘repre-
sentation’, sometimes ‘aboutness’, and leave ‘intentionality’ behind.
AI, Metasemantics, and the Philosophy of Mind
There is a vast literature spanning many subdisciplines of phil oso-
phy that attempts to give an account of what representation 
amounts to and how it comes about. For more than 100 years, 
philosophers have been concerned with questions such as:
 • By virtue of what can a sentence of English, say (1) above, be 
about the Eiffel Tower?
 • By virtue of what is the thought that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris 
about Paris?
 • What is the connection between the answer to those two 
questions?
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When applied to language, these kinds of questions are often 
described as parts of metasemantics.6 When the focus is on the 
intentionality of the human mind, the relevant literature is often 
classified as philosophy of mind.
To put this book into perspective, it’s worth noting that most of 
the contributions to the philosophy of AI have drawn on 
work done in the philosophy of mind. It has not been based on work 
done in the philosophy of language (or the intersection of phil-
oso phy of language and philosophy of mind), and not paid any 
heed to the externalist tradition in the philosophy of language that 
is the theoretical foundation both of this work and of much of the 
most important work in twentieth- century philosophy of lan-
guage and mind. It is hard to prove a negative, but the reader could 
look at the bibliographies of recent overview works—of Bringsjord 
and Govindarajulu (2018) on the philosophy of AI, or—perhaps 
more pertinently—Bruckner (2019) for the philosophy of deep 
learning. We see literally no works of philosophy of language 
there. The same thing applies to an extensive review of social sci-
ences (including philosophy) on explainability and AI (Miller 2018). 
The closest engagement we’ve found with philosophy of language 
is in the monograph Floridi (2011), but in that work there is no 
Burge, no Kripke, no Putnam, no externalism. In the same vein, 
the otherwise excellent book How to Build a Brain (Eliasmith 2013) is 
6 See, for example, Brentano (1911) and Crane (1998) for people who take 
aboutness to be fundamental to theory of mind, the language- of- thought theo-
rists like Fodor (1975), and the teleosemanticists like Dretske (1980) and Millikan 
(1984). Classic works on the representational properties of language include 
Russell (1905), Strawson (1950), Kripke (1980) (discussed at length below), 
Donnellan (1966), and Evans (1982). More recent work that shows these issues 
remain live concerns includes Recanati (2012) and Hawthorne and Manley (2012), 
and a textbook introduction that brings one right up to date on active issues in 
the field is Cappelen and Dever (2018).
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written as if the externalist tradition doesn’t exist.7 Other recent 
work approaches the topic from a functionalist perspective 
(López- Rubio 2018); from a Kantian perspective (Schubbach forth-
coming); from a teleosemanticist perspective (Shea 2018) or using 
sui generis theoretical tools (Floridi, the book just mentioned); 
through the lens of more venerable philosophical conceptions of 
abstraction as found among the British empiricists and their fol-
lowers (Buckner 2018); or from the perspective of modern com-
positional semantic theories (Nedft 2020). In all this we find no 
mention of the externalist tradition, a strange gap in the literature 
we’re aiming here to fill.
7 There is of course significant work on the extended mind hypothesis (Clark 
and Chalmers 1998) and while this is a form of externalism, it is not one based in 
the Kripke, Burge, Putnam tradition. There is also work on what is called ‘embodied 
embedded cognition’, and while this could also be called a form of externalism, 




Our goal in this book is to point in what we think is the right direction for explaining the contents of AI systems, and to 
do some initial exploration of the territory in that direction. In 
this chapter, we’ll set out two central claims (and a third periph­
eral claim) that structure our positive proposals. The first claim is 
directed primarily at work being done in the artificial intelligence 
literature. That claim contains a bit of bad news: much of the work 
being done on interpretability of artificial intelligence, we think, 
centres around an incorrect picture of how content is determined. 
But it also contains a bit of good news: work on the determination 
of content in philosophy provides a better externalist picture of 
how content is determined and sophisticated tools for developing 
that picture.
The second claim is directed primarily at philosophers. The sec­
ond claim also starts with a bit of bad news: philosophers shouldn’t 
get too triumphant about the special suitability of externalist 
theories of content determination for the AI content project. 
That’s because consideration of some of the specific details about 
AI systems reveals that the externalist accounts that philosophers 
have developed contain crippling anthropocentric biases that 
make them unsuitable for use on nonhuman cases like AI systems. 
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever, Oxford University Press (2021). 
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But again there’s a bit of good news: consideration of those  specific 
details also helps point the way towards a deeper and more gener­
alized understanding of externalism, one that gives a picture that 
can apply across human and nonhuman cases.
Putting the two claims together, one of the lessons is that there 
is room for highly productive interaction between philosophers 
and artificial intelligence researchers here. Both sides, we think, 
have been hampered by narrow perspectives. On one side, 
 people have been approaching problems of AI content with an 
unnecessarily narrow picture of how contents might be determined. 
On the other side, people have been thinking about content de ter­
min ation using an unnecessarily narrow range of cases of content 
bearers. Each side has things the other side lacks; bringing every­
one together opens up the potential for deeper and more pro duct­
ive work by everyone.
We’ll see eventually that when the pieces are brought together, 
important methodological questions arise about how to carry out 
a research project using all of those pieces. Our third peripheral 
claim is then that a characteristically philosophical move will be 
useful: in order to get the right picture about how to develop a 
metasemantics of AI content, we need to think first about some 
meta­metasemantic questions.
First Claim: Content for AI Systems Should Be 
Explained Externalistically
Machine learning neural net programs are different from other 
programs in a way that matters for content. Consider a simple bit 
of Python code:
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If num > 1:
for i in range(2,num):
if (num % i) == 0:
print(num,“ is not a prime number”)
break
else:
print(num,“ is a prime number”)
else:
print(num,“is not a prime number”)
When the variable ‘num’ is set to 5009 and the program outputs 
‘5009 is a prime number’, there is a clear story about why that out­
put means that 5009 is a prime number. The output means that 
5009 is prime because of the programming/computational details 
about how that output is produced. The program produces the 
output ‘5009 is a prime number’ because it tries dividing 5009 by 
all integers between 2 and 5008, and fails to find a nontrivial inte­
ger divisor of 5009.1 Because not having an integer divisor is what 
it is to be prime, the computational production of the output is 
representing primeness.
As we’ve seen, the computational structure of machine learn­
ing neural networks makes it incredibly difficult to produce this 
kind of story grounding content in the programming/computa­
tional details. When we look at the vast array of internode con­
nection strengths in the neural network of SmartCredit, or 
trace  the computational path of Lucie’s financial details as they 
1 This way of saying what the program is doing takes for granted that, for 
example, the programming code ‘num % i’ corresponds to division (mod i). 
A  more complete explanation would explain this representational feature in 
terms of lower­ level architecture.
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percolate through that network, we don’t find anything that 
obviously produces a helpful content­ level story. This program­ level 
ob scur ity then leads people to various reactions:
• Some people get tempted into scepticism about content, 
thinking that there’s no way to tell a content­ level story on 
the basis of such obscure computational mech an isms.
• Some people get tempted into thinking that AI systems 
must have wildly alien contents, representing (perhaps) 
massively disjunctive properties that are computationally 
tracked by the details of the neural network, but which can’t 
be expressed or comprehended by humans.
• Some people think that humanly com pre hen sible contents 
can be extracted from the computational details of the neural 
network, but that sophisticated tools of computational 
intervention are needed to figure out how specific contents 
are grounded in specific portions of specific neural networks. 
(Example: the rapidly expanding body of work on feature 
visualization tools.)
Our first central lesson for this book is that all of the above is the 
wrong way to think about the problem of AI content. AI content 
is not a problem at the level of programming and computational 
detail. Instead, AI content is a problem at the level of en vir on­
mental and sociological detail.
One important thought for considering the foundation of 
content for neural network AI systems is: all of this has happened 
before. This is not the first time we’ve encountered the problem 
of  assigning content to systems whose computational details 
are enormously, and perhaps incomprehensibly, complex. That’s 
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because all of us are neural networks of exactly that sort. And 
we’ve thought a lot about how to attribute representational 
 content to people.
It’s possible to take the computational perspective on content 
determination for people. To take this perspective involves think­
ing that what a person means by the sentences they utter, or what 
the contents of their beliefs are, or what features of the world they 
are representing in perception, are determined by the computa­
tional details of their neuroanatomy. Taken to the extreme, this 
sort of project leads to identifying representational functions of 
specific neurons, for example, ‘face detection neurons’.2 Of course, 
the computational approach doesn’t need to be taken to this 
extreme—we might think that human content is grounded at 
some ‘higher level’ of computational organization. Maybe we 
need multiple neurons working together in the right way before 
they can represent anything, or maybe we need entire regions of 
the brain computationally organized in the right way before we 
get representation. But from this computational perspective, we 
can extract a research program: consider the computational 
structure of various parts of human brains at various levels of 
abstraction, and try to determine which of those computational 
structures manage to represent and what they represent.
But there’s an important alternative perspective on content 
determination which argues that that entire research program is 
a  mistake. Externalist views hold that the problem of content 
de ter min ation for people isn’t a computational problem; 
it’s an en vir on mental and sociological problem. (More carefully: 
externalism holds that content determination isn’t uniquely a 
2 See e.g. Axelrod et al. (2019).
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computational program. While a person’s internal state may do 
some of the work in fixing content, their external connections 
to their environment and society also do some of the work. So in 
thinking about content determination, we shouldn’t look auto­
matically and single­ mindedly at computational factors.) There 
are many versions of externalism available, but what they have in 
common is a denial that a person’s representational capacities are 
fully grounded by internal features of that person. Instead, exter­
nalist views hold that we represent the way we do in part because 
of features external to us. For example:
• Some of our visual experiences might be representations of 
faces in part because of our evolutionary history, which is a 
history of a social species whose survival and reproductive 
success depended on recognition of social cues, leading to 
evolutionary selection for facial recognition abilities. On 
this picture, it’s not computational features of our neurons 
that make them facial detectors, it’s historical and teleological 
features of us that make us facial detectors.
• Some of our linguistic utterances might mean what they 
mean in part because of the way that we are related to our 
larger speech community and because of what the words 
we use mean in that speech community. On this picture, 
knowing everything about the computational architecture 
of a particular language user could leave us far short of 
what’s needed to assign content to that user’s utterances, 
since we need at a minimum to know how other people are 
using those words as well.
• Some of our beliefs have the contents that they do because 
of the specific environments in which we’ve acquired 
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these beliefs. Someone who lives in an en vir on ment 
 surrounded by water will acquire beliefs about water, while 
someone who lives in an environment surrounded by some 
other clear liquid will end up with beliefs about that liquid. 
(On this picture, looking at computational features of the 
brains of the believers won’t reveal what their beliefs are 
about—the two believers in the two environments could 
have their different beliefs despite having the same internal 
computational organization.)
Those are just some quick snapshots of some externalist 
approaches—later in this book we’ll develop some of the exter­
nalist approaches in more detail.
One of our central theses, then, is that we should pursue 
 externalist approaches to content determination, rather than 
internalist computationally oriented approaches. An analogy to 
make the point clear:
Suppose we get interested in the question of what makes things 
valuable. So we collect various things of value: dollar bills, krone 
coins, gold doubloons. We start examining the samples at the 
microlevel, looking for the features that make them valuable. 
Looking at the atomic level, we don’t find anything clearly value­
determining. So we look at a slightly higher level, checking 
the  chemical and molecular structures. Still nothing value­
determining appears, so we go up another organization level—we 
look at threads in the dollar bill, or the ridges on the krone coin. 
Again, nothing value­ determining emerges.
The problem, of course, is that this approach to the de ter min­
ation of value is fundamentally misguided. Value isn’t the kind 
of  feature that emerges at some specific physical level of the 
m a k ing a i in t e l l igibl e
66
description of a valuable object. No amount of probing features 
at  the right level is going to produce useful results, because 
the  problem isn’t a vertically determined one. Explaining the 
de ter min ation of value needs to be done (at least in part) 
 horizontally, by thinking about how the valuable object is 
related to us, our practices, and things in the environment. 
The  determination of value is a sociological problem, not a 
microphysical problem.3
Similarly with content, we suggest, Much of the interesting 
work that’s been done in the artificial intelligence literature on 
interpretability and explainability of AI has presupposed a prob­
lematic internalistic and computational perspective, and assumes 
that the research project needs to be centred around probing 
kinds of content to be found at various levels of computational 
organization. Externalist approaches offer much greater promise 
for explaining AI contents. That shouldn’t be surprising. 
Externalist approaches, since they allow content explanation to be 
‘horizontal’, making it an environmental and sociological ques­
tion, rather than ‘vertical’, let us shortcut full engagement with the 
computational complexities and obscurities of AI systems. These 
are the kinds of approaches that have been most successful for 
‘neural network’ creatures like us; it makes sense that they would 
also be successful for the neural networks we have created. And 
it’s not surprising that content in general would be an externalist 
notion, grounded in relations of content­ bearing creatures and 
systems to their environment—the nature and role of content, 
3 That point is compatible with the thought that the sociological eventually gets 
grounded in the microphysical in a reductionist way, but (a) it doesn’t require 
that further thought, and (b) even if the reductionist agenda eventually works 
out, it remains true that the right explanatory approach to value goes through 
the sociological.
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after all, is precisely to relate creatures and systems to their 
en vir on ment, so that they can encode information about the 
en vir on ment and properly interact with the environment.
Second Claim: Existing Externalist Accounts  
of Content Are Anthropocentric
Our first claim is that externalist accounts of content de ter min­
ation provide the right route forward. But it’s not enough just to 
point to existing work in externalist metasemantics. Existing 
externalist metasemantic stories have been told as stories about 
people like us, but AI systems, despite some architectural simi­
larities to people, aren’t entirely like us. Our first claim started 
with the thought that all of this has happened before—that the 
content­ determination problems that AI confronts us with are 
problems we’ve already encountered in thinking about our own 
contents. But, as Twain emphasized, history doesn’t repeat, it 
rhymes. It’s the same problem, but in a different key.
Consider a simple case (later discussion in the book will provide 
more sophisticated discussion of more sophisticated cases; for 
now, we just want proof of concept). Suppose Jones’s visual per­
ceptual experience represents the object in front of him as a snake, 
and we want a story about why snake is part of the content of that 
visual experience. Why does Jones’s visual experience represent a 
snake, rather than a thin rectangular region with portions of 
black, red, and yellow? An externalist might at this point appeal to 
external features of Jones, including his evolutionary history. 
Jones’s visual experience represents a snake because Jones is 
a  member of a species whose visual systems evolved in an 
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environment containing dangerous snakes, so that having 
snake­recognition capacities was evolutionarily advantageous.
Obviously we aren’t going to get explanations quite like that for 
artificial intelligence systems. Artificial intelligence systems didn’t 
evolve—these programs aren’t members of species that repro­
duce via offspring that mix genetic traits from two parents, they 
aren’t at risk of being killed by predators in their environment 
before reproducing, they aren’t subject to random mutations. 
More generally, AI systems have very different sorts of en vir on­
mental and sociological connections than we do—these differences 
then create problems in taking off­ the­ shelf externalist tools for 
content determination, created as theories about human content, 
and applying them directly to AI systems.
So far we have been discussing externalism at a very high level 
of abstraction—as the general view that environmental and socio­
logical factors can matter to content determination, and thus that 
content is not determined solely by the internal computational 
state of a content­ bearer. But to have a substantive theory of AI 
content determination, we need to descend from that high level of 
abstraction and say which environmental and sociological factors 
matter and in what way they matter.
Philosophers have developed impressive models for how to 
understand the content of human language and human mental 
states. We have developed theories of what content is, how it can 
be expressed in language, and how it can be shared in communi­
cation. Those theories, however, were developed with humans as 
their starting point. In other words, we developed those theories 
by observing a specific animal, with specific biological features 
and evolutionary history. There are many features of our commu­
nicative patterns that are contingent on the kinds of animals we 
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are and the kinds of lives we lead. For example, we have mouths 
and ears, which make talking and listening natural. We have fingers, 
which make writing (and sign language) possible. And so on.
However, most people who study meaning and communica­
tion will agree that things made very differently from us can 
express content. If there are aliens, we might be able to communi­
cate with them. They might be able to think things and say things 
to us, even if both their internal hardware and their external rela­
tion to their environment are very, very different from ours. In 
other words, the ability to communicate in a contentful way is 
multiply realizable: it is an ability that is not restricted to animals and 
certainly not to animals just like us.
These two facts (that our theories of content have been devel­
oped with humans as their starting point but beings other than 
humans, plausibly, can represent and communicate) are in ten­
sion, and failure to attend properly to the second fact has caused 
our theories to be biased. The bias is that most of our theories of 
representation are too anthropocentric. They are parochial because 
they are based on continent features of our communicative 
practice. These features are salient to us, but not essential to the 
nature of content and communication.
Philosophical work in metasemantics, because of its focus on 
creatures like us, has produced what we will call an anthropo-
centric metasemantics. The existing philosophical accounts of 
content determination are too parochial by being too focused on 
contingent features of human communicative/representational 
practices. What’s needed (both for a metasemantic account that’s 
suitable for AI systems and for a general approach to metasemantic 
questions that’s general and robust enough to be philo soph ic al ly 
satisfying) is a de- anthropocentrized metasemantics. To achieve 
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that de­ anthropocentrization, we’ll set out the idea of 
 anthropocentric abstraction. In anthropocentric abstraction, 
we take existing externalist accounts of content determination 
and abstract away from these contingent and parochial features of 
human communication to reveal a more abstract pattern that is 
realizable in many kinds of creatures.
The trick with anthropocentric abstraction is that we can’t sim­
ply abstract away all the details about the specifics of human 
engagement with environment and society. An abstracted metase­
mantic theory that said just that content in general (not just for 
creatures like us) is determined by some kind of relation to the external 
environment would be too vacuous to be useful or interesting. 
What’s needed is to abstract just the right amount: enough to 
remove any undue anthropocentric bias, but not so much that we 
remove all content from the externalism.
Finding this abstractive sweet spot will inevitably involve care­
ful consideration of the details of AI systems. We need to consider 
the points of similarity and difference between AI systems and us, 
so that we can see how to take externalist frameworks originally 
developed as tools for understanding our ability to represent the 
world and abstract them into tools that also explain the ability of 
AI systems to represent the world. We’ll dive into details as we 
consider some specific externalist frameworks, but we’ll start by 
noting six big­ picture points of comparison:
1. Creation: Unlike humans, AI systems are intentionally 
designed and created by people who already have their own 
representational contents. AI systems thus give rise to 
special questions about how their contents relate to the 
contents of their creators.
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2. Limited Range: Many AI systems have a very limited 
range of conceptual applications. An image recognition 
program might only be able deploy the contents ‘cat’ 
and ‘dog’, and only be able to apply those contents to 
 photographic images. Humans, on the other hand, have 
a very wide range of contents that can be applied across a 
wide range of domains.
3. Unclear Boundaries: Programs, unlike people, easily 
break down into smaller subprograms, and easily integrate 
with other programs to create larger computational and 
functional units. Questions about what exactly has the 
content are thus trickier for programs than for people.
4. Output Variability: Some contentful AI outputs are 
 linguistic, and at least on the face of it, these linguistic 
outputs have the same content as sentences in a natural 
language. Other contentful AI outputs are non­ linguistic: 
AI systems can produce numerical outputs (probability 
distributions), moves on a game board, digital  photographical 
images, and so on.
5. Dedicated Integration: AI systems typically have very 
specific roles that they are intended to play in our lives 
(assess credit risk, play chess games, etc.), and the contents 
they bear need to help make sense of them playing those 
roles. AI systems are largely single­ purpose tools; we are 
largely many­ purpose tool users; this difference between 
us and AI systems can matter to the details of content 
de ter min ation.
6. Black Box and White Box Implementation: Like us, AI 
systems have internal computational architecture that is 
largely black box, with computational details that are 
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obscure and not revelatory of purpose or representational 
content. But many AI systems are in fact complicated 
mixtures of black box and white box components.  
A complex neural net might, for example, be combined 
with a Monte Carlo randomizing tree search algorithm 
whose computational implementation, purpose, and 
representational significance are all entirely transparent.
It is in thinking through points of difference and similarity such 
as  these that philosophical work on metasemantics has much 
to  learn from AI research as we look for the right abstractive 
sweet spot.
Third Claim: We Need Meta- Metasemantic Guidance
The problems of anthropocentric abstraction are not unique 
to  AI  systems. To attribute content to animals, we may need to 
engage in some anthropocentric abstraction, abstracting away 
from human­ specific details to an approach suitable to the spe­
cific ways that other animals are embedded in their environments. 
The same might be true for content attribution to, for example, 
pictures, dance, music, and film. In all these cases we might need 
models that go beyond what we have developed to account for 
content of human beliefs and languages.
Different cases of anthropocentric abstraction will involve 
 confronting different questions about how to abstract. We need 
many different metasemantic theories: a human metasemantics, 
explaining the specific ways in which contents of humans are 
grounded in specific internal features of humans and specific ways 
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that humans are embedded in their environments; an artificial 
intelligence metasemantics, explaining the different specific ways 
in which contents of AI systems are grounded in the different spe­
cific internal features of those systems and the different specific 
ways that they are embedded in their environments, and so on, for 
other varyingly alien bearers of content.4
Each of these domains will require detailed separate investi­
gations: anthropocentric abstraction is not a unified type of 
 theorizing. Here we focus on the problem of abstracting external­
ism in a way suitable for AI systems. As we’ll see in the subse­
quent chapters, in considering how to abstract, we encounter 
a  number of choice points. As a result, we are exploring a 
large logical space—a space containing multiple metasemantic 
theories for different content­ bearing creatures and systems, 
and different options for how to analogize a metasemantic 
 theory for one kind of creature to a metasemantic story for a 
different kind of creature. Navigating that logical space raises 
a methodological question: how do we decide what the right way 
is to abstract? Even once we are completely clear on all of the 
ways in which AI systems are different from and similar to us, 
and completely clear on what the right externalist metasemantic 
framework is for us, how do we decide what abstracted analogue 
of that framework is best for the AI systems?
Our third central claim in this book is that this methodo­
logical problem is best addressed by considering questions 
4 We don’t mean to commit here to any particular way to carve up the metase­
mantic landscape. Maybe different kinds of AI require different kinds of 
metasemantics; maybe humans and some nonhuman animals all get contents 
determined by the same metasemantics.
m a k ing a i in t e l l igibl e
74
of  meta- metasemantics. Consider an explanatory hierarchy of 
content­ related facts:
1. The semantic facts are facts about what contents specific 
content­ bearing items have. It’s thus a semantic fact, for 
example, that the word ‘Aristotle’ in English refers to 
Aristotle.
2. The metasemantic facts are facts that explain why the 
semantic facts are what they are. The semantic fact that 
‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle is, for example, according to a 
Kripkean metasemantic approach (which we’ll discuss in 
greater detail in Chapter 6) explained by the fact that the 
name ‘Aristotle’ is part of a causal chain of usages going 
back to Aristotle.
3. The meta- metasemantic facts are facts that explain why the 
metasemantic facts are the way they are. Meta­metasemantic 
questions are rarely explicitly addressed by philosophers. 
Why is the semantic fact that ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle 
explained by a Kripkean causal chain metasemantics rather 
than by some other metasemantic account?
Answering meta­ metasemantic questions, we will suggest, 
requires considering the theoretical role of contents. By consider­
ing what explanatory work contents and content attributions do 
for us, we can work out what kinds of fact could best fix semantic 
features so that contents can play those explanatory roles. A good 
meta­ metasemantic framework can thus offer us the needed 
methodological guidance. In determining how to abstract an 
AI­suitable metasemantics from the existing human­ targeted 
externalist metasemantics, we need to think about the role we 
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want contents to play, and then think about the details of AI systems 
and the role of those AI systems in our lives and our environment. 
From all of this we can hope to extract a specific picture of what 
content determination mechanisms for AI systems would be best 
suited to the roles that the meta­ metasemantics identifies.
A Meta- Metasemantic Suggestion:  
Interpreter-centric Knowledge- Maximization
The field of meta­ metasemantics is less well developed than 
metasemantics.5 There isn’t even a consensus that metasemantic 
theorizing should be guided by an explicit meta­ metasemantics. 
One reason for that might be a healthy fear that it is hard to 
see  where this will stop: why not develop the field of meta­
meta­ metasemantics? After all, if we need the metasemantics to 
guide our semantics, and we need meta­ metasemantics to guide 
our metasemantics, why and how would this ever stop?
We recognize this as a concern to some, but we have no fear: we 
endorse this endless hierarchy of theorizing. There is of course a 
practical limit to what we humans can process and grasp, but that 
isn’t the limit of interesting inquiry. In this book, however, we 
move at most three meta levels up—we will leave the explorations 
of higher levels to others (or to ourselves in the future). We do that 
with a very concrete goal in mind: to guide our theorizing about 
the metasemantics of AI. Moreover, we will not devote the book 
to arguing for our meta­ metasemantic view. We will instead use a 
5 There is a bit of meta­ metasemantic literature on the question of whether 
meta­ metasemantics for externalist theories should be externalist or internalist 
(see e.g. Cohnitz and Haukioja 2013 for discussion and references).
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proposal made by Timothy Williamson in the last chapter of The 
Philosophy of Philosophy (Williamson 2007).
Before briefly sketching that view, we should emphasize that if 
you have alternative theories about meta­ meta­ metasemantics, 
we encourage exploring the various ways those views will trickle 
down to metasemantics and that again to particular in ter pret­
ations of AI output. The overall spirit of this book is to develop a 
framework for thinking about interpretable AI and there will be 
many alternative ways to fill in that framework. The use of 
Williamson’s meta­ metasemantics is just one of them.
In The Philosophy of Philosophy, Williamson can be read as pro­
posing a version of the principle of charity as a meta­ metasemantic 
principle. Roughly, Williamson’s view is that the correct metase­
mantics is one that maximizes knowledge for the interpretee. Moreover, 
Williamson thinks this is the principle that makes externalism 
correct. His proposal is that a knowledge­ maximization principle 
is the foundation of externalist metasemantics.
The argument goes as follows. Imagine a case of demonstrative 
misidentification: Alex is a devoted physiognomist who thinks he 
can tell a person’s character from their face. He sees Bea, and on 
the basis of her appearance forms the belief he would express by 
saying ‘She is F, G, and H’. She is none of these things: physi­
ognomy is nonsense. But, it so happens, there is someone, some­
where (let’s say New Zealand), who is F, G, and H, and has no other 
properties. Call that person ‘Ceres’.
We can use this scenario, Williamson thinks, to shed light on 
our theory of reference, and in particular to draw connections 
between interpretation and reference. Consider the question of 
who Alex’s utterance (or the related thought) of ‘she’ refers to. 
ou r t heory
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Does it refer to Bea, the person in front of him, or Ceres, the  person 
who is F, G, and H? If you aim to maximize the true beliefs you 
impute to someone (à la work like Davidson 1973), taking the refer­
ence to be Ceres seems like the way to go: it makes Alex’s belief 
come out true.
But that’s obviously wrong: ‘a descriptive theory of reference 
gone mad’ (2007: 263), in Williamson’s words. The referent, it seems, 
is Bea. But how do we make that square with in ter pret ation?
Williamson’s neat idea is that what we should aim to maximize 
is not the interpretee’s true beliefs, but their knowledge, and that 
doing so yields an argument for externalism. Thus, to put the 
 matter crudely, imagine the speaker uttering the following four 
sentences:
• She is F.
• She is G.
• She is H.
• She is in front of me.
If we want to maximize belief, we should say that ‘She’ refers to 
Ceres, since that gets us three true beliefs, and one false belief, 
although it gets us no knowledge. If we want to maximize know­
ledge, we should say that ‘she’ refers to Bea, since it gets us one 
piece of knowledge, namely that Bea is in front of the speaker.
The reason for this is that perception is a suitable ‘channel’ for 
knowledge, whereas physiognomy isn’t. But perception is of 
course a paradigm causal channel as well, and so Williamson, 
generalizing from these sorts of considerations, suggests that 
knowledge­ maximization is a better principle of interpretation 
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than belief maximization because knowledge tracks causal 
 channels in a way that true beliefs don’t always. As he intriguingly 
suggests:
Such examples [as the one we just considered] are of course just the 
analogue for demonstrative pronouns of examples Kripke and 
Putnam used to refute descriptive cluster theories of reference for 
proper names and natural kind terms. In effect, such theories are 
special cases of a truth­ maximizing principle of charity. One fun­
damental error in descriptive theories of reference is to try to make 
true belief do the work of knowledge. (2007: 264)
Our aim here is not to get too deep into theories of in ter pret ation.6 
But we do want to make one change to Williamson’s theory: we 
suggest choosing a metasemantics that maximizes knowledge of 
the interpreter, not of the subject (be it a person or a machine) being 
interpreted. In other words, we are suggesting our metasemantic 
principles should be guided by a meta­ metasemantic principle 
that tells us to pick a metasemantics that maximizes what we, 
the interpreters, end up knowing as a result of the interpretative 
enterprise.
That raises the question: why aim for meta- metasemantic principles 
that tell us to maximize the interpreter’s knowledge and not the interpretee? 
A couple of points in reply to this: first, note that this is a question 
in meta­ meta­ metasemantics. We will not try to provide a general 
meta­ meta­ metasemantic theory here. We are not alone in not 
doing that. In fact, we know of no worked­ out three­ level metase­
mantic theory. Since, in a little book like this, arguments have to 
stop somewhere, we would be fairly comfortable simply using 
6 The most sophisticated recent work on the topic is by Robbie Williams (see 
2005, 2007) and references therein. A nice overview of the space of options for 
charity principles is in Felman (1998).
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this as a starting point. However, there’s a bit more to be said. 
Recall our earlier point that the meta­ metasemantics should be 
guided by considerations of what explanatory work content and 
content attributions are doing for us. We think it should be fairly 
noncontroversial that a central goal of content and content 
attributions to AIs is to increase our knowledge. That gives us 
mo tiv ation for being self­ centred. It is our knowledge that matters, 
not that of the artificial systems.
What we just said leaves open the possibility that others might 
have other interests. The artificial systems, for example, if they have 
interests, might want to rely on different meta­meta­metasemantic 
principles when they interpret each other or us. Maybe they 
want  metasemantic principles that maximize know ledge (or 
power or something else) of the artificial systems. It is also pos­
sible that our interests are aligned. That’s an open question. More 
generally, we think the right view is one according to which 
interests of various kinds will play a central role in higher up on the 
meta­ . . . ­metasemantic hierarchy.
These larger questions about how to ground the various levels of 
metasemantic theorizing are interesting (and worthy of an entire 
separate monograph, since they are issues largely unexplored), but 
will not concern us in what follows. Instead, we will use versions of 
the Williamsonian principle to illustrate how meta­ metasemantics 
can and should play an important role in the z philosophy of AI. 
More specifically, whenever we engage in  de­ anthropocentrizing 
(which is our way of developing a metasemantics for AI), there will 
be choice points. We will use knowledge­ maximization as our 




The Predicate ‘High Risk’
In this and the next two chapters, we show how the framework outlined in Chapter 4 can be applied to particular outputs of AI 
systems. We’ll take as our example the output from SmartCredit 
that resulted in Lucie being turned down for a mortgage. Recall 
from Chapter  1 that according to SmartCredit, Lucie is high risk. 
We’ll split this statement into three parts and present a separate 
theory for each part:
(i) The statement is about Lucie, i.e. SmartCredit refers to 
Lucie. We want to figure out how SmartCredit can refer 
to Lucie.
(ii) The statement is about the property of being high risk. We 
want to figure out how SmartCredit can denote that 
property.
(iii) The statement predicates the property of being high risk 
to Lucie. On the assumption that SmartCredit has the 
capacities outlined in (i) and (ii), we next want to figure 
out how SmartCredit can attribute the property of being 
high risk to Lucie.
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This chapter is about (ii), i.e. how SmartCredit can pick out the 
property of being high risk. Chapter  6 is about how SmartCredit 
refers to Lucie. Chapter 7 outlines a proposal for how SmartCredit 
can predicate being high risk to Lucie. Each chapter will make use of 
different externalist tools: for names we use ideas from Evans; for 
predicates, we use ideas from Kripke; for predication we use ideas 
from teleosemantics. The proposals all instantiate the general 
strategy we presented in Chapter 4.1
Our test case is relatively simple. There’s an enormous amount 
more to be done even if we’re completely successful with this test 
case—attributing content to AI outputs that don’t have linguistic 
form, and especially attributing content to non- explicit AI in tern al 
states that don’t appear as output (understanding SmartCredit not 
just as denying a loan, but doing so for some reason). However, 
even the simple test case will be challenging enough for now and 
so that’s where we’ll start. Once we succeed with these baby steps, 
it’ll be time to move on to the more complex issues.
The Background Theory: Kripke- Style Externalism
Saul Kripke’s series of lectures published as Naming and Necessity 
(Kripke 1980) outlines what has now become one of the leading 
theories of how language connects to the world. Similar and com-
plementary views were developed at more or less the same time 
1 It might seem surprising that we use a variety of externalist theories that are 
often seen as competitors. It’s not strange if, as we do, you endorse a form of 
metasemantic pluralism: There are many metasemantic mechanisms (and there 
could be even more than we currently know of ).
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by Hilary Putnam (1975) and Tyler Burge (1979). The distinctive 
 feature of these views is a form of externalism: what grounds 
meaning and determines what sentences and expressions are 
about is external to the speaker’s mind. If you look at just the 
speaker of ‘John is in Paris’, you won’t find out what the expression 
‘Paris’ is about. Moreover, it is not determined ‘computationally’: 
reference determination is not about how a particular symbol 
computationally integrates into the neural net calculations. It’s not 
computational in the sense of being about the internal  computational 
structure of the representational item itself. It’s all about external 
relations to the world—looking at internal computation structure 
is just wrong- headed through and through. What determines that 
an utterance of ‘Paris’ is about Paris has to do with the history of 
use of that name. Here is how Kripke introduces his basic idea:
Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain 
name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. 
Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link 
as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who 
has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the marketplace or else-
where, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can’t 
remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom 
he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feynman is a famous 
physicist. A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately 
to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to 
Feynman even though he can’t identify him uniquely.
(Kripke 1980: 91)
Note that on this view, a speaker can use a name to talk about 
something or someone even if that speaker has no ability to 
describe that thing correctly. It is not the speaker’s beliefs about 
what ‘Paris’ denotes that determines what she denotes by ‘Paris’. 
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Aboutness is determined by an external chain of communication. 
Here is Kripke’s rough summary of his view:
An initial ‘baptism’ takes place. Here the object may be named by 
ostension [ . . . ]. When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the 
receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it 
with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I hear 
the name ‘Napoleon’ and decide it would be a nice name for my pet 
aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition. (Kripke 1980: 96)
The structure of such a theory is relatively simple. It has three 
parts:
1. There’s an introductory, anchoring, event, where an 
expression is ‘hooked up’ to some part of the world (‘Paris’ 
to Paris, ‘Napoleon’ to Napoleon, ‘zebra’ to zebras, ‘chair’ to 
chairs, etc.). Kripke suggested this could happen through a 
baptism (as in the example in the quotation above) or by a 
description being used to pick out the thing talked about (if 
we said, ‘let “Alfred” be the name of the first person to buy a 
copy of this book’).
2. Then there’s a chain of transmission from person to 
person. This is what Kripke also calls a communicative 
chain. Kripke stipulates that this chain has to be reference 
preserving (more on that below).
3. Then there’s a speaker using the expression at some point 
in the chain: She can use, say, ‘zebra’ to talk about zebras 
by virtue of being part of a communicative chain that 
started with zebras (e.g. that started with a baptism where a 
speaker said: call those kinds of animals ‘zebras’.)
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There are two notable and relevant features of this view:
1. Even if you knew everything that had ever happened to the 
speaker, you would not know what she is referring to (what 
she is talking about). That is determined by historical facts 
that are independent of that particular speaker (the 
beginning of the communicative chain, which could have 
started before the speaker was born). In particular: if you 
look inside the head of the speaker, there’s no fact ‘in there’ 
that will tell you what she is talking about.
2. The speaker could be radically wrong about what she is 
talking about—she could be wrong about what her use of 
‘Napoleon’ refers to (she need not know what she is talking 
about because she need not know what is at the origin of 
the communicative chain).
Of course, often things are more complicated and messy. And the 
Kripkean view has inspired mountains of theorizing, both defend-
ing and furthering his externalist view (as in Salmon 1986, Soames 
2002 and more recently, in a textbook presentation: our 2018) and 
responding to it (as in the causal descriptivism of Lewis 1984 and 
Kroon 1987, or the two- dimensional semantics defended in works 
like Chalmers 2006).
While important, we don’t think that we need to engage with 
this literature too much here—our aim is to get as far as we can 
with (and simply assuming the truth of) the key Kripkean 
insight and picture of reference. With that mind, let’s consider 
how this can help us understand content attribution to ML 
 systems.
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Starting Thought: SmartCredit Expresses High Risk 
Contents Because of its Causal History
The externalist story we just outlined has two ways of describing 
the anchoring of the content of ML systems:
 1. SmartCredit’s history includes an anchoring event, anchoring 
on high risk.
2. SmartCredit is a link in a transmission chain leading back 
to high risk.
The obvious problem with this line of thought is that there’s no 
simple way to apply Kripke’s picture directly to SmartCredit. 
There’s just nothing that looks like a standard anchoring event in 
SmartCredit’s history. SmartCredit never points to anything (let 
alone to the property of high risk), it never descriptively singles 
out anything, it never has referential intentions. And SmartCredit 
can’t be inheriting a semantic connection of high risk from else-
where (from the programmers, perhaps) in the usual way, because 
there’s nothing that looks like the standard transmissive link in 
SmartCredit’s case. SmartCredit has no intention to use a term in 
the same way as those from whom it received the term. In sum:
 • There is nothing like a Kripke- style baptism event.
 • There is no intention to refer to high risk, no pointing at 
high risk, no descriptive identification of high risk.
 • And there is nothing like Kripke- style proper transmission. 
In particular, there are no reference- preserving intentions.
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So while—for reasons we spelled out above—externalism might 
seem plausible at first glance, the versions that are available off the 
shelf seem initially unpromising.
Anthropocentric Abstraction of ‘Anchoring’
The problems above take this form: they point out disanalogies 
between the ways in which humans initiate and participate in 
communicative chains and the ways AI, on our proposal, would 
do so. There will obviously be very many such differences. 
Humans are animals that engage with the world in ways com-
puters can’t. We have all kinds of inter- and intra- personal experi-
ences that computers lack. To be open to the idea that systems 
very different from humans can have content, we need to engage 
in what we call ‘anthropocentric abstraction’: the effort to find 
some more abstract description of the structure that leads to con-
tent attribution for humans—a description that moves away from 
the contingencies and limitations of our peculiarities.
There’s a general structure to that process of anthropocentric 
abstraction:
 • We start with a pattern instantiated by human peculiarities.
 • There is then a hierarchy of degrees of abstractions: what 
we are looking for is a degree of abstraction that preserves 
sufficiently many important features of the original 
 phenomenon. It’s not too abstract and it’s not too focused 
on specific details. Call that ‘the abstractive sweet- spot’.
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This process of abstraction can be done bottom- up (starting with 
particular cases and working one’s way up) or top- down (starting 
with a general theory and working one’s way down to specific 
cases). Kripke’s strategy is the former: he starts with cases that we 
all agree are instances of reference, and then he builds a very thin 
theoretical framework on top of that. What he in effect does is 
give a brief sketch of how we humans typically do it, based on 
reflection on a few cases. He does not start by an a priori articula-
tion of a general condition that has to be imposed on reference 
and then looking for human behaviour that satisfies those condi-
tions. We will use the Kripkean bottom- up approach. We start 
with the assumption that an ML system is, say, a high risk detector. 
We then explore its history and we ask: what in that history cor-
responds to what we find in the human case? Does any of it 
match—at an appropriately abstract level—some of the compo-
nents of what Kripke finds in the human case?
Schematic AI- Suitable Kripke- Style Metasemantics
In order to de- anthropocentrize the Kripkean story that the 
 analogue of anchoring for AI systems is to be found in their neural 
net training, very roughly, our proposal is this:
SmartCredit’s outputs express the property of high risk because the 
training of SmartCredit’s neural network was done against the prop-
erty of high risk, thereby anchoring the program to that property.
This is the coarse- grained answer, but the details will matter a 
great deal and they are in large part unsettled. Some of the rele-
vant details involve how neural nets are trained:
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 • A generic initial neural net is given samples from a large 
pool of training cases.
 • Each training case has been hand- coded (‘high risk’ versus 
‘low risk’), for example by the programmers.
 • The AI’s output for the training case is then compared to the 
hand coding using some scoring function evaluating how 
well the AI classified the training case.
 • That score is then used to update the weightings of the node 
connections in the neural net.
Our suggestion is that SmartCredit’s outputs express the prop-
erty of high risk because SmartCredit was given training cases 
that were hand- coded for being high risk lendees or low risk 
lendees, and was then scored highly for categorizing cases hand- 
 coded high risk as high risk and scored poorly for categorizing 
cases hand- coded high risk as low risk. Its net is then adjusted on 
the basis of that score. After some (indefinite) number of it er-
ations of this process, SmartCredit’s outputs gain representa-
tional content.
Here, in slogan form, is the proposal:
AI Anchoring: SmartCredit is anchored in high risk via a 
scoring function that scores well for matching high risk hand 
coding and low for not matching.
We think that this is a plausible starting point, but it’s just 
a  schematic view right now, because there are a number of 
choice  points that we’ll encounter as we think through the 
details of hand coding, of scoring functions, and of updating 
procedures.
90
m a k ing a i in t e l l igibl e
Complications and Choice Points
Hand coding choice points: We’ve been setting out a Kripke- 
inspired picture on which SmartCredit is anchored in the prop-
erty of high risk because it’s trained on a bunch of cases that have 
been hand- coded as high risk or low risk. But there’s more than 
one thing we might mean by ‘hand- coded as high risk or low risk’. 
To see this, consider two cases:
(C1) SmartCredit’s training set was assembled by programmer 
Pat. Pat has gone back through old bank records, found numer-
ous instances of people who did and did not default on their 
loans, and then put together files of the input data (at the time 
of loan application) for these people, together with a label of 
‘high risk’ for the actual defaulters and ‘low risk’ for the actual 
non- defaulters. But Pat makes a few mistakes along the way. 
Among the thousands of test cases, there are three (for three 
individuals A, B, and C) that Pat marks with a ‘high risk’ label 
even though they didn’t, in fact, default on their loans. When 
SmartCredit is trained on this data set, is SmartCredit being 
trained on a data set hand- coded for the property of being high 
risk, or on a data set hand- coded for the property of being high 
risk or one of A, B, and C?
(C2) Pat wanted more cases than were available in the bank’s 
lending history, so created a number of additional fictional 
cases. Pat uses the best of her financial knowledge to design 
fictional cases of defaulters and non- defaulters, and then cre-
ates initial data sets suitable for those fictional cases, and labels 
those cases with ‘high risk’ and ‘low risk’ labels as appropriate. 
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But, of course, there is no independent fact of the matter of 
whether these cases are genuinely high risk or low risk cases. 
When SmartCredit is trained on this data set, is SmartCredit 
being trained on a data set hand- coded for the property of 
being high risk, or on a data set hand- coded for the property P 
of being someone who Pat thinks would be high risk?
We can now consider various particular versions of the general 
Kripke- inspired metasemantics:
(K1) SmartCredit is anchored to a property P if P is the prop-
erty in fact shared by all the training cases hand- coded with the 
same label.
(K2) SmartCredit is anchored to a property P if P is the prop-
erty that the hand- coder intends to be indicating by marking 
training cases with a given label.
Consider hand coding. Suppose that some of the training cases 
are mislabelled in the hand coding—cases that are in fact high risk 
lenders are marked as low risk lenders. How will this affect what 
property the neural net is anchored in? (The intended property? 
Some disjunctive property?) Or suppose we don’t use actual cases 
as training cases, but fictional cases, so that there is no independ-
ent fact of the matter about how the cases are correctly hand- coded. 
What effect will such training cases have on content fixation?
Scoring choice points: When SmartCredit is being trained—
and thus, on our Kripke- inspired picture, hopefully being 
anchored to the property of high risk—its outputs for a test set are 
compared to hand- coded evaluations of the test set. We then want 
to give SmartCredit feedback based on how well it did at 
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cat egor iz ing the test cases. But there are many notions of ‘how 
well’ that could be used here.
Consider a complication that we’ve been sweeping under the 
rug. SmartCredit, like many AI classifiers, doesn’t produce binary 
classification judgements. When given Lucie’s data, it doesn’t just 
report that Lucie is high risk or report that Lucie is low risk. 
Instead, it assigns probabilities that Lucie is in each category. So 
SmartCredit might report that Lucie is 0.8 likely to be high risk 
and 0.2 likely to be low risk. Now suppose that SmartCredit prod-
uces probabilistic outputs like this for thousands of cases. For 
each of these cases, we also have hand- coded evaluations of 
whether the person is genuinely high or low risk. Now we want to 
assess how well SmartCredit did. That can’t just be a count of how 
many cases SmartCredit got right and how many SmartCredit got 
wrong—the ‘how well’ assessment needs to take SmartCredit’s 
probabilities into account.
What we need is a scoring function. But there are many ways to 
design a plausible scoring function, and different scoring func-
tions are in fact used in different AI applications. Let’s consider 
briefly two scoring functions. One is the Brier score. To obtain 
SmartCredit’s Brier score, for each case we take the difference 
between SmartCredit’s assigned probability of being high risk and 
the actual ‘probability of being high risk’ (1 if the case is hand- 
 coded as high risk; 0 if it is hand- coded as low risk). We then 
square each of those differences and add them. So for a test set S, 
SmartCredit’s Brier score is:
 
( )
( ) 2i i
i  in  S
1 / S *  ( L  A )−∑  
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where Li is SmartCredit’s probability that the ith case is high risk 
and Ai is the actual probability that the ith case is high risk.
Lower Brier scores indicate better accuracy; higher Brier scores 
indicate worse accuracy.
Another scoring function is the log- loss score. To get 
SmartCredit’s log- loss score, take SmartCredit’s assigned  prob abil ity 
that a given case is high risk, and then take either the loga rithm of 
that probability (if the case is hand- coded as high risk) or the 
 logarithm of 1 minus that probability (if the case is hand- 
 coded as low risk). So for a test set S, SmartCredit’s log- loss score is:
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )i i i i
i  in  S
1 / S *( A *log L   1 A *log 1 L− + − −∑  
Again, lower log- loss scores indicate better accuracy.
Brier scores and log- loss scores won’t in general be the same, 
and so training a program to minimize the Brier score won’t in 
general produce the same behaviour as training a program to 
minimize the log- loss score. For example, the log- loss score pun-
ishes large probability errors more severely than does the Brier 
score. Consider the accuracy penalties, for both scoring functions, 
of outputting probabilities of either 0.01 or 0.001 for a case that is 
in fact high risk:
Brier score:
Output = 0.01: Brier score = (1- 0.01)2 + (0- 0.99)2 = 1.9602
Output = 0.001: Brier score = (1-.001)2 + (0- 0.999)2 = 1.996002
Log- loss score:
Output = 0.01: Log- loss score = -log(0.01) = 2
Output = 0.001: Log- loss score = -log(0.001) = 3
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The Brier score increases the accuracy penalty for the second case 
by less than 2 per cent, while the log- loss score increases the 
ac cur acy penalty for that case by 50 per cent. (Brier scores for indi-
vidual cases are bounded at 2 while log- loss scores are unbounded, 
so in extreme cases the penalty increase for the Brier score tends 
to 0 while the penalty increase for the log- loss score increases 
arbitrarily.) So an AI system trained using a log- loss scoring func-
tion is, compared to a system trained using a Brier score, made 
more likely to avoid extreme probability errors.
Of course, if SmartCredit is getting everything right, it doesn’t 
matter which scoring function is used. But no AI system is going to 
get every judgement right. Just for a toy case, let’s suppose that the 
financial prospects of bitcoin speculators are particularly difficult 
for SmartCredit to evaluate. (For whatever reason, the kinds of cor-
relations between social media footprint and creditworthiness that 
SmartCredit relies on are much less robust among bitcoin specu-
lators than among the general population.) So SmartCredit’s 
assigned probabilities for bitcoin speculator test cases tend to 
prod uce extreme errors—SmartCredit is often highly confident 
that a genuinely risky bitcoin speculator is low risk, or vice versa.
Now consider two properties to which SmartCredit might be 
anchored, Kripke- style: (i) being high risk, or (ii) being a bitcoin 
speculator or a high risk non- bitcoin- speculator. There could then 
be two different elaborations of the Kripke- inspired picture, 
which predict anchoring onto these different properties:
(K1) SmartCredit is anchored to property P if SmartCredit is 
trained using a training set hand- coded for some property Q 
such that P is the simplest property that produces a reliably low 
Brier score compared to the hand- coded Q facts.
95
a ppl ic at ion
(K2) SmartCredit is anchored to property P if SmartCredit is 
trained using a training set hand- coded for some property Q 
such that P is the simplest property that produces a reliably low 
log- loss score compared to the hand- coded Q facts.
Then suppose that according to the metasemantic view (K1), 
SmartCredit represents being high risk, while according to the 
metasemantic view (K2), SmartCredit represents being a bitcoin 
speculator or a high risk non- bitcoin- speculator. Both (K1) and 
(K2) are particular ways of filling out the general externalist 
Kripke- inspired metasemantics—how could we decide which of 
(K1) and (K2) is the right way to abstract a non- anthropocentric 
metasemantics from the Kripkean starting point?
At this point, we turn to the meta- metasemantics. Given our 
interpreter’s knowledge- maximization picture of the meta- 
 metasemantics, we need to know whether a (K1)-style metase-
mantics or a (K2)-style metasemantics for SmartCredit will 
 maximize the knowledge we obtain through our interactions with 
SmartCredit. The answer to that question is then sensitive to a 
number of externalist features of the social and environmental 
setting in which we use SmartCredit. For example:
 • If the environment is heavily populated with bitcoin 
speculators, (K1) will have SmartCredit inaccurately 
labelling them as (e.g.) high risk, since the Brier score 
doesn’t weight the extreme probability errors for these 
cases heavily enough to influence the property tracked, 
while (K2) will have SmartCredit accurately labelling them 
as either bitcoin speculators or as high risk non- bitcoin- 
speculators. (K2) would then, to that extent, be more 
96
m a k ing a i in t e l l igibl e
conducive to interpreter knowledge. But if the environment 
is sparsely populated with bitcoin speculators, the stronger 
property represented by SmartCredit according to (K1) 
might lead to more knowledge on our part (since we can 
also infer the disjunctive property).
 • What we plan to do with the classification we get from 
SmartCredit can influence which property is knowledge- 
maximizing for us. Suppose the bank has a policy of not 
lending to bitcoin speculators, and the cases of both Simon 
the bitcoin speculator and Lucie the non- bitcoin- speculator 
are both given to SmartCredit. We then form both (i) 
classificatory beliefs about Simon and Lucie, and (ii) a 
secondary practical belief about how we ought to treat 
Lucie (that we should or should not give her a loan). When 
the content of the secondary practical beliefs rely on the 
SmartCredit content ascribed by metasemantics (K1), our 
secondary belief about Lucie is knowledge (because bad risk 
is a good reason to deny a loan). But when the content of 
the secondary practical beliefs rely on the SmartCredit 
content ascribed by metasemantic (K2), our secondary 
belief about Lucie is not knowledge (because bad risk or 
bitcoin speculator is not a good reason to deny a loan). So (K1) 
has some knowledge maximization effect over (K2). But if 
the bank has no policy against loaning to bitcoin specu-
lators, the secondary practical question arises for Simon as 
well. (K1) and (K2) make that secondary belief about Simon 
not knowledge, but (K2), and not (K1), makes the classificatory 
belief about Simon knowledge. So in this environment, (K2) 
has some knowledge maximization effect over (K1). In 
general, since log- loss scoring functions avoid extreme errors 
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more than Brier scoring functions, (K2) will be a better 
knowledge- maximizer than (K1) in cases in which our 
subsequent use of the categorizing is in a context in which 
we care a lot about avoiding bad errors. So, for example, a 
‘guilt- innocence’ detector might be more likely to be 
knowledge- maximizing when it’s guilt detecting according 
to the (K2) log- loss metasemantics than when it’s guilt 
detecting according to the (K1) Brier score metasemantics, 
given the nature of the other beliefs we’re going to form 
based on the guilt- innocence categorization.
Update choice points: Even more pressingly, there are many 
ways of going from a scoring of the AI output to a specific al ter-
ation of the neural net node connection weightings (many com-
plicated papers are written about this in the AI literature). Clearly 
not all ways of updating are going to produce the same content 
(intuitively, ‘inverting’ the update function for SmartCredit’s train-
ing should ‘invert’ its representational contents), so again there’s 
room for interaction between the details of the update function 
and the details of the anchoring.
Taking Stock
Here is what we have done:
 We started with an outline of Kripke’s causal chain metase-
mantics.
 We observed that the details of this metasemantics aren’t 
straightforwardly applicable to AI systems.
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 We suggest that the Kripkean metasemantics is an 
an thropo cen tric instance of a larger class of metasemantic 
principles.
 We took some initial steps toward de- anthropocentrizing, 
proposing an AI- friendly version of anchoring.
 Finally, we outlined some choice points for that theory.
Appendix to Chapter 5: More on Reference 
Preservation in ML Systems
We just expressed optimism about anthropocentric abstraction 
of ‘reference- preserving intentions’. We should add that a full the-
ory will have to engage with a range of interesting differences 
between humans and ML systems. There are fundamental differ-
ences between programs and people in the way that information 
is transmitted and this will matter to whether reference chains are 
being preserved in ‘the right way’. Here are some additional cases 
to consider:
(1) Suppose we have programmed a neural network on a par-
ticular computer in Oslo. That network then gets trained on 
lots of duck photographs. Let’s assume that’s enough for 
anchoring, and as a result, that neural network’s outputs are 
now about ducks. We then email that program to another 
computer in Austin. On that computer in Austin there’s now 
a new token- distinct but type- identical program. Is that pro-
gram part of the same referential chain? Are its states also 
about ducks?
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(2) We can easily imagine more complicated cases. Suppose 
we have a neural network that’s been trained to recognize 
photographs of Pacific black ducks. We want to make a new 
program that recognizes photographs of eider ducks. Rather 
than retrain a new neural network on a new collection of eider 
duck photographs, we take the neural network weightings 
of the Pacific black duck recognizer together with a descrip-
tion of the typical colouring of an eider duck and apply a 
metaprogram that reweights a neur al network to transform 
its recognitional sen si tiv ities. We end up with a new program 
that functions well: it reliably (but not always) labels eider 
duck photographs as hits and non- eider duck photographs as 
misses. But are its reports about eider ducks? That depends on 
whether this more complicated method of causal transmis-
sion counts as reference preserving. More generally, programs 
offer opportunities for causal transmission and manipulation 
(by human programmers, by other programs, and  
so on) that aren’t available with people, and a good  
non- anthropocentric version of externalism needs to include 
tools for deciding which of these opportunities are reference 
preserving and which are not.
(3) Suppose we are trying to do early cancer detection, so we 
create a machine learning cancer detector. We train it in the 
usual ways, giving it a sample set of cases and a scoring system 
on those cases. But once the program has been trained up, we 
also allow it over time to use data mining methods to look for 
 additional patterns in the new cases and dynamically adjust its 
own  categories. That means that over time, the program might 
end up cat egor iz ing in ways that largely disagree with the 
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scoring on the original training set. But we can imagine multiple 
ways in which this change in categorization behaviour might go. 
We might discover that the program has become a better can-
cer de tect or than we were—that we had made mistakes on some 
of the original training set, but that the program is now able to 
detect cancer better than we could, and is correcting those mis-
takes. Or we might discover that the program has become a 
deeper characterizer than we were. Perhaps we learn that ‘can-
cer’ is actually a confused category, one which lumps together 
medically distinct conditions and artificially separates other 
conditions that are medically similar. The program as it develops 
has got onto a different, more medically robust category, and is 
tracking that rather than cancer. Or we might discover that the 
program has gone off the rails entirely—that its dynamic adjust-
ment of its own categories has drifted hopelessly away from any-
thing that we ever wanted to track, and that it’s now just tracking 
some random and medically un inter est ing collection of blood 
chemistry features. In each of these cases, we’re faced with the 
question of whether the program’s outputs are still about can-
cer or have come to be about new categories. Answering that 
question, from an externalist perspective, requires determining 
whether the dynamic development of the program is properly 
reference preserving. No simple application of the Kripkean 
model is going to answer that question.2
2 It is unclear how different this is from human cases: we can imagine a human 
researcher, who starts off as a straightforward cancer researcher, whose research 
develops in each of the three ways sketched above, but who keeps using the word 
‘cancer’. We’re then confronted with similar questions about whether his use of 
the word ‘cancer’ is still part of the causal chain to which he was originally intro-
duced.
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(4) Lockdown is a public safety AI system, designed to 
assess  the risks of venturing outdoors. Lockdown takes a 
wide  variety of input data on weather, crime, epidemiology, 
 economic markers, social media activity, and so on, and 
delivers a verdict of ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’. But Lockdown 
 delivers   location- specific recommendations. Albert, running 
Lockdown in Oslo, gets an output of ‘safe’, meaning that it is 
safe to  go  outdoors in Oslo. Beth, running Lockdown in 
Stockholm,  gets an output of ‘unsafe’, meaning that it is 
 dangerous to go outdoors in Stockholm. Lockdown’s 
 outputs  are thus context- sensitive—a Lockdown output 
of  ‘safe’ means, roughly, that it is safe here, where 
‘here’  picks  out  the place being evaluated on that run of 
Lockdown.
There are two interrelated problems about representational 
content that are raised by an AI system like Lockdown. 
First,  if Lockdown’s contents are best understood as 
 context- sensitive, stating that things are safe or unsafe in the 
context of utterance, what counts as the context of utterance? 
Second, what determines that these kinds of AI outputs are 
context- sensitive, rather than context- insensitive? How does 
an appropriately de- anthropocentrized metasemantic story 
predict which AI outputs are context- sensitive and which 
are not?
These four cases illustrate the kinds of complexity that will arise 
in developing a complete externalism for ML systems. One 
 possibility here that we find quite plausible is this: many of these 
questions do not have predetermined answers. What will count as 
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a correct answer in many of these cases will depend on decisions 
we as speakers (and as speech communities) make as the engage-
ment with ML systems become more entrenched. Maybe in 100 
years, we will have developed stable patterns of how to interpret 
these kinds of cases.
6
APPLICATION
Names and the Mental Files Framework
Does SmartCredit Use Names?
In the previous chapter, we outlined a proposal for how a de- anthropocentrized version of Kripke’s theory could explain 
how SmartCredit could represent the property of being high risk. 
In the sentence we started with ‘Lucie is high risk’, that property is 
attributed to a person, Lucie. We now turn to the question of how 
SmartCredit can refer to Lucie.
An initial observation: we cannot assume that the lexical item 
‘Lucie’ plays a significant role in SmartCredit’s neural network. 
What happens is this: some information about Lucie is initially fed 
into the system. This will include various financial and demo-
graphic information. The system will then ‘collect’ more informa-
tion. If we idealize a bit, we can think of the system as ending up 
with a potentially enormous collection, C, of information. What 
SmartCredit is then programmed to do is assess whether an indi-
vidual that has all the properties in C is high or low risk. In the 
case we have been considering, the conclusion is that the individ-
ual is high risk. If this is the right description, SmartCredit is dif-
ferent from regular English speakers in that proper names play a 
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever, Oxford University Press (2021). 
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rather limited role in its computational structure. Property clus-
ters play a central role. What we assume when we translate the 
output into the sentence: ‘Lucie is high risk’ is that Lucie satisfies a 
certain property cluster. We can think of the output as in effect 
being of the form:
Something satisfying C is high risk.
Then there’s a background assumption, that a particular person, 
Lucie, satisfies C.  What happens at the output point is that this 
assumption is added and we present the output as if it’s directly 
about Lucie, i.e. as:
Lucie is high risk.
If the story we’ve just told is correct, that presentation of the out-
put is tendentious because it relies on an implicit assumption: 
that the person we refer to with the name ‘Lucie’ is someone who 
satisfies C.
One advantage of this picture is that, if correct, it means that we 
don’t need to add an account of how SmartCredit can have com-
petency with names. What we need is an account of how it can 
use the predicates that are components of C (and we gave an 
account of that in the previous chapter), and then an account of 
predication (which we will give in the next chapter).
A disturbing feature of this account is that the real output of 
SmartCredit, i.e. that something satisfying C is high risk, could become 
impossible to understand and track. The property cluster that C is 
an abbreviation for will potentially track properties and intercon-
nections between properties that we cannot express. Initially, the 
input we give SmartCredit might be tractable for us, but as it starts 
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collecting information from varied sources, the resulting com-
plexity will, in many cases, be too complex for a human mind, 
even if we did have the terminology to express it.
If the output is something we cannot grasp, that makes the 
assumption that Lucie satisfies the conditions in C one we cannot 
fully grasp (or understand). If we can’t grasp it, we can’t assess it. 
In other words, we are then building in a tacit assumption that 
we’re incapable of assessing. Since C will contain an enormous 
amount of information, we can safely assume that it will fre-
quently happen that some of the information doesn’t apply to the 
individual to whom we take it to apply, in this case Lucie. We then 
face questions about how to treat the output of SmartCredit when 
some, but not all or most, of the information in C fails to apply to 
the individual we interpret the output to be about.
In other words, if SmartCredit has no capacity for representing 
in some way analogous to how we represent using proper names, 
then we face both communicative and epistemic obstacles in our 
engagement with it.
The Mental Files Framework to the Rescue?
We just outlined some problems for a certain model of how AI 
represents Lucie. Anyone familiar with the last 120 years of 
phil oso phy of language will recognize that analogues of these 
problems have been extensively discussed. One of the funda-
mental divides in the literature is between theories according to 
which names are clusters of descriptions and theories accord-
ing to which they are not. In the above paragraph, we in effect 
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first proposed a descriptivist view and then raised some prob-
lems for it.
Rather than rehearse that entire debate here, we will do as we 
did in the section of predicates: use one of the standard theories 
and see if it can be applied to an AI system like SmartCredit. The 
framework we will appeal to is the so- called mental file frame-
work. Early work on this includes Lockwood (1971), Perry (1980), 
and Evans (1982). Recanati (2012) is a recent and comprehensive 
presentation and defence of the view. In what follows, we will rely 
in large part on Recanati’s view.
At the core of the theory is the idea that human cognition cen-
trally involves clusters of properties. In saying that they are clus-
ters, we mean that the properties are presented as co- instantiated. 
Such clusters are, in this literature, called mental files. Using the 
metaphor of files, we can talk of the files as consisting of proper-
ties, where that is to say that these properties are co- instantiated. 
Here is Aiden Gray’s useful summary of the view:
The role of a file is to collect and store information derived from a 
single object. Files are temporally enduring—an agent maintains a 
file over time, adding new information derived from the same 
object. A thinker can employ a file to think and reason about the 
referent of the file. (Gray 2016: 348)
Three important observations about the properties contained 
in a file:
1. A negative thesis: The object the file is about is not the 
object that has all the properties in the file. In Evans’ 
terminology: the denotation of a file is not achieved 
through fit.
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2. A positive thesis: Reference to an object is determined 
by various external relations. We’ll say more about these 
below; they can be epistemic, historical, and causal.
3. A corollary: The file for a person, say Lucie, can fail to 
describe her: As long as the external connection holds 
between Lucie and the file, the file is about Lucie even if all 
the information contained in it fails to apply to Lucie.
According to the mental file framework, we should think of 
proper names as associated with mental files. For each name, a 
different mental file. The files can evolve over time (as we gain and 
lose information), can be combined, and can sometimes be 
divided.
Two important questions arise for this kind of view. First, what 
does it take for a mental file to be associated with a name: e.g. 
under what conditions is a file the Lucie- file? The leading theorists 
are quite vague on this. Again, Gray gives a good description:
One sometimes sees the claim that a particular file is ‘labeled’ with a 
name—for example, Recanati (2012, pg. 190) and Lockwood (1971, pg. 
208). This is, at best, a placeholder for an account of the connection 
between a file and a name, and, at worst, a misleading metaphor.
We think Gray is right that the mental file framework is deeply 
metaphorical and that these metaphors are both integral to the 
attractiveness of the view and potentially misleading. Our heads 
contain no real files, no labels, and no filing cabinets. Insofar as 
the theory trades heavily on these metaphors, it’s in danger of 
misleading us. But for now, we’ll put those concerns aside. We’ll 
focus on the good parts of the theory and use them to help us 
understand SmartCredit.
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The second question that is important for our purposes is how 
to understand the relation between a file and its referent. We know 
from 1 and 2 above that it’s not through fit, but through some kind 
of external relation. To assess the theory, we will need more 
details. Recanati’s favoured term for the relation is ‘epistemically 
rewarding’. He says:
The characteristic feature of the relations on which mental files are 
based, and which determine their reference, is that they are epi-
stem ic al ly rewarding [. . .] They enable the subject to gain informa-
tion from the objects to which he stands in these relations.
(Recanati 2012: 35)
Perception of an object is a paradigm of an epistemically reward-
ing relation. That, however, obviously cannot be the full story 
about names because we can talk about Cicero using ‘Cicero’ 
despite never smelling or touching or hearing or seeing him. So if 
we use ‘Cicero’ to talk about Cicero in virtue of having a file that 
stands in an epistemically rewarding relation to Cicero, then such 
relations must include, for example, information gained through 
testimony.
Epistemically Rewarding Relations  
for Neural Networks?
To extend Recanati’s framework AI, we need to de- anthropocentrize 
the notion of an epistemically rewarding relation. We have ideas 
about what would constitute such relations for humans and, 
as we have seen, perception is often presented as a paradigm. 
Independently of considerations having to do with AI, we know 
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that this is too anthropocentric: surely there can be creatures that 
refer using, say, ‘Lucie’ to refer to Lucie, just as we do, but don’t 
perceive the world the way we do or, more generally, gain know-
ledge about the world in ways completely different from us. Maybe 
they rely entirely on telepathy. Maybe they gain knowledge in 
ways we have never thought of or cannot fully understand. It 
would be parochial to stipulate that such creatures cannot use 
‘Lucie’ to refer to Lucie.
The kinds of AI that we are discussing are, to a significant extent, 
alien. In particular, the algorithms governing neural networks will 
do things we don’t or can’t fully understand. As a result, the epi-
stem ic al ly rewarding relation will look different from the human 
paradigms.
What we need to do is familiar by now: the models developed 
by mental file theorists must be de- anthropocentrized and applied 
to AI systems like SmartCredit. The resulting theory should sat-
isfy the two core elements of our positive theory:
•  It will be externalist (because the relation between a file 
and the object the file is about is external to the speaker).
•  It will be developed by abstracting away from 
 anthropocentric components of existing theories.
Note that when Recanati and other mental file theorists describe 
epistemically rewarding relations that human speakers rely on, 
they do so in rather abstract terms. They don’t, for example, go 
into the details of how particular perceptual systems like smell or 
touch work (and end up being epistemically rewarding). They are 
not even particularly clear on just what counts as ‘rewarding’ or 
‘epistemic’. It’s just assumed that, say, perception is a paradigm of 
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something that’s an epistemically rewarding relation. Similarly, it 
is not to be expected that our theory goes into great detail of all 
the various epistemically rewarding and reference determining 
relations that AIs stand in to objects. What we have to say here 
will be at a fairly high level of abstraction.
The first step is to appeal to the meta- metasemantic principle 
of knowledge maximization from Chapter  4. According to this 
prin ciple, the relevant epistemically rewarding relation should be 
knowledge maximizing. The most natural way to do that is to 
build knowledge maximization directly into the account of ‘epi-
stem ic al ly rewarding’. Gray cites the following passage from 
Williamson:
A causal relation to an object (property, relation, . . .) is a channel for 
reference to it only if it is a channel for the acquisition of knowledge 
about the object (property, relation).
(Williamson 2007, 264, ellipses in original)
The more detailed story then is an answer to the following question: 
which specific such relation maximizes the interpreter’s knowledge 
if used to determine reference? The answer to this will to a large 
extent vary between AI systems. It will depend on the details of how 
the system works, how it was created, and how it is used.
In saying this, we don’t mean to be defeatist about a general the-
ory. Some of the material from the previous chapter is directly rele-
vant here. In Chapter 5, we developed an account of anchoring for 
predicates that relied on the idea that a property anchors a training 
process. In many cases, elements of the training process will also be 
important in understanding the epistemically rewarding relation 
to an object that determines reference of singular terms. Here it is 
natural to appeal to some of the central notions developed by 
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Gareth Evans (one of the early proponents of mental file theory). 
According to Evans, the denotation of the use of a term T is fixed by 
what he called the ‘dominant source’ of the information associated 
with T. This was the way Evans developed Kripke’s causal theory. 
He agreed with Kripke that reference is not fixed by descriptive fit, 
i.e. not fixed by what the associated descriptions pick out. However, 
he diverged from Kripke in giving the associated descriptions a 
reference- determining role: not through fit, but through an exter-
nal causal relation. The notion of a dominant causal source is now 
at the centre of the theory and will need further elaboration. 
However, for our purposes, we will simply use this schematic idea 
and apply it to AI. The schematic idea is this:
Denotation through dominant causal source: A system can denote an 
object that is the dominant causal source of a set of information 
given as input in the training stage.
If we return to our simple case of SmartCredit and Lucie, the ini-
tial stage involves information being fed into the system. Call the 
conjunction of that, C. Think of C as a mental file. There will be an 
object that is the dominant causal source of C. If things go well, 
this will be Lucie. If so, SmartCredit can refer to Lucie through 
Lucie being the dominant causal source of C. If so, it is correct to 
describe the output of the system as being of the form: Lucie is high 
risk (and not just: ‘Someone satisfying C is high risk’).
Case Studies, Complications, and Reference Shifts
There are several concerns about Evans’ theory. Central among 
these is that we need more clarity in what counts as a dominant 
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source of a body of information. That it is dominance that deter-
mines reference means that not all of the associated information 
needs to have the referent as a source: there can be misinforma-
tion mixed in that doesn’t have the referent as a source. Evans is 
also clear that dominance is not simply a matter of quantity: it is 
not a matter of a simplistic counting information and then locat-
ing the source of the majority. Some of the information is more 
heavily weighted than others. Evans is also clear that over time, 
dominance can shift. He illustrates this with the example of 
‘Turnip’ (1973: 306). The example involves a youth, A, with the 
nickname ‘Turnip’. He leaves his village at an early age. Many years 
later, a different person, B, settles in the village. The old villagers 
believe that A has returned and refers to B using ‘Turnip’. At first, 
the dominant causal source associated with ‘Turnip’ will be the 
A. Over time, however, this can change: the dominant source of 
information can be shifted from A to B.  In Evans’ example, it’s 
easy to see how that can happen: as villagers see more and more of 
B, the file associated with ‘Turnip’ will gradually fill up with more 
significant information that has B as its source. The information 
that has A has its source will gradually fade into relative insignifi-
cance. The possibility of a name shifting referent over time was 
one of the central motivations for Evans’ theory. Evans argued that 
Kripke’s theory couldn’t account for such reference shifts and that 
his alternative could do so easily.
We mention this because the kind of flexibility that Evans’ ver-
sion of the mental file theory provides can be useful for interpret-
ing AI. First, it should be possible for the initial data to contain 
what we would naturally classify as misinformation about A. One 
way this could happen: some of the descriptive material, D, in the 
A- file has another object, B, as its source. It correctly characterizes 
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B, but fails to describe A. As long as B isn’t the dominant source of 
the information in the file, the file as a whole can have A as its 
denotation. It simply contains the misinformation that A is 
D. Moreover, gradual shifts can happen as follows: the informa-
tion we feed the system can initially have Lucie as its dominant 
source. As information is added over time, the dominant source 
can shift to another person. This can happen in two ways:
(i) What counts as dominant information can shift even if 
the total amount of information doesn’t shift. This can 
happen even as the informational content of a file in an AI 
system is stable.
(ii) Information can be added to the file. This can change the 
dominant causal source and that again can result in 
reference shift for the file as a whole.
Whether (i) is an option will depend on how dominance is under-
stood. As we see it, dominance is unlikely to be understood inde-
pendently of human interests. What counts as dominance is not 
an objective feature that can be read off the world independently 
of what interpreters care about. If that is right, then a gradual 
change in what we care about can result in a change in what the 
file refers to. Note that these issues about how to understand dom-
in ance comprise a meta- metasemantic question. Our guiding 
principle is knowledge- maximization and it tells us that dom in-
ance should be construed in a knowledge- maximizing way.
Many cases will not fit cleanly into either of (i) or (ii) above. 
Consider the following: suppose we have an AI system that is set 
up to make assessments of economic health. Initially, it is fed 
information about the economic situation in the US. It starts 
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giving outputs of the form ‘The economic outlook is G’. Since 
the US is the dominant source of the information the system is 
operating on, we should interpret this to mean that the economic 
outlook in the US is G.  Doing so is knowledge- maximizing. 
Now suppose that over time, the system starts to focus more 
specifically on the input of economic data from California (it is 
still using the entire data set, but changes its focus to California). 
This could happen for several reasons: maybe that turns out to 
be the data that’s most predictive or that its algorithms can do 
the most with. It keeps producing outputs of the form ‘Economy 
is doing great’ or ‘Economy is doing poorly’. Now we ask: which 
economy does it refer to, the US, or just California, or some-
thing else?
The general form of an answer to that is guided by the general 
principle that it refers to whatever place it’s in an epistemically 
rewarding relation to. Our knowledge- maximizing principle tells 
us to construe ‘epistemically rewarding’ as a relation that is know-
ledge maximizing for us as interpreters/users. However, just say-
ing that leaves us with a range of possible outcomes. Here is one 
possible outcome: it might turn out that its predictions are more 
accurate about California, although it does well enough for the US 
as a whole. If so, there are competing considerations for how to 
understand ‘maximizing’. It will matter what we care the most 
about: precise knowledge or maximally general knowledge? The 
answer to that, again, might depend on what we are going to do 
with this information and how we use it to generate further 
knowledge. This case shows how the metasemantics, guided by 
knowledge- maximization, will be sensitive to our interests and 
activities in ways that are hard to predict.
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Next consider an AI system used by law enforcement to help 
determine who is guilty of various crimes. It’s in effect an AI- 
 detective and it tells about the degree of guilt of various subjects. 
Initially, we feed it information about Lucie’s activities. After pro-
cessing these, it outputs ‘Innocent’, if it finds no violations of any 
laws. If Lucie has had a couple of speeding tickets, the output is 
‘Guilty of minor traffic violations’. The referential issue is fairly 
simple since Lucie remains the dominant source of information 
throughout. Here is a more complicated case: we start to feed it 
data about a supposed mob family. The data includes a broad 
range of actions performed by several people over a period of 
time. This makes the referential question more difficult to settle. 
We need to decide whether it is tracking guilt of the organization, or 
guilt of specific people in the organization. After all, if the organization 
is guilty, that is the result of various crimes committed by the 
members of the crime family. In tracking the family, it is tracking 
the individuals. We can use the knowledge- maximization prin-
ciple to help us adjudicate: is the epistemically rewarding relation, 
i.e. the knowledge- maximizing relation, one that leads to the fam-
ily or to particular individuals? As in the previous case, that might 
depend on our interests and what we end up doing with that 
knowledge. It could, for example, depend on how we use it to 
generate new knowledge.
What both these cases are meant to illustrate is that the correct 
externalist interpretations can be sensitive to variations in our 
epistemic goals and practices. This follows quite naturally from 
the general principle of aiming for a metasemantics that maxi-
mizes knowledge. The measure of maximization can vary in 
various ways and the two cases illustrate that.
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Taking Stock
Here is what we have done:
1. We started with an outline of the mental file metasemantic 
framework.
2. We observed that the details of this metasemantics aren’t 
straightforwardly applicable to AI systems—in particular, 
we need to abstract on the notion of an epistemically 
rewarding relation.
3. We took some initial steps toward de- anthropocentrizing, 
proposing an AI- friendly version of epistemically rewarding.
4. Finally, we outlined some choice points for that theory, 
using Evans’ notion of a dominant source of information.
As in the case of predicates discussed in Chapter 5, this proposal is 
schematic, though not more so than the theories it is modelled on. 
It reinforces the conclusion from Chapter 4: the standard internal-
ist approaches to AI have significant limitations. We cannot dis-
cover all the facts about the contents of the machine learning 
system’s classifications simply by looking at the internal program-
ming implementation of those systems. What discussion in this 
chapter concludes is that we need to focus in particular on the 
interpreters’ epistemic goals and activities. What the AI system is 




In the previous two chapters, we’ve sketched metasemantic  stories that specify the facts in virtue of which SmartCredit 
refers to Lucie and the property high risk in its output tokening of 
‘Lucie is high risk’. However, getting metasemantic stories that 
ground the meanings of these component parts of SmartCredit’s 
output is arguably insufficient. We also need to explain why 
SmartCredit, in combining the expressions ‘Lucie’ and ‘is high 
risk’ in its output, doesn’t just mention a person and a property, 
but also predicates the property of the person. In short: can 
SmartCredit (and other AI systems) produce or entertain or 
express full propositions?
In the philosophical literature, there is a very venerable litera-
ture about the nature of propositions. Our focus in what follows 
will not be about whether propositions are abstract entities, struc-
tured, etc. Our concern is primarily with the phenomenon called 
variously entertaining or expressing a proposition by predicating a 
property of an object. We are interested in predication qua an 
important semantic phenomenon, not qua a solution to the prob-
lem of the unity of propositions or the nature of propositions.
We’ll pause here for a moment and recall the unrefuted sceptic 
from Chapter  2: according to him, what we are doing now is 
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever, Oxford University Press (2021). 
© Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192894724.003.0007
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adding mistakes on top of our earlier mistakes. The earlier mis-
takes, according to the sceptic, were to look for genuine reference 
in the output of AI. We hope that a sceptic reading the previous 
chapters would react a bit concessively: maybe, they might say, 
there’s a case to be made for reference to the property of being 
high risk and to Lucie, along the lines suggested. However, that 
need not be accompanied by conceding that the further step of 
finding a complete proposition (that Lucie is high risk) in the AI out-
put is reasonable, nor agreeing that we should attribute to the sys-
tem a commitment to that propositional content.
As before, our response is this: while we’re not unsympathetic 
to the sceptic’s position, we think the best way to test it is to try to 
see if an account of propositional content can be found. This is 
particularly important because there are hardly any efforts to do so. 
If you end up convinced that what we are about to propose is a 
potential way forward, then that’s progress. If you find our effort 
entirely unconvincing, then it’s a bit of additional support for the 
sceptic.
Predication: Brief Introduction  
to the Act Theoretic View
To understand the full range of AI content, we need to think that 
SmartCredit can not only denote Lucie and the property high 
risk, but also predicate the property of being high risk to Lucie. In 
order to create a model of how that can happen, we need to 
understand the act of predication. Here we encounter the same 
kind of dilemma we’ve faced throughout this book: there are 
very many theories of predication. Our book is brief and we 
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 cannot comprehensively engage with that entire literature. What 
we will do instead is explore these issues against the background 
of a particular theory: the act theoretic view. An obvious draw-
back of this strategy is that if you, our reader, is adamantly 
opposed to this view, what follows will at best be of conditional 
interest to you. We hope, however, that the general strategy (of 
de-anthropocentrizing a view of predication) will be of use to 
you, even if the way we implement it isn’t.
The view we will work with for the sake of argument is found 
most recently in the work of Scott Soames and Peter Hanks (we’ll 
mostly be focusing on their respective monographs, both from 
2015, but see also Soames 2019, and, for a slightly larger overview 
of the logical space of contemporary theories in this vein, Soames 
et al. 2014). According to Soames and Hanks, propositions are act 
types. They don’t have intrinsic representational properties. 
Token acts (of the relevant type) are the original bearers of repre-
sentation, truth conditions, and truth value. This is a change from 
traditional ways of thinking about propositions and representa-
tional objects more generally. They’ve traditionally been thought 
of as entities that somehow had an existence independent of the 
act of grasping them. The Fregean picture was of the mind as 
reaching out to—or grasping—entities that had existence inde-
pendently of the act of grasping. The act type view reverses that 
picture: the primary explanatory element is the act of predication. 
Propositions understood as abstract objects, are act types instan-
tiated by those token acts.
What is the act of predicating? Soames takes this to be a primi-
tive notion. It picks out something we can easily recognize. For 
example, to think that Lucie is high risk involves denoting high risk, 
denoting Lucie, and then predicating the former of the latter. This 
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token act of predicating belongs to a type. That type is the prop os­
ition that Lucie is high risk. The proposition that Lucie is high risk (i.e. 
the act type) has representational properties derivatively: it’s the 
token act of that type that is true or false.
Is it an objection to Soames’s view that he doesn’t offer us an 
analysis of predication? He thinks not, and we agree. As he writes:
One might ask what we mean by ‘predication’—what, in effect, the 
analysis of predication is. Although it is unclear that an informative 
answer can be given to this question, it is equally unclear that this is 
anything to worry about. Some logical and semantic notions—like 
negation—are primitive. Since this elementary point typically 
doesn’t provoke hand- wringing, it is hard to see why the primitive-
ness of predication should. (Soames 2015: 30)
Although primitivism about predication is defensible, it’s worth 
considering at least one opposing view which tries to say more. 
The essence of predication, according to Hanks, is the ability to 
sort things into groups:
Acts of predication are acts of sorting things into groups. When 
you predicate a property of an object you sort that object with 
other objects in virtue of their similarity with respect to the prop-
erty. To predicate the property of being green of something is to 
sort that thing with other green things. This act of sorting can be 
done behaviorally, for example by picking the object up and putt-
ing it with other green things, or it can be done in thought, by men-
tally grouping the object with other green things, or in speech, by 
saying that it is green. (Hanks 2015: 64)
So understood, the ability to predicate, i.e. categorize, is a basic 
biological function that human beings share with the rest of the 
animal kingdom. Hanks approvingly cites Susan Gelman, who 
says:
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[A]ll organisms form categories: even mealworms have category- 
based preferences, and higher- order animals such as pigeons or 
octopi can display quite sophisticated categorical judgments.
(Gelman 2003: 11)
Hanks uses the example of sniffer wasps (and bees) to illustrate 
how basic this ability is. Sniffer wasps can be trained to do vari-
ous things, for example, detect landmines (and also various nar-
cotic substances). In so doing, the wasp, according to Hanks, 
predicates the property of smelling like—for example—TNT to 
various objects. The act of predication, on this view, is the act of 
flying to those things.1
In the rest of this chapter, we explore whether a de- 
anthropocentrized version of the act theoretic view can be applied 
to AI systems. If that can be done, there is some evidence that the 
final step is achievable: Not only can SmartCredit denote the prop-
erty of being high risk and Lucie, it can also predicate the former 
of the latter.
Turning to AI and Disentangling Three  
Different Questions
In order to understand predication in AI, we’ll disentangle three 
difference questions that are not always separated in the literature:
Q1: What is it in a sentence that means predication? There are  several 
candidates for what that may be:
1 Absent the ability to use language to characterize its mental act, there is an 
irresolvable indeterminacy in the content of the wasp’s judgement. Nothing fixes 
what the wasp judges or believes.
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(i) the concatenation of subject and predicate;
(ii) the space between subject and predicate; and
(iii)  the root note in a tree having subject and predicate as 
daughter nodes.
The choice of syntactic object will depend on your background 
syntax and assumptions about how syntax, at the most basic 
level, interfaces with semantics. We won’t take a stand on that 
here (for some helpful discussion, see King 2007 especially 
33–6). What is important is that there’s some syntactic feature 
that means or expresses predication. The question of how that 
syntactic feature ended up expressing predication is different 
from the question of what predication is, just as the question 
of how names—for example—ended up referring is different 
from the question of what reference is.
Q2: Which mental act is the mental act of predication? According to 
the act theoretic view, there is some kind of mental act that 
humans (and other animals, e.g. wasps) can perform. That act 
is, in part, constitutive of propositions. Since this act will be 
implemented in different ways in different animals, we can ask: 
how do we identify the particular mental state that is the act of 
predication? Moreover, since it’s plausible that syntactic predi-
cation expressed in language somehow represents the mental 
act of predication we’re assuming, having a grasp of what the 
latter is like will help us understand what syntactic predication 
expresses.
Q3: The metasemantics of predication: Having distinguished (1) and 
(2), we can distinguish two metasemantic questions:
(a) Why does this bit of syntax (i.e. the act of con cat en-
ation) mean predication? How did that part of syntax end up 
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 having that meaning? (Analogous to how we can ask: how 
does a name end up having the referent that it does?)
(b) Why does this mental act mean predication? That 
might seem like a surprising question, but the underlying 
motivation for it is this: it is not just the intrinsic features 
of that act which makes it an act of predication. We’ll see 
below that it is, in part, the functional role of that act—
and we’ll suggest that functional role can be spelled out in 
a teleofunctional way.
Note that both of these lattermost questions are questions in 
metasemantics that pattern with the metasemantic questions we 
have discussed about ‘high risk’ and ‘Lucie’ in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The three questions are closely connected. For Soames or Hanks, 
the answer to question (1) is that the relevant bit of syntax roughly 
expresses the performance of the mental act. The answer to (1) 
therefore partly depends on the answer to (2). However, the answer 
to (1) is not fully derivative of the answer to (2) because in order to 
answer (1), we need two things. Firstly, we need an answer to (3a), 
i.e. an account of why concatenation (or whatever) is hooked up 
to this mental act, rather than to something else. We also need an 
answer to (3b), i.e. a metasemantic explanation for why the mental 
act means what it does.
The Metasemantics of Predication: 
A Teleofunctionalist Hypothesis
At this point we are going to add a new theory to the mix: teleofunc-
tionalism. We do this for three reasons. First, it seems to us natural 
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to think that this is, at least in part, a motivating thought behind the 
act theoretic view. Second, we want to use this as yet another 
illustration of how externalist theories can be helpful in giving an 
account of interpretable AI. Third, in de- anthropocentrizing the 
notion of predication we find in contemporary philosophy of 
language, we will need to find some way of identifying predication 
independently of its realization by human mental states, and 
functionalist theories in general are well- placed to do this.
As we interpret the act theoretic view, it identifies a mental 
act, A, that we perform. What makes A an act of predication? 
Well, it’s because the characteristic function of that act is to give 
rise to states of belief/judgement in us, which then give rise to 
characteristic kinds of behaviour. There’s a familiar functionalist 
story sitting in the background here—to know what something 
represents, think about what kind of representational content 
would make sense of that something as a mediator between its 
characteristic inputs and outputs. It’s then teleofunctional because 
what matters is not the actual input/output performance, but 
what it’s intended/designed/evolved to do. We can summarize 
this as the TF- Hypothesis:
TF­ Hypothesis: A mental act is the act of predication because of its 
teleofunctional role in giving rise to judgements that guide action.
The basic idea is that no mental act can be the act of predication 
in isolation from the function it performs. The relevant func-
tion is that of giving rise to judgements that then guide action. 
If a mental act doesn’t give rise to judgements that play a role in 
guiding action, it would not be the act of predication. In the 
case of the sniffer wasp, the act of flying to a location is followed 
by acts of trying to extract sugar (that’s how they are trained: 
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the TNT is laced with sugar and so the sniffer wasps are condi-
tioned to fly to objects that smell like TNT). In the case of 
humans, the actions we perform are infinitely richer and impos-
sible to make precise (and the claim we are making doesn’t 
require that it can be).
In sum, the first part of the proposal is this: (i) a mental act can-
not be the act of predication in isolation from function; (ii) the 
relevant function is that of giving rise to judgements that guide 
action; and (iii) that we perform acts with this function can be 
explained along teleofunctional lines. This gives us a way of iden-
tifying predication of the sort that Soames and Hanks are con-
cerned with without committing ourselves to any particular 
architecture that implements it.
Some Background: Teleosemantics and 
Teleofunctional Role
To understand our appeal to teleofunctional role, it will be helpful 
to say a few words about teleosemantic theories more generally. 
The basic thought is that the very fact that we (and, as we’re argu-
ing, AI systems) have content, as well as the particular contents we 
(and they) have is to be explained in terms of the idea of function. 
Paradigmatically, for teleosemanticists, these functions are bio-
logical. Thus, for example, the function of the heart is to pump 
blood; that’s what it’s there for, where in turn this notion of a par-
ticular thing being there for a particular function is to be cashed out 
in terms of evolutionary history—of natural selection. We evolved 
hearts because they are efficient ways to help spread oxygen and 
nutrients around the body (roughly).
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The basic idea behind teleosemantics is that we treat represen-
tations just like we treat any biological adornment. Why does a 
cat represent birds? Well, why does a cat have whiskers? The 
answer to the latter question—roughly, we aren’t vets—is that 
whiskers help cats navigate tight spaces. Having whiskers confers 
an advantage on cats, an advantage that in their evolutionary pre-
history made them more apt at navigating their environment than 
similar felids which lacked whiskers. The whiskered cats success-
fully reproduced more, and so whiskers were selected for.
The same applies to contents. A cat that has no capacity to repre-
sent birds is a poor cat. It will miss out on opportunities for food, 
and so is less likely to thrive and reproduce, and so less likely to 
prod uce other cats. Cats that can represent birds will be well- fed 
and attractive mates, and more likely to produce other cats, which 
will be more likely than not themselves to be able to represent birds.
There are many teleosemantic theories, and many objections to 
teleosemantic theories, and while it’s beyond both our aims here 
and our ability to decide between them, it will be useful to con-
sider briefly some options and live questions which are relevant 
for this book. So, we might wonder what sort of representations 
we can attribute on the basis of teleosemantic reasoning. We con-
sidered attributing content like that associated with the full sen-
tence ‘there is a bird there’ to our cat, but can we also attribute 
sub- sentential contents, such as representations of ᴄᴀᴛꜱ, or—
more abstractly and difficulty—ʙᴇɪɴɢ ᴛʜᴇʀᴇ? Theorists like David 
Papineau (presented in, for example, 1987, and more recently 
defending against some objections in 2001) think that our content 
attributions should be ‘top- down’, concentrating on representa-
tions of full beliefs and desires primarily as opposed to their 
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component concepts (if the latter exist at all). Others—and this 
will arguably be particularly relevant for us—point out that this 
theory struggles with creatures that lack evolutionary history, or 
with creatures whose evolutionary history didn’t involve the 
things they represent. It’s good that we don’t attribute iPad 
thoughts to cats, because they evidently don’t care about them. 
We do greatly care about iPads, but iPads don’t really figure in 
the history—on the evolutionary timescale—of our species. 
Davidson’s famous Swampman example (1987) is of a creature 
molecule by molecule identical to us created by some—say—
quantum mechanical fluke which, as such, has no evolutionary 
history (because it isn’t the child of a child of a child . . . whose lin-
eage is shaped by natural selection). To such a creature, it seems, 
we can’t attribute any selected- for biological function, and thus 
no content—an arguably bad result.
Some wonder whether behaviour and evolutionary history are 
sufficient to give us determinate representations. Thus Fodor (1990) 
complains that considering functions will run into extensionality 
problems familiar from the philosophy of content in general. If we 
want to attribute to a frog the concept ꜰʟʏ because it behaves as if 
it has the concept, should not we equally want to attribute to it the 
concept of ꜱᴍᴀʟʟ, ᴅᴀʀᴋ, ꜰʟʏɪɴɢ ᴛʜɪɴɢ? After all—at least if we 
stipulate that all and only flies are small, dark flying things—the 
two functions seem identical from a biological point of point. 
Content, the objection goes, is indeterminate in a way that is 
un attract ive.
Let us emphasize: this is very much scratching the surface of a 
gigantic debate. There are many sophisticated accounts out there 
and an ongoing research program concerned with dealing with 
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issues like the above.2 But, for our purposes, it doesn’t matter. 
Just  as  we were happy to take the basic Kripkean picture, 
 deanthropocentrize a bit, and see how far we could get, so the fore-
going superficial survey of teleosemantics suffices for our purposes.
We use some of the ideas behind basic teleosemantics in a new 
way: to give an account of how a certain state can mean predica-
tion and also to give an account of what predication is.
Predication in AI
For AI, we can raise questions analogous to Q1–Q3. Start with the 
assumption that there is some aspect of the AI output that 
expresses predication. There is an initial question how to identify 
that external aspect of AI predication. Here are some options:
•  If the output is linguistic in form, then maybe the answer 
here is the same as the answer in the normal linguistic case.
•  However, not all AI outputs need be in linguistic form: If 
AlphaZero just moves pieces on the board (maybe it’s 
connected to a magnetic system that lets it move the pieces), 
we can ask: what aspect of its output counts as the 
predication of ‘good to move to A4’ to the queen? One 
possible answer appeals to teleofunctionalism: that’s the 
designed function of that aspect of the output.
2 Thus we haven’t mentioned Ruth Millikan’s seminal work (1984, 1989a,b), or 
Nicholas Shea’s sophisticated recent account (2018). And we haven’t considered 
the important work of Karen Neander (2006, 1991, 1996). Again, the sole reason 
for this is that we don’t think it has immediate bearing on the points to be made 
in this chapter. For an overview and more references, see Neander (2018).
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For our purposes, we don’t need to take a stand on the correct 
account of how predication is realized in the system. We’ll just 
assume it is realized in some aspect, A, of the output. We can then 
ask (on analogy with Q1): why does A mean predication?
There is also an analogy with question Q2 above: we can assume 
that as in the human case, there is an aspect of the machine’s ‘inner 
life’ that is predication (on analogy with the ‘inner’ human judge-
ment that can be expressed, e.g. linguistically). Again, it’s an open 
(and interesting question) what this is. Some options include:
• the system’s computation;
•  internal contentful states of the sort that get called 
‘ intentional internals’ in the AI literature; and
• some interactive aspect of how we use the AI.
If there is some such inner state, ST, then the feature we called A 
above only expresses predication derivatively: it is teleofunctionally 
connected to ST. ST, on this view, is the ‘real’ act of predication. A 
expresses predication derivatively, by being teleofunctionally con-
nected to ST.
AI Predication and Kinds of Teleology
Our proposal has incorporated an appeal to teleofunctionalism. 
One issue (of the many issues) we have not yet addressed is: what 
kind of teleology are we talking about when we talk about teleofunctionalism?
In answering this question, we can be guided by the meta- 
 metasemantic principle in Chapter 4: knowledge- maximization. 
That principle guided our metasemantic theory (which in turn 
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guided our interpretations). We can appeal to it here again in order 
to determine what the correct notion of teleology should be. The 
question then is: what kind of telos would be knowledge- 
 maximizing for us interpreters, if we took it to be the teleofunc-
tional role that makes a state into the state of predication?
The answer to this is far from obvious. Here are some options:
• The first place to look is at the design stage: the AI is 
designed by humans (or, sometimes, other AIs) and the 
designers will have in mind a functional role for the AI. So 
the simple answer is: the telos of the system is derived 
(maybe in some complex way) from that of its designers’ 
intentions. It is that intended function by virtue of 
which some internal state (or derivatively, an external 
mani fest ation) is predication.
• Alternatively, we could treat AIs as more wasp- like.  
We would then ask what promotes the AI’s own  
survival. ‘Survival’ in this case would need to be  
de-anthropocentrized—we look for whatever is the 
equivalent of survival for the AI system.
• A third alternative is to think about the goal, as derived 
from humans, not as derived from the AIs survival, but 
about the human- AI system as a whole. In this case, the 
telos is of the combination of humans and AI, not of one of 
those in isolation.
We are simply listing these as options. Our goal here is not to 
argue for a particular answer, but to show that there’s a rich field 
of inquiry that opens up when teleofunctionalism is introduced to 
help us understand and interpret AI.
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Why Teleofunctionalism and Not Kripke or Evans?
A reader might reasonably say: in previous chapters we appealed 
first to Kripke (to explain AI denotation of high risk), then to 
Evans (to explain AI denotation of Lucie), and then now we are 
suddenly using a teleofunctionalist framework to explain predica-
tion. The reader might then ask: what is going on here? Aren’t 
these competing frameworks? How can we selectively endorse all 
of them?
The first part of this answer to this is that we are not endorsing 
any of these metasemantic frameworks. Our goal is to show how 
they can be developed and adopted to understanding AI. We do so 
by de-anthropocentrizing guided by knowledge- maximization. If 
one or more of these strategies are promising, that’s at least the 
beginning of a reply to the representational sceptic, who argues 
that this project is not even worth pursuing. It is also an argument 
in favour of exploring the various externalist traditions in the 
phil oso phy of language. That tradition has not been sufficiently 
exploited in this domain. In short, part of the answer to ‘Why tele-
ofunctionalism?’ is: just so we can talk about another tool in the 
externalist toolkit, and continue to develop a general ‘think about 
the externalist relations of the AI system, not its internal compu-
tational states’ theme.
More specifically, it’s hard to see how any kind of tracking/
anchoring story could work for predication, because it’s not clear 
what the thing to be tracked/linked is, or what it would mean to 
track or link to it. Predication is the classic syncategorematic item, 
where you want to give meaning not directly, but via how it affects 
the meanings of other stuff. Conceptual role semantics is a natural 
thing to use for syncategorematic items (that’s why ‘and’ has 
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always been the best case for conceptual role semantics), and con-
ceptual role semantics is really just a special case of functionalism.
Teleofunctional Role and Commitment  
(or Assertion)
So far, we have sketched an explanation of what it is about 
SmartCredit (internally, externally, or both) that makes it the case 
that SmartCredit has propositional content: that it doesn’t just 
refer to Lucie and express the property of being high risk, but that 
it has the content that Lucie is high risk. So far, we have not explored 
the question of what it is about SmartCredit that makes it the case 
that SmartCredit takes a stand on that proposition: that it asserts 
that Lucie is high risk, or concludes that Lucie is high risk, or sug-
gests that Jones is high risk. Here is Soames on the distinction:
Although to entertain the proposition that o is red is to predicate 
redness of o, and so to represent o as red, it is not to commit oneself 
to o’s being red. We often predicate a property of something with-
out committing ourselves to its having the property, as when we 
imagine o as red, or merely visualize it as red. Hence, predication 
isn’t inherently committing. Nevertheless, some instances of it, e.g. 
those involved in judging or believing, are either themselves com-
mitting, or essential to acts that are. (Soames 2019: 2)
This is a point where Soames and Hanks disagree. As Hanks 
puts it:
an act of predicating greenness of something is correct just in case 
that thing is green. Correctness and incorrectness here are just 
truth and falsity . . . This means that the act is true just in case that 
thing is green. An act of predicating a property of an object is true 
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or false insofar as it can satisfy or fail to satisfy the correctness 
 conditions determined by the property. Acts of predication have 
truth conditions and truth- values. (Hanks 2015: 66)
For those sympathetic to Hanks’s view, commitment/assertion is 
built into predication and so we wouldn’t need a separate section 
on this.3 For the sake of argument, we will tentatively assume 
Soames’ view and see what can be added to get us from AI- 
 predication to AI- commitment.
Theories of Assertion and Commitment  
for Humans and AI
The question, then, is whether we can think of ML systems as 
committing to a content. To answer that, we need an account of 
what goes into that kind of commitment. Again, there’s a massive 
literature on this as applied to humans (for which see e.g. Brown 
and Cappelen 2011, or Goldberg forthcoming).
To explore the issue of whether ML systems can perform speech 
acts, we could proceed as we did above: we look at various the or-
ies of what it takes to perform speech acts, and then see whether 
ML systems satisfy those conditions. If we focus on just assertion, 
there are at least four categories of views:
(i)  Assertions are those sayings that are governed by certain 
norms—the norms of assertion.
(ii) Assertions are those sayings that have certain effects.
3 But it raises the question of how to understand embedded propositions in 
negation, conditionals, etc. See Hanks 2015: ch. 4 for further discussion.
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(iii) Assertions are those sayings that have certain causes.
(iv)  Assertions are those sayings that are ac com pan ied by 
certain commitments.
Within each of these categories of views, there’s a great deal of 
variation. For example, there are very many norm- based views 
and no agreement about what the relevant norms are. Here are 
some of the more prominent suggestions (see Cappelen 2011: 9 for 
this taxonomy and references):
Truth rule: One must: assert p only if p is true.
Warrant rule: One must: assert p only if one has warrant to 
assert p.
Knowledge rule: One must: assert p only if one knows p.
BK rule: One must: assert p only if one believes that one 
knows p.
RBK rule: One must: assert p only if one rationally believes that 
one knows that p.
Other theories of assertion construe it as an act of commitment. 
This view is found in a range of authors, going back to Pierce and 
continuing with people such as Brandom (Pierce 1934; Searle 1969; 
Brandom 1994). Here is a version of the view from John MacFarlane:
(W*) In asserting that p at C1, one commits oneself to withdrawing 
the assertion (in any future context C2), if p is shown to be untrue 
relative to context of use C1 and context of assessment C2.
(MacFarlane 2005: 320)
Here is a research project: for each of these, explore whether these 
are norms that can be followed by an ML system. Despite their 
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differences, they all raise the more general issue: what is it to follow 
or obey a norm and is that the kind of thing that an ML system can 
do? To investigate that question, we need an account both of the 
nature of norms and of what it is to follow them. Our prediction is 
that doing so will require using many of the same strategies we used 
above: you’ll find current theories parochial because of being too 
anthropocentric. Then you will need to engage in anthropocentric 
abstraction, and you’ll find some way to create a notion of ‘asser-
tion’ or ‘saying’ that can fit ML systems. This will have the added 
effect of improving normative theories of assertion or saying.
In this book we will not carry out this project, in part because 
one of the authors of this book is sceptical of the very category of 
assertion (Cappelen 2011) and the other sympathetic to the Hanks’ 
view that predication is committal (and so the theory of predica-
tion is all we need). That said, for those who want to pursue this 
project, the general meta- metasemantic principle from Chapter 4 
should still be of help. Applying the knowledge- maximizing prin-
ciple, we should expect the speech act of assertion to be such that 
it is knowledge- maximizing: we should expect assertion to be the 
kind of thing that maximizes knowledge for the audience member 
(i.e. the interpreters). If you were to pursue that line, the 
Williamsonian view that assertion is governed by the knowledge 
norm is tempting. However, endorsing that view also involves 
accepting that there are constitutive norms of assertion. That is an 
additional controversial assumption, but not one we will explore 
further in this book (but see the references above, in particular the 









This book does not aim to be a comprehensive treatment of all issues relevant to AI interpretability. That would require 
much more than what we have provided here. We have tried to 
focus on a small subset of issues that is relatively self- contained: 
how metasemantic work in the externalist tradition can be used to 
create models for AI interpretability. In this final chapter, we will 
end with four scattered thoughts that we hope will illuminate and 
develop some of the ideas in the previous chapters:
1. The first issue we address is an important direction for 
further work: philosophers need to engage in more detail 
with the fact that AI systems have certain kinds of dynamic 
goals.
2. Second, we explore what happens when someone sympa-
thetic to the views in this book also endorses a version of 
Clark and Chalmers’ thesis of the extended mind.
3. We revisit an objection to our entire approach: that we have 
not sufficiently explored the idea that we should give up 
talk of AI systems being representational or treat such talk 
as a form of make- belief.
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations. Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever, Oxford University Press (2021). 
© Herman Cappelen and Joshua Dever. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192894724.003.0008
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4. Finally, we return to the topic of explainable AI from the 
introduction, indicating what we think can be learnt about 
that movement from the metasemantic perspective taken 
in this book.
Dynamic Goals
The dynamic nature of neural networks gives rise to potential 
(and maybe actual) situations that makes the systems fundamen-
tally uninterpretable. In the discussion above, we have conveni-
ently ignored this feature of neural networks, but that’s maybe 
cheating slightly. Below we give a brief outline of the sorts of 
issues that arise and require further investigation.
We start with a little story that illustrates what we have in mind. 
We should emphasize that this is not science fiction—it is, in 
effect, a partial feature of all neural networks. Our story is just 
meant to highlight something that we have not sufficiently 
focused on.
A Story of Neural Networks Taking Over in  
Ways We Cannot Understand
Suppose you’ve decided to build a machine learning system to 
help a bank run its business. You start with a very specific 
 mandate. The bank makes many loans to individuals—some of 
these loans are repaid, but some are defaulted on and not repaid. 
The bank wants to minimize the number of defaulted loans. 
The difficulty, of course, lies in spotting, among loan applica-
tions, the likely repayers and the likely defaulters.
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Naturally enough, you begin with a supervised learning pro-
ject. The bank gives you access to thousands of actual prior loans 
and their eventual outcomes (repaid or defaulted). You train a 
machine learning system by giving it details about each loan and 
testing your system’s classification against the real loan outcome. 
(Of course, what details to give it about loans will be one of the 
difficult points. Perhaps you begin by giving the information pro-
vided on the loan application—income, savings, and some basic 
demographic information. But then you discover you get better 
outcomes by providing more input data. Eventually, following the 
pattern of companies like SmartCredit, you use the full social 
media history of a loan applicant as part of the input data for clas-
sification.) With adequate training, your program gets very good 
at sorting loan applications into defaulters and non- defaulters.
After a while, though, it occurs to you that you might do better. 
Your current program is very good, but not perfect, at finding 
defaulters. It makes occasional mistakes in both directions: some-
times it flags a loan application as a likely default when in fact the 
applicant doesn’t default (a false positive), and sometimes it 
doesn’t flag a loan application as a likely default but the applicant 
does in fact default (a false negative). Both false positives and false 
negatives are costly. False negatives directly cost the bank through 
loans that aren’t repaid; false positives cost the bank by denying it 
access to potential interest income. If your program could be per-
fect, eliminating all false positives and all false negatives, that 
would be ideal. But that’s not realistic—the available data just 
doesn’t definitively and perfectly reliably settle the outcome of 
every loan. Mistakes are going to happen.
Your goal so far has been to minimize mistakes. But you realize 
that that might not be ideal. Some mistakes are much costlier than 
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others. False negatives are costlier than false positives. And mis-
takes on large loans are costlier than mistakes on small loans. So 
you change the reinforcement learning pattern for your system. 
Now instead of just giving it a yes/no, default/no- default feedback 
on each loan application it evaluates, you give it a damage score 
feedback, telling it the amount of money that its evaluation has 
cost the bank, in light of the true outcome of the loan. The system 
is then trained to minimize damage scores.
It could well happen that the result is an increase in overall error 
rates in making default judgements. The machine learning system 
becomes sensitive to different patterns in the data, and those pat-
terns aren’t as well coordinated with the question of whether the 
loan will be defaulted, so it makes more mistakes of that sort. But 
the new patterns are well coordinated with something like costly 
default. One way to put this is that your program has changed from 
being a default detector to being a costly default detector. When 
we think of it in this way, there hasn’t really been an increase in the 
error rate. It’s true that more often now the machine learning sys-
tem says ‘yes’ for a loan that goes on to be defaulted on, and ‘no’ to 
a loan for which there isn’t any subsequent default. But those are 
only errors if we think that the program’s ‘yes’ means ‘yes, this loan 
is safe from default’ and its ‘no’ means ‘no, this loan isn’t safe from 
default’. If the machine has changed, by virtue of the new re inforce-
ment pattern, from being a default detector to being a costly 
default detector, then its ‘yes’ now means ‘yes, this loan is safe 
from costly default’, and it isn’t, in fact, making more mistakes.
The revised bit of financial software is a hit—bank profits go up 
as costly defaults are avoided. Encouraged, you look for further 
such modifications in your financial detector. You have a few 
ideas—maybe you could train it to minimize some product of 
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size- of- default and low- size- of- bank- financial- reserves, or maybe 
you could train it to minimize loss of potential interest earnings, 
so that false negatives are allowed to increase when interest rates 
go up. But you’re a programmer, not a financial wizard—you 
worry that while you’ve got a few ideas about what loan features 
should be detected, you might be missing important features. (Or 
making horrible mistakes about what features to fixate on—
maybe for subtle financial reasons you don’t grasp, it would be a 
disaster to bias towards giving out more loans when interest rates 
are high.)
So you have another idea. Why not just use the overall financial 
state of the bank as the feedback mechanism for your program? 
Let it experiment with accepting and rejecting loan applications in 
various ways, and just let it know as it accepts and rejects how the 
bank is doing. That way, if increasing loans when interest rates are 
high is a good idea for overall bank health, the program can hope-
fully eventually get on to that pattern. But if that’s not a good idea 
for overall bank health, the program will avoid looking for that 
pattern. No need for you to use your own defective financial 
understanding in picking a pattern for the program to detect.
After much training, the new system goes into effect, and it’s a 
big success. Bank profit margins, when making loans following 
the advice of the new system, go up sharply. The bank CEO comes 
by to ask you about this great new piece of software, and asks you 
what the program is looking for when considering a loan applica-
tion. This looks like a hard question to answer. You used to know 
what the program was looking for—originally it was looking for 
loan applications with a high probability of default, and then it 
was looking for loan applications that it would be costly to accept. 
But with your final revisions, there’s some important sense in 
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which you don’t know any more what the program is looking for. 
Maybe you were right and it’s good to accept more loan applica-
tions when interest rates are high, and thus maybe the program is 
now looking for some feature involving interest rates. But you 
can’t tell easily—you’d have to look over thousands of loan re com-
menda tions by the program to see if that pattern does indeed 
emerge. And that’s only one thing the program might be looking 
for; one that happened to occur to you. Who knows what other 
subtle patterns might be hidden in the program’s decisions?
Why This Story is Disturbing and Relevant
It now looks like you’re in a somewhat disturbing situation, 
because in some important sense:
A. you no longer know what the program is looking for, and 
thus you don’t know what the program means when it 
gives a positive or a negative verdict; and
B. control over what content the program is using, what 
category it is testing for, has been taken out of the hands of 
you, the programmer, and given over to the program.
We could try to avoid this conclusion by saying that the program 
is investigating some high- level abstract goal. You trained the final 
version of the program by giving it information about the overall 
financial health of the bank and then asking it to approve or reject 
loan applications depending on whether they improved that 
financial health. So maybe that’s what gives the content of the 
program’s verdicts. Maybe when the program says ‘yes’ to an 
application, it is characterizing that application as ‘a loan that will 
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improve the overall financial health of the bank’ (rather than as ‘a 
loan unlikely to be defaulted on’). More generally, can’t we always 
just ask what you trained the program to do, by asking what kind 
of scoring mechanism you used for its decisions, and then just 
read off from that what the content of its decisions are? If that’s 
right, the contents of the states of a program can change, but not 
in any mysterious way—they change only when we change how 
we evaluate program outputs.
But here are two worries about this ‘high- level content’ 
response.
First, it seems like it’s missing something important to attribute 
only the high- level content to the program. Set aside software for 
a moment. Suppose the bank hires a (human) financial advisor, 
and asks him to figure out rules for which loan applications should 
and shouldn’t grant in order to maximize the financial health of 
the bank. The financial advisor hides away in his office for a while 
studying volumes of data about old loan applications, and eventu-
ally declares himself ready and starts evaluating loan applications. 
Things go very well—the loan decisions the advisor makes are 
working out to the advantage of the bank. So we ask him what the 
method is—what feature of applications does he look for in deter-
mining which ones to accept?
If he tells us that he looks for loan applications that have the 
property ‘will improve the financial health of the bank’ (mention-
ing, perhaps, that that is after all exactly what we asked him to 
find), we will feel that he is holding out on us, and not telling us the 
property that he’s really looking for. What we want to say is that 
he’s looking for some unknown property P, and he’s looking for 
that property because having that property contributes to the over-
arching goal of improving the bank’s financial health. The 
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overarching goal doesn’t set the content of his rules—rather, it 
gives the reason for his rules having the content that they do 
(whatever that is).
Similarly with the software. To say that it’s detecting the prop-
erty ‘improves the financial health of the bank’ seems like it’s con-
fusing what property it’s detecting with why it is detecting that 
property. If that’s right, then we don’t know what property the 
program is detecting, and can’t directly control what property it’s 
detecting.
A second worry is this: the high- level content approach depends 
on us at least knowing what the scoring mechanism is for the pro-
gram. But maybe that doesn’t always happen. Suppose the finan-
cial software is designed so that in addition to changing its sorting 
procedures, it can also change its scoring mechanism. So we don’t 
tell it to start favouring detection categories that maximize the 
overall financial health of the bank—it changes its own scoring 
mechanism to start favouring those categories. Of course, if the 
program isn’t going to behave randomly, its own changes in scor-
ing mechanism need to be rule- governed in some way. So perhaps 
the programmers give the program a second- order scoring mech-
anism for evaluating how well its choices of scoring mechanisms 
are doing. In that case there’s an even- higher- level content that we 
could ascribe to the system: the program is detecting objects as 
‘being things that maximize fit with respect to some criterion that 
maximizes achievement of goal G’, where goal G is what we’ve 
encoded in the second- order scoring mechanism.
And, of course, we can ascend another level to a third- order 
scoring mechanism, which lets the program pick its own second- 
 order mechanism for assessing its own choices of first- order scor-
ing mechanisms for assessing its own choices of classifications, 
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and then test that choice against our third- order criterion. Again, 
a very abstract higher- order characterization of the content of the 
machine verdicts can be given in this way, but any worries we 
already had about whether this abstract higher- order content is 
missing something important are only going to be made worse.
There’s no limit to how many levels we can ascend. One limit 
point of this procedure has us switching over from a supervised 
learning software design to an unsupervised learning data mining 
design. The unsupervised learner starts with a kind of higher- 
 order scoring rule, which just characterizes certain kinds of very 
abstract mathematical structure in the data as being good. It then 
looks for such structure in the data, and characterizes things in 
terms of that structure. Then it looks at that characterization and 
again looks for the desired kinds of structure in it. And so on, 
until, hopefully, some interesting large- scale patterns start to 
emerge. We might set such a data miner to work on a large history 
of loan applications and other financial information about the 
bank, and then try out using its classifications in making decisions 
about approving and rejecting loans. If things work out well using 
its classifications like this, we could then conclude that the 
machine is getting on to some feature worth attending to, without 
having any idea what that feature is, and thus without having any 
idea of what the program is telling us.
Taking Stock and General Lessons
It would be great to know even in these cases of complex dynamic 
shifting of program contents what these programs are telling us. 
After all, we may be handing off control over large aspects of our 
lives to such systems. If we’re going to be denying someone a loan 
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to buy a house based on the output of some program, it would be 
nice if we could tell that person something about why their loan 
was denied, what it was about them that made them not loan- 
 worthy. If we’re going to begin an aggressive course of medical 
intervention on someone based on the output of some program, 
it would be nice if we could tell that person something about why 
that medical intervention was called for, what it was about them 
that was unwell or would be made better. In the limiting case, if we 
hand off control over judgements to machine learning systems 
with dynamically shifting goals that we can’t understand, there 
may be no reason to expect that the things that we’re told to do are 
things that we ought to do in any sense.
Dynamically shifting program contents, in short, give us spe-
cial reasons for wanting a good story about what makes programs 
about the things they are about and a good story about how to 
find out what programs are about, but also special reasons for 
thinking that it may be particularly difficult to get the good stories 
that we want.
The Extended Mind and AI Concept Possession
Background: The Extended Mind and Active Externalism
In this book we have drawn heavily on the externalist tradition in 
metasemantics. It’s a tradition that traces back to the work of 
Millikan, Kripke, Marcus, Putnam, and Burge. There is, however, 
another tradition that uses the term ‘externalism’. In a brief but 
massively influential paper, Andy Clark and David Chalmers 
defend what they call ‘active externalism’. They argue for the view 
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that the environment, what is found beyond the skull/bone 
boundary, can drive cognitive processes. Their form of external-
ism is one in which ‘the human organism is linked with an exter-
nal entity in a two- way interaction, creating a coupled system that 
can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right’ (1998: 8). The 
result of this is a view according to which various external devices 
(which can include AI systems) should, under certain circum-
stances, be seen not just as cognitive tools, but as integral parts of 
human cognitive processes. They apply this view not just to cog-
nitive processing, but also to, for example, beliefs. If a device 
external to skull/bone ‘contains’ information and an agent is 
appropriately related to that external device, then that informa-
tion can be one of the agent’s belief. For example, on the assump-
tion that Lucie’s phone is appropriately related to her, and that the 
phone contains the information that Nora lives in Pokfulam, then 
Lucie believes that Nora lives in Pokfulam, even if that informa-
tion is inaccessible to her without the help of her phone. The 
phone, on this view, is an extension of Nora’s mind, on par with 
the synapses and whatever else is doing work inside Nora’s skull 
and bone. Clark and Chalmers say that this kind of view enables us 
to ‘see ourselves more truly as creatures of the world’ (1998: 18). It 
is a corollary of the view that we should also see the self as extended 
beyond skull and bone. The external tools that are parts of Lucie’s 
mind are parts of her—they are her in the same sense as her brain 
or ear is her.
Clark and Chalmers emphasise that the external device plays 
‘an active causal role’, in the following sense: the system as a whole 
(what’s inside skull/bone + the device + the relationship between 
the device and what’s inside skull/bone) jointly influence actions. 
This is, in all relevant respects, similar to what cognition usually 
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does: ‘Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts equally 
well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head.’
The Extended Mind and Conceptual Competency
The kinds of externalisms we have relied on earlier in this book do 
not directly engage with action in the way, e.g. external electronic 
devices can do on Clark and Chalmers’ view. For example, the distal 
sources of Kripkean causal chains (the dubbings) are not causing a 
speaker or thinker to turn left rather than right as she is walking 
down the street. Information on the iPhone, on the other hand, 
could have that kind of active impact on an agent’s action. Hence 
the term ‘active externalism’. As in the earlier part of this book, we 
will conditionally endorse this form of active externalism.
There has been a great deal of discussion and development of 
the Extended Mind Thesis and we will simply bypass that discus-
sion. We want to focus on one potential corollary of the view that, 
to our knowledge, has not been extensively explored. Can the 
extended mind also have extended conceptual capacities? More 
specifically: suppose, as we have argued, that AIs can have con-
ceptual content and conceptual competency. That view, com-
bined with the Extended Mind Thesis, has as a corollary that we 
get/inherit that conceptual competency from those AIs that are 
part of our minds.
From Experts Determining Meaning to Artificial  
Intelligences Determining Meaning
There is a way into this that doesn’t require appeal to the Extended 
Mind Thesis. Suppose you are sympathetic to Putnam or Burge’s 
fou r conclu ding t hough ts
151
style varieties of passive externalism. Putnam’s slogan was ‘Meanings 
ain’t in the head’. That raises the question: where are they? The 
answer is either nowhere or somewhere outside the head. If we insist on 
something location- like, what we typically get is an appeal to 
experts. Experts, we are told, have the authority to determine the 
extension of e.g. predicates for natural kinds. In Burge’s arthritis 
example, the community of medical experts have made it the case 
that the term ‘arthritis’ denotes ailments of the joints.
If you are on board with this view, and you are on board with 
our view that artificial systems could have contents, then the 
meanings could be located in artificial experts as well as human 
experts. This is a very natural move and it is independent of the 
endorsement of the Extended Mind Thesis. One source of objec-
tions to that view is that artificial agents don’t have meanings or 
representational capacities. We have argued against that view. If 
you’re on board with our arguments, the step from Putnam to AIs 
determining meanings isn’t that radical.
Some New Distinctions: Extended Mind Internalist  
versus Extended Mind Externalists
Here are two interpretations of the core part of Putnam’s exter-
nalism that are typically not clearly distinguished:
P1:   meanings are not located inside the speakers skull/bone.
P2: meanings are not ‘in’ the speaker’s mind.
A simplistic assumption to the effect that the mind is ‘inside’ the 
skull/bone would equate P1 and P2. If you endorse the Extended 
Mind Thesis, you could deny P1 and endorse P2. More generally, a 
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broader range of possible positions open up when thinking about 
meaning externalism. Here are some of those options:
• Extended mind internalist: meanings are located in 
(supervene upon) the extended mind.
• Extended mind externalist: meanings do not supervene 
on what’s in the extended mind.
• Skull/bone internalist: meanings supervene on what’s 
inside skull/bone.
• Skull/bone externalist: meaning do not supervene on 
what’s inside skull/bone.
Note that a skull/bone externalist can endorse either extended 
mind internalism or extended mind internalism.
Kripke, Putnam, and Burge as Extended  
Mind Internalists
Classical externalists like Putnam, Burge, and Kripke all seem like 
they would most naturally be classified as extended mind exter-
nalists. The reason for this is that the communicative chains that 
Kripke appeals to don’t play the same kind of active role as the 
various kinds of external devices that Clark and Chalmers use as 
their paradigms (e.g. notebooks and phones that are used to guide 
behaviour on a regular basis). The experts who play a meaning- 
 constitutive role for Putnam and Burge are similarly distal.
However, on further reflection, this is not at all obvious. A lot 
will depend on how the relationship to external devices is 
understood. On that point, Clark and Chalmers are extremely 
open- minded—more so than is typically recognized. When 
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summarizing the relationship, R, that they suggest needs to obtain 
between an external device and an agent for that device to be part 
of the extended mind, they first mention four factors:
Constancy: ‘. . . the notebook is a constant in Otto’s life—in 
cases where the information in the notebook would be rele-
vant, he will rarely take action without consulting it.’ (17)
Ease of access: ‘. . . the information in the notebook is directly 
available without difficulty.’ (17)
Automatic endorsement: ‘. . . upon retrieving information 
from the notebook he automatically endorses it.’ (17)
Conscious endorsement in the past: ‘. . . the information in 
the notebook has been consciously endorsed at some point in 
the past, and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorse-
ment.’ (17)
These four factors, however, are simply presented as salient gener-
alizations of some features of the examples discussed in the paper 
and not given a theoretical justification. A full theory would need 
a justification for each of these, discussions of other options, and 
precisification. Clark and Chalmers are aware of this. Towards the 
end of the paper, their view becomes very liberal and open- ended. 
They say that what is part of the extended mind can be in de ter-
min ate. They say that being part of the extended mind might 
come in degrees: something can be a bit, but not fully, part of 
someone’s mind. Finally, whether something is part of the 
extended mind could depend on context and in particular it could 
depend on the question under discussion. In a certain conversa-
tional setting, E might be part of A’s extended mind, but in other 
conversational settings E might be excluded:
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In intermediate cases, the question of whether a belief is present 
may be indeterminate, or the answer may depend on the varying 
standards that are at play in various contexts in which the question 
might be asked. (17)
In another passage they say that other people could, in certain 
context, for certain purposes, when certain questions are under 
discussion, be part of an agent’s extended mind:
[T]he waiter at my favorite restaurant might act as a repository 
of my beliefs about my favorite meals (this might even be con-
strued as a case of extended desire). In other cases, one’s beliefs 
might be embodied in one’s secretary, one’s accountant, or one’s 
col lab or ator. (17–18)
Putting aside Clark and Chalmers’ view, it should be clear that the 
exact nature of the relation an external phenomenon needs to 
stand in to a person in order to be part of that person’s extended 
mind is unsettled. It is unsettled not just in the sense that we know 
too little about it, and so haven’t found the answer. It is also unset-
tled in that our concept of ‘mind’, ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘memory’, and 
so on are in flux. Those concepts will evolve in part with the way 
we interact and engage with technology. A full exploration of this 
would go very far beyond anything we can cover, but we end this 
section with a couple of conjecture/proposals:
1. For certain purposes having to do with attribution of 
conceptual competency, other people, e.g. experts, can be 
part of an agent’s extended mind. Suppose the expert 
opinion is very easily available in a reliable way (say 
through a device for accessing information on the internet) 
and suppose the agent defers in various ways to those 
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experts. This doesn’t look too different from the waiter or 
accountant case.
2. Speakers who are part of Kripkean communicative chains 
are in constant causal contact with that chain and, according 
to Kripke, intend to refer to whatever was at the begin-
ning of the chain. The connection to the communicative 
chains is constant, easy, automatic, and deferential. So, 
when questions of conceptual competence comes up, 
causal communicative chains can be part of our extended 
mind.
If these hypotheses are correct, then Kripke, Putnam, and Burge 
should be classified as internalists in our new sense, i.e. they are 
extended mind internalists. Of course, we have made them inter-
nalists, by radically extending our notion of the internal. Rather 
than see the content- determining factors as factors outside the 
mind- determining content, we have extended the mind to include 
the content- determining factors.
Concept Possession, Functionalism, and Ways of Life
Here is a natural thought: the kinds of concepts we have are related 
to the kinds of creatures we are and our way of life. Our concep-
tual repertoire is, in part, determined by us being certain kinds of 
animals, with certain kinds of inputs (in large part determined by 
our perceptual capacities), and certain kinds of outputs (our actions 
often involve movements of our physical bodies). Functionalists 
pick up on this basic idea and tie contents to the kinds of inputs 
and outputs that are possible for us. These functional roles, that 
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are meaning determining, are fixed by the kinds of creatures we 
are and our way of life.
However, if extended internalism is true, then this is less of a 
limitation: we start out as certain kinds of animal with certain 
input and output capacities. Then we extend ourselves using, for 
example, artificial intelligence. This extension means that the 
range of contents we can entertain is extended because our pos-
sible input and output functions have been extended. This is 
because what we are has changed and our way of life has changed, 
as a result of ourselves being extended.
Implications for the View Defended in This Book
The strategy in this book has been to start with anthropocentric 
views in metasemantics, do some de- anthropocentrizing, and 
then try to apply the result to artificial intelligences. The Extended 
Mind Thesis suggests a complimentary strategy: incorporate! We 
have been assuming that whatever the AIs are doing isn’t what we 
humans are doing and so we need to find some common process 
at a higher level of abstraction (the abstractive sweet spot). The 
alternative strategy just explored thinks of those AIs as potential 
(at least to some degree and in some contexts) parts of our minds. 
If those AIs are part of our minds (or rather: their processes are 
cognitive processes on par with what’s happening inside skull/
bone), then they are part of us (in the extended sense of us) and so 
what they are doing is what we are doing.
The effort to understand alien content determination thus 
becomes an effort to understand our own extended mind’s con-
tent determination. That is a very useful perspective from which 
to approach these issues, but the issues that need resolution will 
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be roughly the same as those discussed earlier in this book. Our 
aim will be to get a grip on how hard to understand extended parts 
of us (e.g. the artificially created neural network that, to some 
degree and in some contexts, are parts of our extended mind) 
determine content. Seen in that light, the project pursued in this 
book is an exercise in extended- self- examination.
An Objection Revisited
We return briefly to an important thought that was behind some of 
Alfred’s objections in Chapter 2. He was resisting the idea that ques-
tions about content had significance for his work in AI. We man-
aged to persuade Alfred to take an interest in some of the 
philo soph ic al issues we have outlined above, but of course, the way 
we wrote and ended that dialogue was self- serving: we gave our-
selves what we needed. In some sense, we didn’t do Alfred (or 
Alfred’s position) justice. In particular, we didn’t help him articulate 
an alternative to the content- focused picture that we have been 
pushing throughout. The objection we will now briefly address is 
this: Alfred should have focused on the notion of evidence or 
 reliability—that’s the alternative to a content- driven approach.
Here’s a way to articulate that alternative:
The No- Content- Just- Evidence view: Once StopSignDetector has been 
thoroughly trained on an initial sample of photographs pre- labelled 
as stop signs or not, we should then take the output of 
StopSignDetector as evidence that something is a stop sign, without 
thinking of StopSignDetector as having outputs whose content 
involves stop signs. StopSignDetector is, if nothing else, a reliable 
detector of stop signs. It is reasonable for us to form beliefs on the 
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basis of the outputs of reliable detectors. Reliable systems can serve 
as a form of evidence.
This view should be explored. It’s an interesting alternative to the 
strategy defended in this book. So far, our aim has not been on 
developing direct objections to the No- Content- Just- Evidence 
view, but rather to make an indirect case against it by developing 
various pro- content alternatives. Those advocating for the No- 
 Content- Just- Evidence should do the same: develop positive 
 models that integrate theory of evidence and reliability with the 
nature and use of AI. Note that this is again a fundamentally philo-
soph ic al project: it places philosophy at the centre of an under-
standing of AI. Those trained in computer programming, for 
example, are not trained to think about the nature of evidence, 
reliability, and how to apply theories of these phenomena to the 
output and use of AI. A defence of No- Content- Just- Evidence view 
would involve a shift in focus from the metaphysics of content to 
the theory of evidence and reliability. For some initial literature on 
this, see Kelly (2014) and references therein.
Reply to the Objection
While we welcome an exploration of the No- Content- Just- Evidence 
view, we are sceptical. We think it faces some serious obstacles, and 
in the next couple of pages we briefly outline some of these.
What Makes it a Stop Sign Detector?
The Evidence view, as we articulated it above, assumed that the 
system in question was a reliable stop sign detector. It is not, 
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however, clear that we are entitled to that assumption. In some 
im port ant sense, we have no idea what the mechanism is by 
which StopSignDetector reacts as it does. All we really know is 
that StopSignDetector has some unbelievably complicated 
neur al network, with connections and connection weights 
developed over millions of rounds of training, that somehow or 
other filter through the incoming data from a photograph (ini-
tially presented in some data form or other—an array of pixel 
values, for example) to work out activation levels culminating in 
the light blinking or not.
The best we can say is that there is some structural property or 
other of photographs that StopSignDetector is really detecting. That 
structural property presumably is some enormously complicated 
property about hugely computationally demanding relations 
among many different aspects of the incoming numerically given 
data—almost certainly a property that no human mind could 
ever really grasp, and possibly a property that there isn’t even a 
way to express in a human language. Call that structural property 
S. (Now there’s a way to express it in our language!) If the existence 
of S is helping us decide that StopSignDetector is genuinely dis-
posed to react to stop sign pictures, then we must have some rea-
son to think that S and stop signs are reliably correlated—that, in 
general, when we get a new photograph of a stop sign, it’s prob-
ably going to have property S.
But why would we think that? The training of StopSignDetector 
doesn’t look like it gives us a good reason to accept it. Here’s what 
we learn from the training. There are two big piles of test cases 
that StopSignDetector was trained on—call them the positive 
cases and the negative cases. Property S, whatever it is, must then 
be a property that most of the positive cases have and most of the 
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negative cases don’t have.1 What reason, then, do we have to think 
that the particular property S that StopSignDetector got hooked 
onto is reliably correlated with stop signs?
Adversarial Perturbations
We don’t need to rely on abstract theoretical considerations like 
these. There is a growing body of work on adversarial per turba-
tions (see, for example, Goodfellow et al 2014) and their impact on 
machine learning image recognition systems. Adversarial per-
turba tions provide methods of making small alterations in images 
that result in a machine learning system going from a very high 
success rate in classification to a very low success rate. Adversarial 
perturbations can involve small alterations in the photograph that 
don’t significantly impact human identification abilities—adding 
a few bits of coloured tape here and there to the object to be identi-
fied, for example, or slightly rotating the angle of photograph. Or 
they can involve adding a masking layer of pixels over the original 
photograph that the human eye can’t even detect, but that causes 
massive misclassification by the machine learning system.
Note that to say that adversarial perturbations cause misclassifi-
cation isn’t really right, in the current context. It’s a misclassifica-
tion only if the system was really (for example) a stop sign detector, 
so that the adversarial perturbation is causing the system to get 
1 If there were any doubt about this, note that two different machine learning 
systems can be trained on the same data, using neural network systems with a 
stochastic element, and go on to make slightly different distinctions among new 
cases. That shows that they are really detecting different underlying structural 
properties. And not necessarily slightly different such properties—the detected 
structural properties could be radically different from one another, but have only 
slightly different distributions among the cases we’ve tested so far.
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things wrong by saying that things that really are stop signs aren’t 
stop signs. But that way of putting things is loaded up with 
content- based talk about what the machine really detects and 
says, and the current dispositional line is meant to be a replace-
ment for that talk. From the current perspective, what’s going on 
is that adversarial perturbations are revealing what structural 
property S the machine is really tracking.
The worry, then, is that if StopSignDetector can be easily made 
to blink for non- stop- signs, or not to blink for stop signs, through 
using some adversarial perturbation that a human classifier would 
never even notice, then it’s not clear that StopSignDetector is 
really disposed to blink when presented with a stop sign. The 
adversarial perturbation brings out the possibility of property S 
and the property of being a stop sign coming apart.
The general lesson: lots of things are statistically correlated 
with lots of other things. Dispositions require more than that. 
Dispositions require that the correlations be reliable, so that new 
cases will continue the correlation. When there’s some under-
lying causal structure that created the correlation, we have a rea-
son to think that it’s reliable, even if we don’t fully understand 
how the causal connection works. But in the machine learning 
case, we don’t have any reason to think that there is a causal con-
nection to support the disposition. That’s because we do have rea-
son to think that there’s a different causal connection (one we 
don’t fully understand) between some obscure structural prop-
erty S and the machine learning outputs. Because we know there’s 
that causal connection, it trumps the possibility of the causal con-
nection we really want (but aren’t getting). So we have to fall back 
on the coincidental convergence of weird structural properties 
and our target properties on the training cases—but the 
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coincidental convergence doesn’t give us reason to treat the sys-
tem as reliable for new cases.
This is in no way a conclusive argument to the effect that the 
No- Evidence view could work. It is, however, conclusive evi-
dence that doing so is far from trivial. It requires deep engage-
ment with philosophy. The final view will rely on a theory of 
what dispositions are, what reliability is, and the connection 
between evidence and reliability. We’ll end this brief reply with 
a suggestive conjecture: When you have a satisfactory theory of 
that kind—one that responds to all these concerns—you have 
in effect come very close to constructing a theory of content 
again. According to this conjecture, the Evidence and the Content 
strategies will merge.
Explainable AI and Metasemantics
In the first chapter, we connected the topics of this book to the 
issues that come up in connection with the aim of achieving so- 
 called explainable AI. ‘Explainable AI’ indicates a desire to ensure 
that decisions and other kinds of input made by AIs are not just 
handed down to us as from an oracle. If an AI system tells us that 
Lucie should not get a mortgage, she is entitled to understand why 
she should not get a mortgage. To answer the why- question by 
simply insisting that the decision was made by a reliable but 
incomprehensible algorithm isn’t good enough. Lucie should also 
be able to understand why without having to perform the 
in human task of working through all the calculations made by an 
extremely complex neural network. She is entitled to receive a 
justifying reason for the rejection.
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Even if everything we have said so far in this book is along the 
right track, we haven’t succeeded in giving Lucie a procedure for 
getting a justification from SmartCredit. If we have succeeded, we 
have shown how SmartCredit can say that Lucie is high risk. That 
leaves us far short of getting a justification for why she is high risk. 
We have revealed nothing of the internal reasoning that might 
have gone into producing that output.
So did we engage in false advertising when we raised the prospect 
of illuminating explainable AI? Not really. We didn’t claim we were 
going to show how explainable AI is possible. We did claim that our 
work could contribute to an understanding of how explainable AI 
could be possible. Here is how we see the connection:
1. Without content, there are no reasons. Reasons are things 
with content.2 The natural way to think about the 
2 Actually, this is a bit controversial. While this book is not the place to get to 
grip with the vast and ever increasing literature on reasons, we’d just like to make 
clear that the above is a vast simplification that elides many important distinctions 
which any proper treatment of the topic will need to make room for. For example, 
a much- discussed question in the theory of reasons is taxonomic: how many dif-
ferent types of reason are there? To take an example from Alvarez’s (2016) over-
view on the topic, reducing child obesity might be a reason for the government to 
tax sugary drinks in one sense, but a perfectly fine answer as to for what reason the 
government in fact taxed drinks in the winter of 2019 is because after the election 
the legislative body became filled with people who owned shares in bottled water 
companies. Roughly, the former would be a normative reason (something count-
ing in favour of something in the abstract) while the latter a motivating one (some-
thing that in fact brought about a particular course in action). For a bit more on the 
distinction, see the opening pages of Dancy (2000).
Equally important are questions about the ontology of reasons. We’ve 
assumed they are items with representational content. It’s the subject of further 
work exactly how that will work in the AI setting, because at least some of the 
literature has it that some reasons (normative ones) are non- representational 
entities like facts (Raz 1975 and Scanlon 1998). Moreover, a popular view about 
motivating reasons is that they are mental states (e.g. Audi 2001 and Mele 2003), 
and though this doesn’t immediately cause a problem for us, there might be 
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 explainability desideratum is this: the AI says something—
e.g. that Lucie is high risk. Then Lucie is entitled to a 
justification of that claim. For that entitlement to make 
sense, the system must have said something (namely that 
Lucie is high risk). If there’s no saying, there’s nothing to 
justify. Moreover, the reasons themselves are contentful. So 
we need content both to have something to justify and in 
order to have something that can do the justifying. Here is 
what we have done: we have provided a strategy for estab-
lishing that the system can perform sayings. In so doing, 
we have shown how to take the first step towards 
 explainability.
2. Explainability requires not just the generic possibility of 
content attribution, but also a procedure for determining 
specific contents. We need to know exactly what the 
system said before we can ask it to give a reason for what it 
said. The most central claim in this book is that such 
content cannot be found by looking at the internal 
computational structure of the system. It can only be 
found by looking at external factors of the kinds that the 
externalist tradition in metasemantics appeals to. It is hard 
to over empha size this point. The story about AI content is 
not substantially different from the human story: in neither 
case do we find content by looking at internal computational 
architecture.
questions to be asked about how AI, presumably lacking mental states, can be 
present in the space of reasons. As mentioned, here isn’t the place (and we 
aren’t the authors) to decide these issues. We are just flagging some important 
distinctions an acceptable philosophical treatment of explainability will need 
to grapple with.
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We end with a brief explanation of what an account of reason giv-
ing (and justification) for a decision (or output) would require. 
First a reminder of some issues that would have to be resolved in 
order to present such a theory.
• The philosophical tradition distinguishes between at least 
three kinds of reasons for actions: normative reasons, 
motivating reasons, and explanatory reasons.3 How to 
characterize each of these is a matter of ongoing dispute. So 
a first question to be settled is whether it is any of these is 
what we are looking for. Should we, for example, be 
modelling AI explainability on explanatory or motivating 
reasons in humans? If the answer to either question is yes, 
then a theory of explainable AI could incorporate an 
existing theory of motivating or explanatory reasons.
• Alternatively, a theory of AI explainability could develop a 
new such theory, maybe by engaging in some form of 
de- anthropocentrizing, on analogy with what we have done 
for metasemantics in this book.
3 Often motivating and explanatory reasons are often classified together. We 
are sympathetic to those who prefer to keep them apart. Maria Alvarez in the SEP 
entry ‘Reasons for Actions’ nicely summarizes one argument for the distinction: 
‘The fact that John knows that Peter has betrayed him is a reason that explains 
John’s action. This is an explanatory reason. But that fact about John’s mental 
state of knowledge is not the reason for which John punches Peter. That reason is 
a fact about Peter, namely that he has betrayed John. That is the reason that 
mo tiv ates John to punch Peter—his motivating reason. So in this case we have 
two different (though related) reasons: that Peter has betrayed John and that John 
knows that Peter has betrayed him, which play different roles. One reason mo tiv-
ates John to punch Peter (the betrayal); and the other explains why he does it (the 
knowledge of the betrayal)’ (Alvarez 2016: section 3).
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Back to the human case: we humans have asked for and provided 
reasons (and justifications) for a very long time. It is an activity 
that is at the core of how humans relate to each other. That is in 
part why it is something we care about in connection with AIs. 
Here is a basic fact about the cluster of activities that we call 
‘giving reasons’ or ‘explaining’ or ‘justifying’:
Important and indisputable fact about human explainability: 
Humans have been able to explain and justify their own (and 
 others) actions/decisions without relying on any knowledge of the 
internal structure of the neural network that constitutes (part of) 
their brains. Human explainability succeeds in the absence of any 
knowledge about the internal computational structure of the 
human brain.
What this tells us is that knowledge of internal computational 
structure is unnecessary for explainability. It is, however, exceed-
ingly tempting to conclude also more broadly that such know-
ledge is irrelevant to explainability. If so, it’s a mistake to approach 
the goal of explainable AI by careful investigation into the compu-
tational structure of the AI’s neural network. That kind of inter-
nalism is bound to fail and it will never lead to the space of reasons.
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